feat: secure organization provider credentials

.scratch/saas-production-readiness/issues/19-design-org-scoped-secret-control-plane.md

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 # Design the org-scoped secret and connection control plane
 
 Type: grilling
-Status: open
+Status: resolved
 
 ## Question
 
@@ -11,3 +11,14 @@ provider credentials; support one customer-owned Feishu app per Organization;
 support Organization-managed BYOK and a distinct platform-managed provider
 connection per Organization; and ensure plaintext credentials never reach
 business records, logs, or agent tools?
+
+## Answer
+
+Use the local master-key envelope, immutable connection-secret versions,
+writer-authority split, explicit Organization/Project resolver, staged KEK
+rotation, and separately protected keyring recovery contract accepted in
+ADR-0024. Production receives the root-owned keyring only through systemd
+`LoadCredential`; it has no process-global credential fallback. Agent runs use
+a loopback proxy capability rather than the Organization Provider credential;
+the offline rotation command atomically retains old/new KEKs, rewraps stored
+DEKs, audits the changes, and authenticates the complete envelope set.

.scratch/saas-production-readiness/issues/43-implement-org-connection-secret-plane.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 Type: task
 Status: open
-Blocked by: 19
+Blocked by: none
 
 ## Question
 

AGENTS.md

@@ -14,6 +14,10 @@
 - 每个 org 自选 BYOK 或平台托管 model provider connection;平台托管也必须是该 org
   独享的 key/base URL,不得让无关 org 共用 process-global provider key(见 ADR-0021 /
   `Spec.System.Organization`)。
+- Feishu/provider secret 使用本地版本化 master-key keyring 的信封加密;生产由 systemd
+  credential 注入,运行时只允许显式 org/project scope 的 fail-closed resolver,不得回退
+  process-global credential;Agent child 只接收 run-scoped loopback proxy capability,
+  不接收 org provider credential(见 ADR-0024 / `Spec.System.Organization`)。
 - 生产容量按不可突破的 platform ceiling 与 org 可下调 policy 分层;有效限制取两者较低值。
   Agent admission 必须持久、有界、跨 org 公平且显式背压(见 ADR-0022 /
   `Spec.System.Capacity`)。

docs/adr/0024-local-secret-envelope-and-connection-resolution.md

@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+# ADR 0024: Local Secret Envelope And Connection Resolution
+
+## Status
+
+Accepted.
+
+## Context
+
+ADR-0021 requires every customer Feishu application and model provider
+credential to belong to one Organization. It forbids a process-global provider
+credential and requires business code to obtain plaintext only through a
+resolver. Before the pilot can store real customer credentials, the deployment
+also needs a concrete encryption, rotation, recovery, writer-authority, and
+connection-identity contract.
+
+The initial production shape is one Hub service and one PostgreSQL database on
+a controlled host. An external KMS would add another remote availability and
+bootstrap dependency before the pilot has operational support for it. Keeping
+plaintext credentials in environment variables, configuration files readable
+by the service account, database columns, logs, or Agent environments is not an
+acceptable substitute.
+
+## Decision
+
+### Local master-key keyring
+
+The pilot uses a versioned **local master-key keyring**. Each key is a random
+256-bit key-encryption key (KEK) with a stable, non-secret key identifier. The
+keyring names exactly one active KEK and may retain previous KEKs while rotation
+is in progress. It is not stored in PostgreSQL, a release directory, an
+environment variable, or the ordinary database/workspace backup set.
+
+In production, the source keyring is owned by root, mode `0600`, and delivered
+to the unprivileged Hub service by systemd `LoadCredential`. Hub reads the
+read-only file under `CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY`; production startup rejects a
+direct arbitrary file path. Development and tests may use an explicit local
+keyring file. Startup fails when the keyring is absent, malformed, contains an
+invalid key, has no active key, or names an active key that is not present.
+
+### Envelope format and binding
+
+Every immutable secret version receives a new random 256-bit data-encryption
+key (DEK). AES-256-GCM encrypts the secret payload with that DEK. AES-256-GCM
+also wraps the DEK with the keyring's active KEK. Nonces are random and never
+reused with the same key.
+
+The versioned envelope persists only algorithm/version metadata, the KEK
+identifier, nonces, authentication tags, the wrapped DEK, and ciphertext.
+Authenticated additional data binds both layers to the secret purpose,
+Organization identifier, Connection identifier, immutable secret-version
+identifier, and envelope version. Copying ciphertext between rows,
+Organizations, connections, purposes, or versions therefore fails
+authentication. Unknown algorithms or versions, missing KEKs, malformed
+envelopes, and failed authentication are hard errors; there is no fallback to
+another credential source.
+
+The encrypted payload is a versioned object specific to its connection type.
+For a Provider Connection, provider base URL and authentication material are
+inside the payload. For a Feishu Application Connection, application ID,
+application secret, verification/encryption material, and bot identity are
+inside the payload. HTTP responses, business records, logs, metrics, traces,
+audit facts, exceptions, and Agent process environments receive only redacted
+metadata, never those plaintext fields or a decrypted DEK.
+
+### Connection identity, lifecycle, and writer authority
+
+A connection has a stable opaque identifier and belongs to exactly one
+Organization. Secret versions are immutable; the connection points to one
+active version. Rotation creates and validates a new version, atomically moves
+the active pointer, and retains the previous encrypted version for rollback and
+audit until retention policy removes it. A connection is `DRAFT`, `ACTIVE`, or
+`DISABLED`; runtime resolution accepts only an active connection with a valid
+active secret version.
+
+There is one customer-owned Feishu Application Connection per Organization.
+Its provider-local user, chat, event, and callback identifiers are meaningful
+only together with that connection identity. Organization OWNER/ADMIN may
+create and rotate that customer-owned connection. Platform repair remains a
+separate stepped-up, reason-bearing, fail-closed-audited operation under
+ADR-0023, not an Organization API bypass.
+
+A model Provider Connection is unique by Organization and provider identity.
+In `BYOK` mode an Organization OWNER/ADMIN creates and rotates it. In
+`PLATFORM_MANAGED` mode only a stepped-up Platform Administrator may create or
+rotate it, with the platform mutation and redacted Platform Audit Entry in one
+transaction. Switching modes creates or activates the correctly governed
+connection version; it never re-labels plaintext or grants the other control
+plane write authority.
+
+### Resolver boundary
+
+Business code asks one connection resolver for an active connection using an
+explicit Organization, or using a Project that is first resolved to its active
+Organization. Provider resolution also requires the provider identity; Feishu
+resolution requires the intended Feishu Connection identity whenever external
+traffic enters the system. Resolution fails for missing, draft, disabled,
+cross-Organization, corrupt, or undecryptable records.
+
+Decrypted values exist only in the resolver result for the duration of the
+outbound provider/Feishu operation. They are not cached across connections,
+returned through administrative reads, passed to Agent tools, or written back
+to business rows. Production has no process-global Feishu or model-provider
+credential fallback.
+
+The Claude Agent child never receives an Organization's Provider credential.
+For each run, Hub opens a loopback-only proxy with a random, short-lived run
+capability. The child receives only that local endpoint and capability; Hub
+validates the capability, replaces it with the Organization credential at the
+upstream hop, refuses automatic redirects, and destroys the listener when the
+run ends. Agent sandbox credential rules hide even the run capability from
+tool subprocesses.
+
+### KEK rotation, backup, and recovery
+
+KEK rotation is staged: install a new KEK alongside the old keys, mark it
+active, rewrap each stored DEK under the new KEK without decrypting its payload,
+verify every envelope, then retire the old KEK only after the separately
+protected recovery copy and restore drill are current. Secret rotation and KEK
+rotation are distinct operations.
+
+A recoverable deployment requires both the ordinary database/workspace backup
+and a separately protected backup of the local keyring. Neither copy alone can
+recover plaintext credentials. Restore preflight verifies key identifiers and
+authenticates sample/all envelopes before traffic is enabled. A missing or
+incorrect keyring leaves the service unavailable and produces redacted
+diagnostics; operators must restore the correct keyring rather than reset or
+silently discard credentials.
+
+## Consequences
+
+- The database may be restored or copied without exposing plaintext secrets,
+  but losing the separately held keyring makes encrypted credentials
+  unrecoverable.
+- The service unit, installer, preflight, backup, restore, and rotation tooling
+  must treat the keyring as an explicit production dependency.
+- Administrative writes must accept secret material as write-only input and
+  return only connection state, version, timestamps, and redacted fingerprints.
+- Tests must prove cross-Organization/row substitution failure, wrong/missing
+  key failure, version rotation, absence of global fallback, and absence of
+  plaintext from persistence, responses, logs, and Agent environments.
+- External KMS/HSM adoption is deferred. It may replace the local KEK provider
+  without changing connection identity, immutable secret versions, AAD
+  binding, writer authority, or resolver behavior.

