fix: keep agent sandbox sockets on short paths

docs/adr/0018-agent-execution-surface-bounded-by-workspace.md

@@ -99,16 +99,17 @@ The boundary is enforced by the Claude Code SDK's built-in sandbox
   in the run's workspace while `/bin`, shared libraries, CA certificates,
   fonts and the configured `cph` executable remain available as the external
   tool exception described above.
-- `sandbox.filesystem.allowWrite: [workspaceDir]` confines every write to the
+- `sandbox.filesystem.allowWrite` confines deliverable writes to the canonical
-  canonical ADR-0007 workspace. Config/cache/home stay beneath
+  ADR-0007 workspace and opens one service-owned SDK scratch directory under
-  `.cph/agent-runtime/`. `TMPDIR`, `TMP`, and `TEMP` use the absolute
+  `/tmp/cph-agent-<uid>/<project-hash>`. Config/cache/home stay beneath
-  workspace-local `.cph/t/` path so tools remain anchored after `cd`;
+  `.cph/agent-runtime/`; `TMPDIR`, `TMP`, `TEMP`, and `CLAUDE_CODE_TMPDIR` all
-  `CLAUDE_CODE_TMPDIR` uses the short relative `.cph/t` prefix, resolved from
+  point at the project-keyed scratch directory. Its canonical prefix is capped
-  the canonical workspace cwd, because the SDK's socat bridge otherwise falls
+  at 64 bytes so the SDK can append randomized `socat` bridge socket names
-  back to a host temp directory when its Unix-socket prefix is too long.
+  without exceeding Linux `sockaddr_un.sun_path`. The per-Organization OS UID,
-  Root is denied for writes and only the canonical workspace is re-opened, so
+  project hash, mode `0700`, symlink rejection, and exact sandbox allowlist keep
-  `/tmp`, `/var/tmp`, sibling projects and every other host path are rejected.
+  that scratch isolated; sibling scratch paths and ordinary `/tmp` remain
-  There is no writable scratch exception outside the project directory.
+  denied. Root is denied for writes and only the workspace plus that exact
+  internal scratch directory are re-opened.
 - The SDK subprocess environment replaces rather than spreads `process.env`.
   Only provider protocol variables and non-secret runtime variables cross the
   boundary; database, Feishu and Hub session credentials never enter it.

hub/package-lock.json

@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
 {
   "name": "@paradigm/hub",
-  "version": "0.0.4",
+  "version": "0.0.5",
   "lockfileVersion": 3,
   "requires": true,
   "packages": {
     "": {
       "name": "@paradigm/hub",
-      "version": "0.0.4",
+      "version": "0.0.5",
       "dependencies": {
         "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk": "^0.3.202",
         "@fastify/cookie": "^11.0.2",

hub/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@paradigm/hub",
-  "version": "0.0.4",
+  "version": "0.0.5",
   "private": true,
   "type": "module",
   "engines": {

hub/src/agent/security.ts

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
 import { chmod, lstat, mkdir, realpath } from "node:fs/promises";
 import { homedir } from "node:os";
 import { isAbsolute, join, relative, resolve } from "node:path";
@@ -26,6 +27,11 @@ const SANDBOX_HIDDEN_ENV_KEYS = [
   "ANTHROPIC_API_KEY",
 ] as const;
 
+// Linux sockaddr_un.sun_path is 108 bytes including the terminator. Claude's
+// sandbox appends its own user directory and randomized bridge socket names,
+// so keep our prefix well below that hard limit.
+const MAX_AGENT_TMP_PREFIX_BYTES = 64;
+
 export interface AgentSecurityInput {
   readonly workspaceRoot: string;
   readonly workspaceDir: string;
@@ -72,10 +78,7 @@ export async function createAgentSecurityPolicy(input: AgentSecurityInput): Prom
   const agentCache = await ensureDirectoryTree(runtimeRoot, ["cache"]);
   const agentConfig = await ensureDirectoryTree(runtimeRoot, ["config"]);
   const agentState = await ensureDirectoryTree(runtimeRoot, ["state"]);
-  // Keep the SDK temp root both short enough for Linux AF_UNIX sockets and
+  const agentTmp = await resolveShortAgentTemp(workspaceDir);
-  // physically inside the project boundary pinned by AgentFileOp.Authorized.
-  const agentTmp = await ensureDirectoryTree(cphRoot, ["t"]);
-  const claudeCodeTmp = join(".cph", "t");
 
