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curriculum-project-hub/hub/src/agent/runner.ts
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TypeScript

/**
* Claude Code SDK agent runner.
*
* Uses `@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk`'s `query()` as the agent loop. The SDK
* owns tool dispatch, context compaction, streaming — we just map its events
* to the Feishu streaming callback.
*
* Built-in tools (Read, Write, Bash, Glob, Grep) cover our entire tool surface:
* - read_file → Read
* - write_file → Write
* - list_files → Glob
* - cph_check / cph_build → Bash (`cph check .`, `cph build . --target student`)
* No custom tools needed — the SDK's Bash tool runs cph directly.
*
* ADR-0017 update: this drops provider-agnosticism. Claude Code SDK is
* Anthropic-specific. The tradeoff: we get compaction, tool approval, partial
* message streaming, and a battle-tested agent loop — capabilities we'd have
* to build ourselves with a generic provider.
*
* ADR-0018: the agent execution surface is bounded by the run's workspace.
* The SDK sandbox (bubblewrap on Linux, seatbelt on macOS) confines the Claude
* Code process and its subprocesses at the OS level — writes, including the
* SDK's Unix-socket scratch, are confined to the workspace. Host reads are
* denied by default and re-opened only for the workspace plus named system
* runtimes, and `failIfUnavailable` hard-fails if the sandbox can't start. The
* subprocess gets a minimal environment and SDK credential protection removes
* provider secrets from Bash. This upholds `AgentFileOp.Authorized`
* (ADR-0018 / `Spec.System.AgentSurface`) without re-implementing the
* `workspace.ts` `confine()` path validator as a tool wrapper — the OS sandbox
* is the mechanism, the contract pins the invariant.
*/
import { query, type HookCallback, type McpServerConfig, type SDKMessage, type SDKAssistantMessage, type SDKUserMessage, type SDKResultMessage, type SDKPartialAssistantMessage, type SDKSystemMessage } from "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk";
import type { PrismaClient } from "@prisma/client";
import { claudeSdkToolConfigForRole } from "./roleTools.js";
import { createAgentSecurityPolicy } from "./security.js";
import type { RoleSkillEntry } from "./models.js";
export interface ProjectContext {
readonly projectId: string;
readonly boundChatId: string;
readonly workspaceRoot?: string | undefined;
readonly workspaceDir: string;
}
export type StreamEvent =
| { readonly type: "text-delta"; readonly text: string }
| { readonly type: "thinking-delta"; readonly text: string }
| { readonly type: "tool-start"; readonly toolName: string; readonly toolUseId: string }
| { readonly type: "tool-end"; readonly toolName: string; readonly toolUseId: string; readonly input: unknown; readonly durationMs?: number }
| { readonly type: "tool-result"; readonly toolUseId: string; readonly toolName: string; readonly result: string; readonly isError: boolean; readonly durationMs?: number }
| { readonly type: "finish" };
export type StreamCallback = (event: StreamEvent) => void;
export interface RunRequest {
readonly prompt: string;
readonly model: string | undefined;
readonly project: ProjectContext;
readonly systemPrompt: string | undefined;
/** Run-scoped loopback proxy capability; never an Organization provider credential. */
readonly providerProxyEnv?: Record<string, string | undefined> | undefined;
readonly resumeSessionId?: string | undefined;
/**
* RoleEntry.tools from admin/runtime settings. Values are Hub role tool ids
* (for example read_file/cph_check/send_file), mapped to Claude SDK tool
* names at run setup. `undefined` means the full supported tool surface; []
* means no tools.
*/
readonly tools?: readonly string[] | undefined;
readonly skills?: readonly RoleSkillEntry[] | undefined;
readonly mcpServers?: Record<string, McpServerConfig> | undefined;
readonly maxTurns?: number;
readonly runId: string;
readonly sessionId: string;
readonly prisma: PrismaClient;
readonly onStream?: StreamCallback;
/** Optional diagnostic sink for Claude SDK subprocess stderr. */
readonly onSdkStderr?: ((data: string) => void) | undefined;
/**
* Abort controller for the run. Aborting the signal interrupts the SDK query
* (it stops the agent loop and cleans up); the run resolves with status
* "interrupted". The caller owns the controller and triggers abort.