hub/.env.example

@@ -6,12 +6,9 @@ NODE_ENV="production"
 # PostgreSQL connection string.
 DATABASE_URL="postgresql://paradigm:paradigm@127.0.0.1:5432/paradigm"
 
-# Claude Code SDK auth via OpenRouter's Anthropic Skin.
+# Provider URL and credentials are write-only Organization Provider Connection
-# ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN = your OpenRouter API key (https://openrouter.ai/keys)
+# data in PostgreSQL, encrypted by ADR-0024. Process-global ANTHROPIC_* provider
-# ANTHROPIC_API_KEY must be explicitly empty to avoid auth conflicts.
+# settings are rejected in production and must not be added here.
-ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL="https://openrouter.ai/api"
-ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN=""
-ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=""
 
 # Model override (optional). Defaults to anthropic/claude-sonnet-5.
 # Use an OpenRouter model slug, for example:
@@ -57,3 +54,7 @@ HUB_SESSION_SECRET=""
 # Optional OAuth scope (space-separated). Default: contact:user.base:readonly
 # Apply matching scopes in the Feishu developer console.
 # HUB_OAUTH_SCOPE="contact:user.base:readonly"
+
+# Local development/tests only. Production must not set this: systemd injects
+# the fixed cph-secret-keyring credential through CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY.
+# HUB_SECRET_KEYRING_FILE="/absolute/path/to/dev-keyring.json"