   const path = hostEnv["PATH"]?.trim();
   if (path === undefined || path === "") {
@@ -91,14 +94,13 @@ export async function createAgentSecurityPolicy(input: AgentSecurityInput): Prom
   env.XDG_CACHE_HOME = agentCache;
   env.XDG_CONFIG_HOME = agentConfig;
   env.XDG_STATE_HOME = agentState;
-  // General subprocess temp paths stay absolute so tools continue to work
+  // All four variables must use the short path. Claude's sandbox bridge uses
-  // after `cd`. Only the SDK's socket prefix is relative: Claude resolves it
+  // the ordinary temp variables, while other SDK paths use CLAUDE_CODE_TMPDIR.
-  // from the canonical workspace cwd before Bash commands can change cwd.
   env.TMPDIR = agentTmp;
   env.TMP = agentTmp;
   env.TEMP = agentTmp;
   env.CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR = agentConfig;
-  env.CLAUDE_CODE_TMPDIR = claudeCodeTmp;
+  env.CLAUDE_CODE_TMPDIR = agentTmp;
   env.CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_NONESSENTIAL_TRAFFIC = "1";
   env.DISABLE_TELEMETRY = "1";
   env.DO_NOT_TRACK = "1";
@@ -123,7 +125,10 @@ export async function createAgentSecurityPolicy(input: AgentSecurityInput): Prom
       autoAllowBashIfSandboxed: true,
       allowUnsandboxedCommands: false,
       filesystem: {
-        allowWrite: [workspaceDir],
+        // The temp directory is service-owned, project-keyed, mode 0700, and
+        // contains only SDK sockets/scratch. User deliverables remain confined
+        // to workspaceDir.
+        allowWrite: [workspaceDir, agentTmp],
         // Reject every write path by default, then re-open only the canonical
         // workspace. This prevents bubblewrap's ordinary temp exceptions from
         // turning an unauthorized path into a successful ephemeral write.
@@ -132,7 +137,7 @@ export async function createAgentSecurityPolicy(input: AgentSecurityInput): Prom
         // workspace plus the named system runtime needed to execute tools.
         // SDK allowRead takes precedence over matching denyRead paths.
         denyRead: ["/"],
-        allowRead: [workspaceDir, ...runtimeReadPaths],
+        allowRead: [workspaceDir, agentTmp, ...runtimeReadPaths],
       },
       credentials: {
         files: sensitiveReadPaths.map((path) => ({ path, mode: "deny" as const })),
@@ -142,6 +147,24 @@ export async function createAgentSecurityPolicy(input: AgentSecurityInput): Prom
   };
 }
 
+async function resolveShortAgentTemp(workspaceDir: string): Promise<string> {
+  // Do not use os.tmpdir() on macOS: its per-user path can itself exceed the
+  // Unix socket budget. /tmp canonicalizes to /private/tmp there and /tmp on
+  // Linux. The UID boundary prevents Organizations' service accounts sharing
+  // a writable runtime root; the workspace hash separates Projects.
+  const systemTmp = await realpath(process.platform === "win32" ? homedir() : "/tmp");
+  const uid = process.getuid?.() ?? "user";
+  const workspaceKey = createHash("sha256").update(workspaceDir).digest("hex").slice(0, 12);
+  const agentTmp = await ensureDirectoryTree(systemTmp, [`cph-agent-${uid}`, workspaceKey]);
+  const prefixBytes = Buffer.byteLength(agentTmp);
+  if (prefixBytes > MAX_AGENT_TMP_PREFIX_BYTES) {
+    throw new Error(
+      `Agent temp path is too long for sandbox bridge sockets (${prefixBytes} > ${MAX_AGENT_TMP_PREFIX_BYTES} bytes): ${agentTmp}`,
+    );
+  }
+  return agentTmp;
+}
+
 function hostRuntimeReadPaths(env: Readonly<Record<string, string | undefined>>): string[] {
   const platformPaths = process.platform === "darwin"
     ? [
@@ -282,7 +305,7 @@ async function ensureDirectoryTree(root: string, components: readonly string[]):
   }
   const canonical = await realpath(current);
   if (canonical !== current || !isStrictDescendant(root, canonical)) {
-    throw new Error(`Agent runtime path escapes project workspace: ${current}`);
+    throw new Error(`Agent runtime path escapes its configured root: ${current}`);
   }
   await chmod(canonical, 0o700);
   return canonical;

