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41 lines
2.0 KiB
Markdown
41 lines
2.0 KiB
Markdown
# Audit tenant, authentication, and request security boundaries
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Type: research
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Status: resolved
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## Question
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Can any current HTTP, Feishu, filesystem, agent, or database path cross an
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Organization boundary, bypass the intended platform/org/project authorization
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seams, expose secrets, or accept unbounded hostile input in the initial
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production topology?
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## Answer
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Yes. Basic org-admin HTTP/Prisma scoping is correctly enforced and its 28
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targeted integration tests pass, but the agent inherits service secrets and can
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read sibling files, MCP file/context tools accept real targets outside the run
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objects, queued/card actions do not consistently bind or reauthorize their
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target, non-ACTIVE tenants can still trigger agents, and Feishu/provider
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credentials remain global instead of ADR-0021 org-scoped encrypted secrets.
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Current Node and Rust dependency audits also fail on high/vulnerability/unsound
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advisories.
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The complete contract mapping, reproductions, positive evidence, advisory
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inventory, and required release proofs are in the
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[tenant, authentication, and request security audit](../assets/tenant-auth-security-audit.md).
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The newly-clear implementation and decision frontier is:
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- [Confine the agent runtime and protect service credentials](16-confine-agent-and-protect-credentials.md)
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- [Close MCP context and file-delivery escape paths](17-close-mcp-data-egress-escapes.md)
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- [Bind and reauthorize deferred and card actions](18-bind-and-reauthorize-deferred-actions.md)
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- [Design the org-scoped secret and connection control plane](19-design-org-scoped-secret-control-plane.md)
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- [Design the production browser and session boundary](20-design-production-web-session-boundary.md)
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- [Clear dependency advisories and gate releases](21-clear-dependency-security-advisories.md)
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- [Enforce Organization status at the shared authorization seam](22-enforce-organization-status.md)
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Inbound Feishu file count/size/MIME and request-rate policy remain owned by
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[Define initial abuse and capacity controls](05-define-abuse-capacity-controls.md)
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rather than being guessed in this audit.
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