hub/deploy/README.md

@@ -14,13 +14,52 @@ sudo BASE=/srv/curriculum-project-hub \
 ```
 
 On a clean host the first invocation creates
-`/srv/curriculum-project-hub/.secrets/platform.env` with every supported
+`/srv/curriculum-project-hub/.secrets/platform.env` and a random root-owned
-production key and exits with status 78. Fill every required blank, set
+`secret-keyring.json`, then exits with status 78. Copy the keyring to a
-`CPH_BIN` to an executable compatible `cph`, keep the file mode at `0600`, and
+separately protected recovery location before continuing; it must not live only
-run the same command again. No systemd unit is installed until configuration,
+on this host or in the ordinary database/workspace backup. Fill every required
+environment blank, set `CPH_BIN` to an executable compatible `cph`, keep both
+source files root-only at mode `0600`, and run the same command again. No
+systemd unit is installed until configuration,
 paths, Node, bubblewrap, `socat`, `cph --version`, PostgreSQL connectivity and directory
 ownership all pass preflight.
 
+The service account cannot read the keyring source. The installed unit uses
+systemd `LoadCredential` to materialize a read-only `cph-secret-keyring` for the
+running service. Hub refuses production startup if this credential is missing,
+malformed, or does not contain its declared active key. Provider credentials
+are configured through the Organization admin connection API, never through
+process-global `ANTHROPIC_*` variables; preflight rejects those legacy settings.
+
+Rotate the local KEK only from the controlled host console. The command first
+atomically adds a new active key while retaining every previous key, then
+authenticates and rewraps every stored Provider DEK, writes redacted org audit
+events, and verifies the complete set again:
+
+```sh
+sudo bash -c '
+  set -euo pipefail
+  systemctl stop cph-hub.service
+  set -a
+  . /srv/curriculum-project-hub/.secrets/platform.env
+  set +a
+  node /srv/curriculum-project-hub/hub/dist/deployment/rotate-secret-kek.js \
+    --keyring-file /srv/curriculum-project-hub/.secrets/secret-keyring.json
+  systemctl start cph-hub.service
+'
+```
+
+The CLI refuses to rotate while `cph-hub.service` is active; stopping the only
+writer prevents a concurrent BYOK version from being appended under the old
+in-memory keyring. A PostgreSQL transaction advisory lock excludes a second
+rotation and is released automatically if the CLI or host crashes. The
+operation is therefore rerunnable after interruption: old and new keys remain
+in the atomically replaced keyring, so partially rewrapped rows stay
+decryptable. It also refuses success while any envelope still names a
+non-active KEK. Back up the updated keyring to the separate recovery location
+and complete a restore preflight before considering old-key retirement. The
+pilot deliberately does not auto-delete previous keys.
+
 The deployment path also runs `npm run audit:production` from the locked clean
 install before building or restarting the service. A current high or critical
 production advisory therefore blocks deployment instead of becoming a warning

hub/deploy/cph-hub.service

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ Wants=network-online.target
 # this start-time assertion keeps later package/host changes fail-closed.
 AssertPathExists=__BWRAP_BIN__
 AssertPathExists=__SOCAT_BIN__
+AssertPathExists=__KEYRING_FILE__
 
 [Service]
 Type=simple
@@ -18,6 +19,9 @@ Environment=HOME=__SERVICE_HOME__
 Environment=XDG_STATE_HOME=__STATE_DIR__
 Environment=XDG_CACHE_HOME=__CACHE_DIR__
 Environment=PATH=__RUNTIME_PATH__
+# ADR-0024: the root-owned source remains unreadable by the service account;
+# systemd materializes a read-only per-unit credential at runtime.
+LoadCredential=cph-secret-keyring:__KEYRING_FILE__
 UMask=0027
 # Run prisma migrations before each start, then launch the Hub.
 ExecStartPre=__NODE_BIN__ __HUB_DIR__/node_modules/prisma/build/index.js migrate deploy --schema __HUB_DIR__/prisma/schema.prisma

hub/deploy/install_service.sh

@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ WORKSPACE_ROOT="${WORKSPACE_ROOT:-/var/lib/cph-hub/workspaces}"
 HOST="${HOST:-127.0.0.1}"
 PORT="${PORT:-8788}"
 ENV_FILE="${ENV_FILE:-$BASE/.secrets/platform.env}"
+KEYRING_FILE="${KEYRING_FILE:-$BASE/.secrets/secret-keyring.json}"
 SYSTEMD_UNIT_DIR="${SYSTEMD_UNIT_DIR:-/etc/systemd/system}"
 NODE_BIN="${NODE_BIN:-$(command -v node || true)}"
 BWRAP_BIN="${BWRAP_BIN:-$(command -v bwrap || true)}"
@@ -63,7 +64,7 @@ if [ "$SERVICE_USER" = "root" ] || [ "$SERVICE_GROUP" = "root" ]; then
   fail "the Hub service identity must not be root"
 fi
 
-for command in getent groupadd useradd install stat systemctl id; do
+for command in getent groupadd useradd install stat systemctl id openssl date mktemp; do
   require_command "$command"
 done
 for pair in \
@@ -97,6 +98,7 @@ for pair in \
   "CACHE_DIR:$CACHE_DIR" \
   "WORKSPACE_ROOT:$WORKSPACE_ROOT" \
   "ENV_FILE:$ENV_FILE" \
+  "KEYRING_FILE:$KEYRING_FILE" \
   "SYSTEMD_UNIT_DIR:$SYSTEMD_UNIT_DIR" \
   "NODE_BIN:$NODE_BIN" \
   "BWRAP_BIN:$BWRAP_BIN" \
@@ -107,6 +109,32 @@ for pair in \
   require_safe_unit_value "${pair%%:*}" "${pair#*:}"
 done
 
+KEYRING_CREATED=false
+if [ -L "$KEYRING_FILE" ]; then
+  fail "local secret keyring must not be a symlink: $KEYRING_FILE"
+fi
+if [ ! -e "$KEYRING_FILE" ]; then
+  install -d -o root -g root -m 0700 "$(dirname "$KEYRING_FILE")"
+  key_id="local-$(date -u +%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ)"
+  key_value="$(openssl rand -base64 32)"
+  tmp_keyring="$(mktemp "$(dirname "$KEYRING_FILE")/.secret-keyring.XXXXXX")"
+  trap 'rm -f "${tmp_keyring:-}"' EXIT
+  chmod 0600 "$tmp_keyring"
+  printf '{"version":1,"activeKeyId":"%s","keys":{"%s":"%s"}}\n' \
+    "$key_id" "$key_id" "$key_value" >"$tmp_keyring"