hub/test/integration/agent-sandbox-linux.test.ts

@@ -70,8 +70,7 @@ describe("real Claude SDK sandbox boundary", () => {
     const canonicalServiceSecret = await realpath(serviceSecret);
     const resultPath = join(canonicalWorkspace, "sandbox-result.txt");
     const cphVersionPath = join(canonicalWorkspace, "cph-version.txt");
-    const effectiveTempProbePath = join(canonicalWorkspace, ".cph", "t", "effective-temp.txt");
+    const denialLogPath = join(canonicalWorkspace, ".cph", "denials.log");
-    const denialLogPath = join(canonicalWorkspace, ".cph", "t", "denials.log");
     const siblingEscapePath = join(canonicalSibling, "escape.txt");
     const unsandboxedEscapePath = join(root, `unsandboxed-escape-${nonce}`);
     const hostTmpEscapePath = `/tmp/cph-host-temp-${nonce}`;
@@ -95,12 +94,12 @@ describe("real Claude SDK sandbox boundary", () => {
       `if service_value=$(cat ${shellQuote(canonicalServiceSecret)} 2>> ${shellQuote(denialLogPath)}); then exit 23; fi`,
       `mkdir ${shellQuote(join(canonicalWorkspace, "subdir"))}`,
       `cd ${shellQuote(join(canonicalWorkspace, "subdir"))}`,
-      `test "\${TMPDIR-unset}" = ${shellQuote(join(canonicalWorkspace, ".cph", "t"))}`,
+      'test "${TMPDIR-unset}" = "${TMP-unset}"',
-      `test "\${TMP-unset}" = ${shellQuote(join(canonicalWorkspace, ".cph", "t"))}`,
+      'test "${TMPDIR-unset}" = "${TEMP-unset}"',
-      `test "\${TEMP-unset}" = ${shellQuote(join(canonicalWorkspace, ".cph", "t"))}`,
+      'test "${TMPDIR-unset}" = "${CLAUDE_CODE_TMPDIR-unset}"',
-      'test "${CLAUDE_CODE_TMPDIR-unset}" = ".cph/t"',
+      'test "${#TMPDIR}" -le 64',
-      `test "$(realpath "$TMPDIR")" = ${shellQuote(join(canonicalWorkspace, ".cph", "t"))}`,
+      `case "$TMPDIR" in ${shellQuote(canonicalWorkspace)}/*) exit 35;; esac`,
-      `printf 'workspace-temp\\n' > "$TMPDIR/effective-temp.txt"`,
+      `printf 'sdk-temp\\n' > "$TMPDIR/effective-temp.txt"`,
       `if printf 'host-temp\\n' > ${shellQuote(hostTmpEscapePath)} 2>> ${shellQuote(denialLogPath)}; then exit 33; fi`,
       `if printf 'host-var-temp\\n' > ${shellQuote(hostVarTmpEscapePath)} 2>> ${shellQuote(denialLogPath)}; then exit 34; fi`,
       'test "${DATABASE_URL-unset}" = unset',
@@ -159,7 +158,6 @@ describe("real Claude SDK sandbox boundary", () => {
       });
       expect(resultContents).toBe("sandbox-ok\n");
       await expect(readFile(cphVersionPath, "utf8")).resolves.toMatch(/^cph /);
-      await expect(readFile(effectiveTempProbePath, "utf8")).resolves.toBe("workspace-temp\n");
       const denialLog = await readFile(denialLogPath, "utf8");
       expect(denialLog).not.toContain("sibling-secret");
       expect(denialLog).not.toContain("platform-secret");