*/
readonly abortController?: AbortController | undefined;
}
export type RunStatus = "completed" | "length" | "failed" | "interrupted";
export interface RunResult {
readonly status: RunStatus;
readonly text: string;
readonly usage: { inputTokens: number; outputTokens: number };
/** Provider- or gateway-reported cost for this run, in USD. */
readonly costUsd?: number | undefined;
readonly numTurns: number;
readonly sdkSessionId?: string | undefined;
/** Skill ids reported by the SDK init event, not merely requested options. */
readonly initializedSkillIds?: readonly string[] | undefined;
readonly error?: string;
}
const DEFAULT_MAX_TURNS = 25;
const denyUnsandboxedBash: HookCallback = async (input) => {
if (input.hook_event_name !== "PreToolUse" || input.tool_name !== "Bash") return {};
const toolInput = input.tool_input;
if (
typeof toolInput !== "object" || toolInput === null ||
!("dangerouslyDisableSandbox" in toolInput) || toolInput.dangerouslyDisableSandbox !== true
) return {};
return {
hookSpecificOutput: {
hookEventName: "PreToolUse",
permissionDecision: "deny",
permissionDecisionReason: "This deployment requires every Bash command to remain sandboxed.",
},
};
};
export async function runAgent(req: RunRequest): Promise<RunResult> {
const onStream = req.onStream;
const cap = req.maxTurns ?? DEFAULT_MAX_TURNS;
// Lock heartbeat: refresh on each step. Best-effort.
const heartbeat = async () => {
try {
await req.prisma.projectAgentLock.update({
where: { runId: req.runId },
data: { heartbeatAt: new Date() },
});
} catch { /* best-effort */ }
};
let fullText = "";
let usage = { inputTokens: 0, outputTokens: 0 };
let costUsd: number | undefined;
let numTurns = 0;
let sdkSessionId: string | undefined;
let initializedSkillIds: readonly string[] | undefined;
let error: string | undefined;
let cleanupSecurity = async (): Promise<void> => {};
try {
await persistAgentMessage(req, "user", req.prompt);
const toolConfig = claudeSdkToolConfigForRole(req.tools);
const workspaceRoot = req.project.workspaceRoot?.trim();
if (workspaceRoot === undefined || workspaceRoot === "") {
throw new Error("Agent run requires the configured workspace root");
}
const security = await createAgentSecurityPolicy({
runId: req.runId,
workspaceRoot,
workspaceDir: req.project.workspaceDir,
skills: req.skills,
providerProxyEnv: req.providerProxyEnv,
});
cleanupSecurity = security.cleanup;
const hasSkills = security.skillIds.length > 0;
type QueryOptions = NonNullable<Parameters<typeof query>[0]["options"]>;
const options: QueryOptions = {
cwd: security.cwd,
// `skills` controls discovery/allowlisting, but an explicit `tools`
// list still has to expose the Skill dispatcher itself.
tools: [...toolConfig.tools, ...(hasSkills ? ["Skill"] : [])],
allowedTools: [...toolConfig.allowedTools],
maxTurns: cap,
includePartialMessages: true,
// ADR-0018: bypass interactive prompts (headless server); the sandbox
// below is the hard boundary, not the permission-prompt layer.
permissionMode: "bypassPermissions" as const,
allowDangerouslySkipPermissions: true,
// ADR-0018: OS-level sandbox confines the agent process + its Bash
// subprocesses. Writes and ordinary reads are confined to the workspace;
// named system runtime files remain readable so cph can execute. Network
// stays open. failIfUnavailable and allowUnsandboxedCommands=false make
// sandbox loss a hard failure.
sandbox: { ...security.sandbox },
env: security.env,
// The project workspace is untrusted input. Do not load user/project
// settings that could widen tools, hooks, MCP servers, or sandbox paths.
settingSources: [],
settings: { disableBundledSkills: true },
...(hasSkills && security.skillPluginRoot !== undefined
? { plugins: [{ type: "local" as const, path: security.skillPluginRoot, skipMcpDiscovery: true }] }
: {}),
skills: [...security.skillIds],
strictMcpConfig: true,
// Claude Code 2.1.202 can honor the per-call opt-out despite
// sandbox.allowUnsandboxedCommands=false. Enforce the invariant again at
// the PreToolUse boundary, before the Bash process can be spawned.