+  install -o root -g root -m 0600 "$tmp_keyring" "$KEYRING_FILE"
+  rm -f "$tmp_keyring"
+  tmp_keyring=""
+  trap - EXIT
+  unset key_value
+  KEYRING_CREATED=true
+  echo "[install] generated local secret keyring: $KEYRING_FILE" >&2
+fi
+[ -f "$KEYRING_FILE" ] || fail "local secret keyring is not a regular file: $KEYRING_FILE"
+keyring_metadata="$(stat -c '%u:%g:%a' -- "$KEYRING_FILE")"
+[ "$keyring_metadata" = "0:0:600" ] || \
+  fail "local secret keyring must be owned by root:root with mode 0600; found $keyring_metadata"
+
 if [ -L "$ENV_FILE" ]; then
   fail "environment file must not be a symlink: $ENV_FILE"
 fi
@@ -118,9 +146,6 @@ if [ ! -e "$ENV_FILE" ]; then
 # rerunning install_service.sh; failed preflight never installs the unit.
 NODE_ENV=production
 DATABASE_URL=
-ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL=https://openrouter.ai/api
-ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN=
-ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=
 FEISHU_APP_ID=
 FEISHU_APP_SECRET=
 FEISHU_BOT_OPEN_ID=
@@ -132,18 +157,24 @@ HUB_PUBLIC_BASE_URL=
 HUB_SESSION_SECRET=
 HUB_AGENT_MAX_TURNS=25
 HUB_FEISHU_LISTENER_ENABLED=true
-CPH_SANDBOX_EXTRA_DENY_READ=$ENV_FILE
+CPH_SANDBOX_EXTRA_DENY_READ=$ENV_FILE:$KEYRING_FILE
 EOF
   chmod 0600 "$ENV_FILE"
   echo "[install] seeded complete production configuration: $ENV_FILE" >&2
+  echo "[install] copy $KEYRING_FILE to the separately protected keyring backup before continuing" >&2
   echo "[install] fill every required blank, install cph at CPH_BIN, then rerun" >&2
   exit 78
 fi
 [ -f "$ENV_FILE" ] || fail "environment file is not a regular file: $ENV_FILE"
+if [ "$KEYRING_CREATED" = true ]; then
+  echo "[install] copy $KEYRING_FILE to the separately protected keyring backup, then rerun" >&2
+  exit 78
+fi
 
 PREFLIGHT_ARGS=(
   "$NODE_BIN" "$PREFLIGHT_JS"
   --env-file "$ENV_FILE"
+  --keyring-file "$KEYRING_FILE"
   --node-bin "$NODE_BIN"
   --runuser-bin "$RUNUSER_BIN"
   --setpriv-bin "$SETPRIV_BIN"
@@ -249,6 +280,7 @@ sed \
   -e "s|__WORKSPACE_ROOT__|$WORKSPACE_ROOT|g" \
   -e "s|__HUB_DIR__|$HUB_DIR|g" \
   -e "s|__ENV_FILE__|$ENV_FILE|g" \
+  -e "s|__KEYRING_FILE__|$KEYRING_FILE|g" \
   -e "s|__NODE_BIN__|$NODE_BIN|g" \
   -e "s|__BWRAP_BIN__|$BWRAP_BIN|g" \
   -e "s|__SOCAT_BIN__|$SOCAT_BIN|g" \

hub/package.json

@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
       "axios": "1.18.1"
     }
   },
-  "description": "Curriculum Project Hub — Feishu-group collaboration + Claude Code SDK agent runtime. Aligns to spec/System (ADR-0001..0004, 0017).",
+  "description": "Curriculum Project Hub — org-scoped Feishu collaboration and confined Agent runtime. Aligns to spec/System through ADR-0024.",
   "scripts": {
     "dev": "npm run prisma:migrate && tsx watch src/server.ts",
     "build": "tsc -p tsconfig.json",
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
     "prisma:generate": "prisma generate --schema prisma/schema.prisma",
     "prisma:validate": "DATABASE_URL=${DATABASE_URL:-postgresql://stub:stub@127.0.0.1:5432/stub} prisma validate --schema prisma/schema.prisma",
     "prisma:migrate": "DATABASE_URL=${DATABASE_URL:-postgresql://paradigm:paradigm@127.0.0.1:5432/paradigm} prisma migrate deploy --schema prisma/schema.prisma",
+    "secrets:rotate-kek": "node dist/deployment/rotate-secret-kek.js",
     "deploy": "bash deploy/deploy_platform.sh",
     "test": "vitest run",
     "test:watch": "vitest"

hub/prisma/migrations/20260710220000_org_provider_secret_envelopes/migration.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+-- ADR-0024: Organization-scoped provider connections and immutable encrypted
+-- credential versions. No provider plaintext column exists in this schema.
+
+CREATE TYPE "ProviderCredentialMode" AS ENUM ('BYOK', 'PLATFORM_MANAGED');
+CREATE TYPE "OrganizationConnectionStatus" AS ENUM ('DRAFT', 'ACTIVE', 'DISABLED');
+
+CREATE TABLE "OrganizationProviderConnection" (
+    "id" TEXT NOT NULL,
+    "organizationId" TEXT NOT NULL,
+    "providerId" TEXT NOT NULL,
+    "mode" "ProviderCredentialMode" NOT NULL,
+    "status" "OrganizationConnectionStatus" NOT NULL DEFAULT 'DRAFT',
+    "activeSecretVersionId" TEXT,
+    "activatedAt" TIMESTAMP(3),
+    "disabledAt" TIMESTAMP(3),
+    "createdAt" TIMESTAMP(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
+    "updatedAt" TIMESTAMP(3) NOT NULL,
+    CONSTRAINT "OrganizationProviderConnection_pkey" PRIMARY KEY ("id")
+);
+
+CREATE TABLE "ProviderCredentialVersion" (
+    "id" TEXT NOT NULL,
+    "connectionId" TEXT NOT NULL,
+    "version" INTEGER NOT NULL,
+    "envelopeVersion" INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 1,
+    "keyId" TEXT NOT NULL,
+    "envelope" JSONB NOT NULL,
+    "createdByUserId" TEXT,
+    "createdAt" TIMESTAMP(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
+    "retiredAt" TIMESTAMP(3),
+    CONSTRAINT "ProviderCredentialVersion_pkey" PRIMARY KEY ("id")
+);
+
+CREATE UNIQUE INDEX "OrganizationProviderConnection_organizationId_providerId_key"
+  ON "OrganizationProviderConnection"("organizationId", "providerId");
+CREATE UNIQUE INDEX "OrganizationProviderConnection_activeSecretVersionId_key"
+  ON "OrganizationProviderConnection"("activeSecretVersionId");
+CREATE INDEX "OrganizationProviderConnection_organizationId_status_idx"
+  ON "OrganizationProviderConnection"("organizationId", "status");
+CREATE INDEX "OrganizationProviderConnection_providerId_status_idx"
+  ON "OrganizationProviderConnection"("providerId", "status");
+
+CREATE UNIQUE INDEX "ProviderCredentialVersion_connectionId_version_key"
+  ON "ProviderCredentialVersion"("connectionId", "version");
+CREATE INDEX "ProviderCredentialVersion_connectionId_retiredAt_idx"
+  ON "ProviderCredentialVersion"("connectionId", "retiredAt");
+CREATE INDEX "ProviderCredentialVersion_keyId_idx"