hub/test/unit/agent-security.test.ts

@@ -46,7 +46,11 @@ describe("agent subprocess security policy", () => {
     expect(policy.env).not.toHaveProperty("HUB_SESSION_SECRET");
     expect(policy.env.HOME).toMatch(new RegExp(`^${escapeRegExp(canonicalWorkspace)}/`));
     expect(policy.env.CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR).toMatch(new RegExp(`^${escapeRegExp(canonicalWorkspace)}/`));
-    expect(policy.env.CLAUDE_CODE_TMPDIR).toBe(join(".cph", "t"));
+    expect(policy.env.CLAUDE_CODE_TMPDIR).toBe(policy.env.TMPDIR);
+    expect(policy.env.TMP).toBe(policy.env.TMPDIR);
+    expect(policy.env.TEMP).toBe(policy.env.TMPDIR);
+    expect(policy.env.TMPDIR).not.toMatch(new RegExp(`^${escapeRegExp(canonicalWorkspace)}/`));
+    expect(Buffer.byteLength(policy.env.TMPDIR!)).toBeLessThanOrEqual(64);
 
     expect(policy.sandbox).toMatchObject({
       enabled: true,
@@ -54,7 +58,7 @@ describe("agent subprocess security policy", () => {
       autoAllowBashIfSandboxed: true,
       allowUnsandboxedCommands: false,
       filesystem: {
-        allowWrite: [canonicalWorkspace],
+        allowWrite: expect.arrayContaining([canonicalWorkspace, policy.env.TMPDIR]),
         denyRead: ["/"],
         allowRead: expect.arrayContaining([canonicalWorkspace, "/usr/bin"]),
       },
@@ -81,7 +85,7 @@ describe("agent subprocess security policy", () => {
     })).rejects.toThrow("unsupported provider environment variable: DATABASE_URL");
   });
 
-  it("keeps the short SDK socket directory inside the project workspace", async () => {
+  it("keeps every SDK temp variable on a short isolated path outside a long project workspace", async () => {
     const { workspaceRoot, workspace } = await makeWorkspace();
     const policy = await createAgentSecurityPolicy({
       workspaceRoot,
@@ -89,14 +93,16 @@ describe("agent subprocess security policy", () => {
       hostEnv: { PATH: "/usr/bin:/bin" },
     });
 
-    expect(policy.env.CLAUDE_CODE_TMPDIR).toBe(join(".cph", "t"));
+    const canonicalWorkspace = await realpath(workspace);
-    const absoluteTemp = join(await realpath(workspace), ".cph", "t");
+    const temp = policy.env.TMPDIR!;
-    expect(policy.env.TMPDIR).toBe(absoluteTemp);
+    expect(policy.env.CLAUDE_CODE_TMPDIR).toBe(temp);
-    expect(policy.env.TMP).toBe(absoluteTemp);
+    expect(policy.env.TMP).toBe(temp);
-    expect(policy.env.TEMP).toBe(absoluteTemp);
+    expect(policy.env.TEMP).toBe(temp);
-    expect(policy.sandbox.filesystem.allowWrite).toEqual([await realpath(workspace)]);
+    expect(temp).not.toMatch(new RegExp(`^${escapeRegExp(canonicalWorkspace)}/`));
+    expect(Buffer.byteLength(temp)).toBeLessThanOrEqual(64);
+    expect(policy.sandbox.filesystem.allowWrite).toEqual([canonicalWorkspace, temp]);
     expect(policy.sandbox.filesystem.denyWrite).toEqual(["/"]);
-    expect(policy.sandbox.filesystem.allowRead).not.toContain(expect.stringMatching(/^\/run\//));
+    expect(policy.sandbox.filesystem.allowRead).toContain(temp);
   });
 
   it("rejects a project workspace whose real path escapes the configured workspace root", async () => {

hub/test/unit/runner.test.ts

@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ describe("runAgent", () => {
           failIfUnavailable: true,
           allowUnsandboxedCommands: false,
           filesystem: expect.objectContaining({
-            allowWrite: [workspace],
+            allowWrite: expect.arrayContaining([workspace]),
             denyRead: ["/"],
             allowRead: expect.arrayContaining([workspace]),
           }),