fix: prove Linux Agent sandbox boundary

2026-07-10 17:59:56 +08:00
parent f4968d6657
commit f07f280b8f
19 changed files with 381 additions and 55 deletions
@@ -45,6 +45,8 @@ rollback and recovery, and no known critical security or data-integrity gaps.
 - [Decide the platform-administrator identity and audit boundary](issues/42-decide-platform-admin-identity-audit.md) — use a dedicated platform Feishu issuer, one peer administrator role, guarded bootstrap and identity-bound invitations, revocable server-side sessions, atomic append-only Platform Audit, and dual-factor offline recovery without a standing break-glass account.
 - [Restore the checker formatting gate](issues/09-restore-checker-format-gate.md) — pin local and CI Rust/rustfmt/clippy to 1.92.0, apply the canonical workspace format, and keep the full fmt + clippy + 53-test checker gate green.
 - [Provision a runnable non-root Hub service](issues/10-provision-nonroot-service.md) — install a strictly validated service identity and persistent layout, reject release/workspace overlap, validate complete production configuration and real bind settings, and execute Hub/Prisma/cph/bubblewrap probes as the service user under `no_new_privs` before writing the unit.
+- [Confine the agent runtime and protect service credentials](issues/16-confine-agent-and-protect-credentials.md) — replace the Agent environment, deny host reads/writes from root, keep every writable SDK path inside the canonical project, require bubblewrap plus socat, emit bounded correlated diagnostics, and prove the boundary with the real Linux SDK under a capability-free non-root identity.
+- [Close MCP context and file-delivery escape paths](issues/17-close-mcp-data-egress-escapes.md) — use no-follow project-rooted file operations and delivery snapshots, remove Git-root delivery, and bind every Feishu MCP read to the run's project and chat.

 ## Fog