+  ON "ProviderCredentialVersion"("keyId");
+CREATE INDEX "ProviderCredentialVersion_createdByUserId_idx"
+  ON "ProviderCredentialVersion"("createdByUserId");
+
+ALTER TABLE "OrganizationProviderConnection"
+  ADD CONSTRAINT "OrganizationProviderConnection_organizationId_fkey"
+  FOREIGN KEY ("organizationId") REFERENCES "Organization"("id") ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
+ALTER TABLE "ProviderCredentialVersion"
+  ADD CONSTRAINT "ProviderCredentialVersion_connectionId_fkey"
+  FOREIGN KEY ("connectionId") REFERENCES "OrganizationProviderConnection"("id") ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
+ALTER TABLE "ProviderCredentialVersion"
+  ADD CONSTRAINT "ProviderCredentialVersion_createdByUserId_fkey"
+  FOREIGN KEY ("createdByUserId") REFERENCES "User"("id") ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE;
+ALTER TABLE "OrganizationProviderConnection"
+  ADD CONSTRAINT "OrganizationProviderConnection_activeSecretVersionId_fkey"
+  FOREIGN KEY ("activeSecretVersionId") REFERENCES "ProviderCredentialVersion"("id") ON DELETE RESTRICT ON UPDATE CASCADE;
+
+ALTER TABLE "AuditEntry" ADD COLUMN "organizationId" TEXT;
+ALTER TABLE "AuditEntry"
+  ADD CONSTRAINT "AuditEntry_organizationId_fkey"
+  FOREIGN KEY ("organizationId") REFERENCES "Organization"("id") ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE;
+CREATE INDEX "AuditEntry_organizationId_createdAt_idx"
+  ON "AuditEntry"("organizationId", "createdAt");

hub/prisma/schema.prisma

@@ -41,6 +41,8 @@ model Organization {
   projects                     Project[]
   teams                        Team[]
   externalDirectoryConnections ExternalDirectoryConnection[]
+  providerConnections          OrganizationProviderConnection[]
+  auditEntries                 AuditEntry[]                    @relation("organizationAudit")
 
   @@index([status])
 }
@@ -106,6 +108,66 @@ model User {
   permissionGrants             PermissionGrant[]             @relation("grantCreator")
   roleTriggerGrants            RoleTriggerGrant[]            @relation("roleGrantCreator")
   auditEntries                 AuditEntry[]                  @relation("auditActor")
+  providerCredentialVersions   ProviderCredentialVersion[]   @relation("providerCredentialVersionCreator")
+}
+
+/// ADR-0024: model-provider connection identity is stable and belongs to one
+/// Organization. Both BYOK and platform-managed credentials are tenant-local;
+/// only ACTIVE connections with an active immutable secret version resolve.
+model OrganizationProviderConnection {
+  id                    String                       @id @default(cuid())
+  organizationId        String
+  providerId            String
+  mode                  ProviderCredentialMode
+  status                OrganizationConnectionStatus @default(DRAFT)
+  activeSecretVersionId String?                      @unique
+  activatedAt           DateTime?
+  disabledAt            DateTime?
+  createdAt             DateTime                     @default(now())
+  updatedAt             DateTime                     @updatedAt
+
+  organization        Organization                @relation(fields: [organizationId], references: [id], onDelete: Cascade)
+  secretVersions      ProviderCredentialVersion[] @relation("providerCredentialVersions")
+  activeSecretVersion ProviderCredentialVersion?  @relation("activeProviderCredentialVersion", fields: [activeSecretVersionId], references: [id], onDelete: Restrict)
+
+  @@unique([organizationId, providerId])
+  @@index([organizationId, status])
+  @@index([providerId, status])
+}
+
+enum ProviderCredentialMode {
+  BYOK
+  PLATFORM_MANAGED
+}
+
+enum OrganizationConnectionStatus {
+  DRAFT
+  ACTIVE
+  DISABLED
+}
+
+/// ADR-0024: write-only provider secret material is one authenticated envelope
+/// per immutable version. keyId/envelopeVersion are redacted rotation metadata;
+/// all provider URL/token/API-key fields remain inside envelope ciphertext.
+model ProviderCredentialVersion {
+  id              String   @id @default(cuid())
+  connectionId    String
+  version         Int
+  envelopeVersion Int      @default(1)
+  keyId           String
+  envelope        Json
+  createdByUserId String?
+  createdAt       DateTime @default(now())
+  retiredAt       DateTime?
+
+  connection OrganizationProviderConnection  @relation("providerCredentialVersions", fields: [connectionId], references: [id], onDelete: Cascade)
+  activeFor  OrganizationProviderConnection? @relation("activeProviderCredentialVersion")
+  createdBy  User?                           @relation("providerCredentialVersionCreator", fields: [createdByUserId], references: [id], onDelete: SetNull)
+
+  @@unique([connectionId, version])
+  @@index([connectionId, retiredAt])
+  @@index([keyId])
+  @@index([createdByUserId])
 }
 
 /// Platform-level role (admin/teacher). Distinct from ADR-0004 PermissionRole.
@@ -501,6 +563,7 @@ model AuditEntry {
   id          String   @id @default(cuid())
   runId       String?
   projectId   String?
+  organizationId String?
   actorUserId String?
   action      String
   metadata    Json
@@ -508,9 +571,11 @@ model AuditEntry {
 
   actor   User?    @relation("auditActor", fields: [actorUserId], references: [id], onDelete: SetNull)
   project Project? @relation("projectAudit", fields: [projectId], references: [id], onDelete: SetNull)
+  organization Organization? @relation("organizationAudit", fields: [organizationId], references: [id], onDelete: SetNull)
 
   @@index([runId])
   @@index([projectId, createdAt])
+  @@index([organizationId, createdAt])
   @@index([actorUserId])
   @@index([createdAt])
 }

hub/src/admin/errors.ts

@@ -23,6 +23,12 @@ export async function handleRouteError(reply: FastifyReply, err: unknown): Promi
 
 function mapDomainError(message: string): { statusCode: number; code: string; message: string } | null {
