fix: prove Linux Agent sandbox boundary

This commit is contained in:
2026-07-10 17:59:56 +08:00
parent f4968d6657
commit f07f280b8f
19 changed files with 381 additions and 55 deletions
+19 -1
View File
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ describe("agent subprocess security policy", () => {
expect(policy.env).not.toHaveProperty("HUB_SESSION_SECRET");
expect(policy.env.HOME).toMatch(new RegExp(`^${escapeRegExp(canonicalWorkspace)}/`));
expect(policy.env.CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR).toMatch(new RegExp(`^${escapeRegExp(canonicalWorkspace)}/`));
expect(policy.env.CLAUDE_CODE_TMPDIR).toMatch(new RegExp(`^${escapeRegExp(canonicalWorkspace)}/`));
expect(policy.env.CLAUDE_CODE_TMPDIR).toBe(join(".cph", "t"));
expect(policy.sandbox).toMatchObject({
enabled: true,
@@ -81,6 +81,24 @@ describe("agent subprocess security policy", () => {
})).rejects.toThrow("unsupported provider environment variable: DATABASE_URL");
});
it("keeps the short SDK socket directory inside the project workspace", async () => {
const { workspaceRoot, workspace } = await makeWorkspace();
const policy = await createAgentSecurityPolicy({
workspaceRoot,
workspaceDir: workspace,
hostEnv: { PATH: "/usr/bin:/bin" },
});
expect(policy.env.CLAUDE_CODE_TMPDIR).toBe(join(".cph", "t"));
const absoluteTemp = join(await realpath(workspace), ".cph", "t");
expect(policy.env.TMPDIR).toBe(absoluteTemp);
expect(policy.env.TMP).toBe(absoluteTemp);
expect(policy.env.TEMP).toBe(absoluteTemp);
expect(policy.sandbox.filesystem.allowWrite).toEqual([await realpath(workspace)]);
expect(policy.sandbox.filesystem.denyWrite).toEqual(["/"]);
expect(policy.sandbox.filesystem.allowRead).not.toContain(expect.stringMatching(/^\/run\//));
});
it("rejects a project workspace whose real path escapes the configured workspace root", async () => {
const { root, workspaceRoot } = await makeWorkspace();
const outside = join(root, "outside");