hooks: {
PreToolUse: [{ matcher: "Bash", hooks: [denyUnsandboxedBash] }],
},
};
if (req.systemPrompt !== undefined) options.systemPrompt = req.systemPrompt;
if (req.model !== undefined) options.model = req.model;
if (req.resumeSessionId !== undefined) options.resume = req.resumeSessionId;
if (req.mcpServers !== undefined) options.mcpServers = req.mcpServers;
if (req.abortController !== undefined) options.abortController = req.abortController;
if (req.onSdkStderr !== undefined) options.stderr = req.onSdkStderr;
const conversation = query({
prompt: req.prompt,
options,
});
// Track tool start timestamps for duration calculation
const toolStartTimestamps = new Map<string, number>();
for await (const message of conversation) {
switch (message.type) {
case "system": {
if (message.subtype === "init") {
initializedSkillIds = [...(message as SDKSystemMessage).skills];
}
break;
}
case "stream_event": {
const evt = (message as SDKPartialAssistantMessage).event;
if (evt.type === "content_block_delta" && evt.delta.type === "text_delta") {
onStream?.({ type: "text-delta", text: evt.delta.text });
}
if (evt.type === "content_block_delta" && evt.delta.type === "thinking_delta") {
onStream?.({ type: "thinking-delta", text: evt.delta.thinking });
}
if (evt.type === "content_block_start" && evt.content_block.type === "tool_use") {
const toolUseId = evt.content_block.id;
toolStartTimestamps.set(toolUseId, Date.now());
onStream?.({ type: "tool-start", toolName: evt.content_block.name, toolUseId });
}
if (evt.type === "content_block_stop") {
// Tool end is attributed from the assistant message below.
}
break;
}
case "assistant": {
const msg = (message as SDKAssistantMessage).message;
await heartbeat();
numTurns++;
let assistantText = "";
for (const block of msg.content) {
if (block.type === "text" && typeof block.text === "string") {
fullText += block.text;
assistantText += block.text;
}
if (block.type === "tool_use") {
const durationMs = toolStartTimestamps.has(block.id)
? Date.now() - (toolStartTimestamps.get(block.id) ?? 0)
: undefined;
onStream?.({
type: "tool-end",
toolName: block.name,
toolUseId: block.id,
input: block.input,
...(durationMs !== undefined ? { durationMs } : {}),
});
}
if (block.type === "thinking" && typeof block.thinking === "string") {
// Complete thinking block from the assistant message.
// Stream deltas already delivered this; no separate event needed.
}
}
await persistAgentMessage(req, "assistant", assistantText);
if (msg.usage !== undefined) {
usage.inputTokens += msg.usage.input_tokens ?? 0;
usage.outputTokens += msg.usage.output_tokens ?? 0;
}
break;
}
case "user": {
// User messages carry tool_result blocks — what each tool returned.
const msg = (message as SDKUserMessage).message;
const content = msg.content;
if (!Array.isArray(content)) break;
for (const block of content) {
if (typeof block !== "object" || block === null || block.type !== "tool_result") continue;
// Narrowed to BetaToolResultBlockParam by discriminant + field presence
if (!("tool_use_id" in block)) continue;
const toolUseId = block.tool_use_id;
const isError = block.is_error === true;
const resultText = extractToolResultText(block.content);
const durationMs = toolStartTimestamps.get(toolUseId);
onStream?.({
type: "tool-result",
toolUseId,
toolName: toolUseId,
result: resultText,
isError,
...(durationMs !== undefined ? { durationMs: Date.now() - durationMs } : {}),
});
}
break;
}
case "result": {
const result = message as SDKResultMessage;
sdkSessionId = result.session_id;
costUsd = Number.isFinite(result.total_cost_usd) ? result.total_cost_usd : undefined;
if (result.subtype !== "success") {
error = `result_${result.subtype}`;
}
break;
}
}
}
onStream?.({ type: "finish" });
return {
status: error !== undefined ? "failed" : "completed",
text: fullText,
usage,
...(costUsd !== undefined ? { costUsd } : {}),
numTurns,
sdkSessionId,
...(initializedSkillIds !== undefined ? { initializedSkillIds } : {}),
...(error !== undefined ? { error } : {}),
};
} catch (e) {
const aborted = req.abortController?.signal.aborted === true;
return {
status: aborted ? "interrupted" : "failed",
text: fullText,
usage,
...(costUsd !== undefined ? { costUsd } : {}),
numTurns,
sdkSessionId,
...(initializedSkillIds !== undefined ? { initializedSkillIds } : {}),
...(aborted ? {} : { error: e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e) }),
};
} finally {
await cleanupSecurity();
}
}
async function persistAgentMessage(req: RunRequest, role: string, content: string): Promise<void> {
if (content === "") return;
try {
await req.prisma.agentMessage.create({
data: {
sessionId: req.sessionId,
runId: req.runId,
role,
content,
attachments: [],
},
});
} catch {
// Best-effort projection: a history write failure must not break the run.
}
}
function extractToolResultText(content: unknown): string {
if (typeof content === "string") return content;
if (!Array.isArray(content)) return "";
const parts: string[] = [];
for (const part of content) {
if (typeof part === "object" && part !== null && "type" in part && part.type === "text" && "text" in part && typeof part.text === "string") {
parts.push(part.text);
}
}
return parts.join("\n");
}