   const lower = message.toLowerCase();
+  if (lower.includes("provider credential readiness check could not reach provider")) {
+    return { statusCode: 502, code: "provider_unavailable", message };
+  }
+  if (lower.includes("provider credential readiness check failed")) {
+    return { statusCode: 400, code: "provider_credential_rejected", message };
+  }
   if (lower.includes("not found")) {
     return { statusCode: 404, code: "not_found", message };
   }

hub/src/admin/plugin.ts

@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@ import type { PrismaClient } from "@prisma/client";
 import type { FastifyInstance } from "fastify";
 import { registerAuthRoutes } from "./routes/authRoutes.js";
 import { registerOrgRoutes } from "./routes/orgRoutes.js";
+import type { LocalSecretEnvelope } from "../security/secretEnvelope.js";
+import type { ProviderReadinessProbe } from "../connections/providerReadiness.js";
 
 export interface AdminPluginConfig {
   readonly prisma: PrismaClient;
@@ -14,6 +16,8 @@ export interface AdminPluginConfig {
   readonly feishuAppId: string;
   readonly feishuAppSecret: string;
   readonly projectWorkspaceRoot: string;
+  readonly secretEnvelope: LocalSecretEnvelope;
+  readonly providerReadinessProbe?: ProviderReadinessProbe;
   readonly cookieSecure?: boolean;
   readonly oauthScope?: string;
   readonly fetchImpl?: typeof fetch;
@@ -43,5 +47,9 @@ export async function registerAdminPlugin(
     prisma: config.prisma,
     sessionSecret: config.sessionSecret,
     projectWorkspaceRoot: config.projectWorkspaceRoot,
+    secretEnvelope: config.secretEnvelope,
+    ...(config.providerReadinessProbe !== undefined
+      ? { providerReadinessProbe: config.providerReadinessProbe }
+      : {}),
   });
 }

hub/src/admin/routes/orgRoutes.ts

@@ -14,11 +14,16 @@ import { registerExplorerRoutes } from "./explorerRoutes.js";
 import { registerMembersRoutes } from "./membersRoutes.js";
 import { registerSessionsAndUsageRoutes } from "./sessionsRoutes.js";
 import { registerTeamsRoutes } from "./teamsRoutes.js";
+import { registerProviderConnectionRoutes } from "./providerConnectionRoutes.js";
+import type { LocalSecretEnvelope } from "../../security/secretEnvelope.js";
+import type { ProviderReadinessProbe } from "../../connections/providerReadiness.js";
 
 export interface OrgRouteConfig {
   readonly prisma: PrismaClient;
   readonly sessionSecret: string;
   readonly projectWorkspaceRoot: string;
+  readonly secretEnvelope: LocalSecretEnvelope;
+  readonly providerReadinessProbe?: ProviderReadinessProbe;
 }
 
 export async function registerOrgRoutes(app: FastifyInstance, config: OrgRouteConfig): Promise<void> {
@@ -101,4 +106,12 @@ export async function registerOrgRoutes(app: FastifyInstance, config: OrgRouteCo
     prisma: config.prisma,
     sessionSecret: config.sessionSecret,
   });
+  await registerProviderConnectionRoutes(app, {
+    prisma: config.prisma,
+    sessionSecret: config.sessionSecret,
+    secretEnvelope: config.secretEnvelope,
+    ...(config.providerReadinessProbe !== undefined
+      ? { providerReadinessProbe: config.providerReadinessProbe }
+      : {}),
+  });
 }

hub/src/admin/routes/providerConnectionRoutes.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+import type { PrismaClient } from "@prisma/client";
+import type { FastifyInstance } from "fastify";
+import { ProviderConnectionService } from "../../connections/providerConnections.js";
+import type { LocalSecretEnvelope } from "../../security/secretEnvelope.js";
+import { requireOrgRole, type GuardDeps } from "../auth/guards.js";
+import { handleRouteError } from "../errors.js";
+import { ProviderReadinessError, type ProviderReadinessProbe } from "../../connections/providerReadiness.js";
+
+export interface ProviderConnectionRouteConfig {
+  readonly prisma: PrismaClient;
+  readonly sessionSecret: string;
+  readonly secretEnvelope: LocalSecretEnvelope;
+  readonly providerReadinessProbe?: ProviderReadinessProbe;
+}
+
+export async function registerProviderConnectionRoutes(
+  app: FastifyInstance,
+  config: ProviderConnectionRouteConfig,
+): Promise<void> {
+  const guardDeps: GuardDeps = { prisma: config.prisma, sessionSecret: config.sessionSecret };
+  const connections = new ProviderConnectionService(
+    config.prisma,
+    config.secretEnvelope,
+    config.providerReadinessProbe,
+  );
+
+  app.get("/api/org/:orgSlug/provider-connections", async (request, reply) => {
+    try {
+      const { orgSlug } = request.params as { orgSlug: string };
+      const auth = await requireOrgRole(request, reply, guardDeps, { orgSlug });
+      if (auth === null) return;
+      return {
+        connections: await connections.list(auth.organization.id),
+      };
+    } catch (error) {
+      request.log.error({
+        requestId: request.id,
+        operation: "provider_connection.list",
+        ...providerFailureFacts(error),
+      }, "provider connection read failed");
+      return handleRouteError(reply, error);
+    }
+  });
+
+  app.put("/api/org/:orgSlug/provider-connections/:providerId", async (request, reply) => {
+    try {
+      const { orgSlug, providerId } = request.params as { orgSlug: string; providerId: string };
+      const auth = await requireOrgRole(request, reply, guardDeps, { orgSlug });
+      if (auth === null) return;
+      const body = parseCredentialBody(request.body);
+      const result = await connections.rotateByok({
+        organizationId: auth.organization.id,
+        providerId,
+        actorUserId: auth.user.id,
+        ...body,
+      });
+      request.log.info({
+        organizationId: auth.organization.id,
+        connectionId: result.id,
+        providerId: result.providerId,
+        mode: result.mode,
+        status: result.status,
+        secretVersion: result.activeVersion,
+        keyId: result.keyId,
+      }, result.created ? "provider connection created" : "provider connection rotated");
+      return reply.status(result.created ? 201 : 200).send(withoutWriteResult(result));
+    } catch (error) {
+      request.log.error({
+        requestId: request.id,
+        operation: "provider_connection.rotate_byok",
+        ...providerFailureFacts(error),
+      }, "provider connection mutation failed");
+      return handleRouteError(reply, error);
+    }
+  });
+}
+
+function providerFailureFacts(error: unknown): {
+  readonly errorCode: string;
+  readonly failureCategory: string;
+  readonly upstreamStatus?: number;
+} {
+  if (error instanceof ProviderReadinessError) {
+    return {
+      errorCode: error.code,
+      failureCategory: error.category,
+      ...(error.upstreamStatus !== undefined ? { upstreamStatus: error.upstreamStatus } : {}),
+    };
+  }
+  return {
+    errorCode: "provider_connection_operation_failed",
+    failureCategory: error instanceof Error ? error.name : typeof error,
+  };
+}
+
+function parseCredentialBody(value: unknown): {
+  readonly baseUrl: string;
+  readonly authToken: string;
+  readonly anthropicApiKey?: string;
+} {
+  if (typeof value !== "object" || value === null || Array.isArray(value)) {
+    throw new Error("invalid provider credential body");
+  }
+  const body = value as Record<string, unknown>;
+  if (typeof body["baseUrl"] !== "string" || typeof body["authToken"] !== "string") {
+    throw new Error("provider baseUrl and authToken are required");
+  }
+  const anthropicApiKey = body["anthropicApiKey"];
+  if (anthropicApiKey !== undefined && typeof anthropicApiKey !== "string") {
+    throw new Error("invalid anthropicApiKey");
+  }
+  return {
+    baseUrl: body["baseUrl"],
+    authToken: body["authToken"],
+    ...(anthropicApiKey !== undefined ? { anthropicApiKey } : {}),
+  };
+}
+
+function withoutWriteResult<T extends { readonly created: boolean }>(result: T): Omit<T, "created"> {
+  const { created: _created, ...metadata } = result;
+  return metadata;
+}

hub/src/agent/runner.ts

@@ -56,7 +56,8 @@ export interface RunRequest {
   readonly model: string | undefined;
   readonly project: ProjectContext;
   readonly systemPrompt: string | undefined;
-  readonly providerEnv?: Record<string, string | undefined> | undefined;
+  /** Run-scoped loopback proxy capability; never an Organization provider credential. */
+  readonly providerProxyEnv?: Record<string, string | undefined> | undefined;
   readonly resumeSessionId?: string | undefined;
   /**
    * RoleEntry.tools from admin/runtime settings. Values are Hub role tool ids
@@ -125,7 +126,7 @@ export async function runAgent(req: RunRequest): Promise<RunResult> {
     const security = await createAgentSecurityPolicy({
       workspaceRoot,
       workspaceDir: req.project.workspaceDir,
-      providerEnv: req.providerEnv,
+      providerProxyEnv: req.providerProxyEnv,
     });
 
     type QueryOptions = NonNullable<Parameters<typeof query>[0]["options"]>;

hub/src/agent/security.ts

@@ -29,7 +29,8 @@ const SANDBOX_HIDDEN_ENV_KEYS = [
 export interface AgentSecurityInput {
   readonly workspaceRoot: string;
   readonly workspaceDir: string;
-  readonly providerEnv?: Readonly<Record<string, string | undefined>> | undefined;
+  /** Run-scoped loopback proxy capability; customer provider secrets are forbidden here. */
+  readonly providerProxyEnv?: Readonly<Record<string, string | undefined>> | undefined;
   readonly hostEnv?: Readonly<Record<string, string | undefined>> | undefined;
 }
 
@@ -103,7 +104,7 @@ export async function createAgentSecurityPolicy(input: AgentSecurityInput): Prom
   env.DO_NOT_TRACK = "1";
   env.CLAUDE_AGENT_SDK_CLIENT_APP = "cph-hub/0.0.0";
 
-  for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(input.providerEnv ?? {})) {
+  for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(input.providerProxyEnv ?? {})) {
     if (!PROVIDER_ENV_KEYS.has(name)) {
       throw new Error(`unsupported provider environment variable: ${name}`);
     }

hub/src/connections/networkFailure.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+export type NetworkFailureCategory =
+  | "timeout"
+  | "dns"
+  | "tls"
+  | "connection"
+  | "aborted"
+  | "network";
+
+/** Classify transport failures without retaining messages that may contain a URL. */
+export function classifyNetworkFailure(error: unknown): NetworkFailureCategory {
+  const chain = errorChain(error);
+  const names = chain.map((candidate) => candidate.name);
+  const codes = chain.flatMap((candidate) =>
+    typeof candidate.code === "string" ? [candidate.code.toUpperCase()] : []
+  );
+  if (names.includes("TimeoutError") || codes.some((code) => code === "ETIMEDOUT")) return "timeout";
+  if (names.includes("AbortError") || codes.some((code) => code === "ABORT_ERR")) return "aborted";
+  if (codes.some((code) => code === "ENOTFOUND" || code === "EAI_AGAIN")) return "dns";
+  if (codes.some((code) => code.includes("TLS") || code.includes("CERT") || code.includes("SSL"))) return "tls";
+  if (codes.some((code) => ["ECONNREFUSED", "ECONNRESET", "EHOSTUNREACH", "ENETUNREACH", "EPIPE"].includes(code))) {
+    return "connection";
+  }
+  return "network";
+}
+
+function errorChain(error: unknown): Array<{ readonly name: string; readonly code?: unknown }> {
+  const chain: Array<{ readonly name: string; readonly code?: unknown }> = [];
+  let candidate = error;
+  for (let depth = 0; depth < 4; depth += 1) {
+    if (typeof candidate !== "object" || candidate === null) break;
+    const record = candidate as { readonly name?: unknown; readonly code?: unknown; readonly cause?: unknown };
+    chain.push({
+      name: typeof record.name === "string" ? record.name : "Error",
+      ...(record.code !== undefined ? { code: record.code } : {}),
+    });
+    candidate = record.cause;
+  }
+  return chain;
+}

hub/src/connections/providerConnections.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,423 @@
+import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
+import type { Prisma, PrismaClient } from "@prisma/client";
+import { lockActiveOrganization } from "../org/status.js";
+import {
+  LocalSecretEnvelope,
+  type SecretEnvelopeV1,
+} from "../security/secretEnvelope.js";
+import { probeOpenRouterCredential, type ProviderReadinessProbe } from "./providerReadiness.js";
+
+const PROVIDER_ID_PATTERN = /^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9._-]{0,63}$/;
+
+export interface ProviderCredentialInput {
+  readonly baseUrl: string;
+  readonly authToken: string;
+  readonly anthropicApiKey?: string;
+}
+
+export interface RotateByokProviderInput extends ProviderCredentialInput {
+  readonly organizationId: string;
+  readonly providerId: string;
+  readonly actorUserId: string;
+}
+
+export interface ProviderConnectionMetadata {
+  readonly id: string;
+  readonly providerId: string;
+  readonly mode: "BYOK" | "PLATFORM_MANAGED";
+  readonly status: "DRAFT" | "ACTIVE" | "DISABLED";
+  readonly activeVersion: number | null;
+  readonly keyId: string | null;
+  readonly createdAt: Date;
+  readonly updatedAt: Date;
+}
+
+export interface ProviderConnectionWriteResult extends ProviderConnectionMetadata {
+  readonly created: boolean;
+}
+
+export interface ProviderSecretPayloadV1 {
+  readonly schemaVersion: 1;
+  readonly baseUrl: string;
+  readonly authToken: string;
+  readonly anthropicApiKey: string;
+}
+
+export class ProviderConnectionService {
+  constructor(
+    private readonly prisma: PrismaClient,
+    private readonly secrets: LocalSecretEnvelope,
+    private readonly readinessProbe: ProviderReadinessProbe = probeOpenRouterCredential,
+  ) {}
+
+  async rotateByok(input: RotateByokProviderInput): Promise<ProviderConnectionWriteResult> {
+    const payload = validateProviderCredential(input);
+    await this.prisma.$transaction(async (tx) => {
+      await requireByokActor(tx, input);
+    });
+    await this.readinessProbe({
+      providerId: input.providerId,
+      baseUrl: payload.baseUrl,
+      authToken: payload.authToken,
+      anthropicApiKey: payload.anthropicApiKey,
+    });
+
+    return this.prisma.$transaction(async (tx) => {
+      await requireByokActor(tx, input);
+      const connection = await tx.organizationProviderConnection.upsert({
+        where: {
+          organizationId_providerId: {
+            organizationId: input.organizationId,
+            providerId: input.providerId,
+          },
+        },
+        update: {},
+        create: {
+          id: randomUUID(),
+          organizationId: input.organizationId,
+          providerId: input.providerId,
+          mode: "BYOK",
+          status: "DRAFT",
+        },
+      });
+
+      await lockConnection(tx, connection.id);
+      const locked = await tx.organizationProviderConnection.findUniqueOrThrow({
+        where: { id: connection.id },
+        include: {
+          activeSecretVersion: { select: { id: true } },
+          secretVersions: {
+            orderBy: { version: "desc" },
+            take: 1,
+            select: { version: true },
+          },
+        },
+      });
+      if (locked.organizationId !== input.organizationId || locked.providerId !== input.providerId) {
+        throw new Error("provider connection scope changed while rotating credential");
+      }
+      if (locked.mode !== "BYOK") {
+        throw new Error(
+          "provider connection is managed by platform administrators and cannot be changed through organization API",
+        );
+      }
+
+      const version = (locked.secretVersions[0]?.version ?? 0) + 1;
+      const secretVersionId = randomUUID();
+      const envelope = this.secrets.encryptJson({
+        purpose: "provider-connection",
+        organizationId: input.organizationId,
+        connectionId: locked.id,
+        secretVersionId,
+      }, payload);
+      const now = new Date();
+
+      const secretVersion = await tx.providerCredentialVersion.create({
+        data: {
+          id: secretVersionId,
+          connectionId: locked.id,
+          version,
+          envelopeVersion: envelope.version,
+          keyId: envelope.keyId,
+          envelope: envelope as unknown as Prisma.InputJsonValue,
+          createdByUserId: input.actorUserId,
+        },
+      });
+      if (locked.activeSecretVersion !== null) {
+        await tx.providerCredentialVersion.update({
+          where: { id: locked.activeSecretVersion.id },
+          data: { retiredAt: now },
+        });
+      }
+      const activated = await tx.organizationProviderConnection.update({
+        where: { id: locked.id },
+        data: {
+          status: "ACTIVE",
+          activeSecretVersionId: secretVersion.id,
+          activatedAt: now,
+          disabledAt: null,
+        },
+      });
+      await tx.auditEntry.create({
+        data: {
+          organizationId: input.organizationId,
+          actorUserId: input.actorUserId,
+          action: version === 1 ? "provider_connection.created" : "provider_connection.rotated",
+          metadata: {
+            connectionId: locked.id,
+            providerId: input.providerId,
+            mode: "BYOK",
+            status: "ACTIVE",
+            secretVersion: version,
+            envelopeVersion: envelope.version,
+            keyId: envelope.keyId,
+          },
+        },
+      });
+
+      return {
+        ...metadata(activated, { version, keyId: secretVersion.keyId }),
+        created: version === 1,
+      };
+    });
+  }
+
+  async list(organizationId: string): Promise<readonly ProviderConnectionMetadata[]> {
+    return this.prisma.$transaction(async (tx) => {
+      await lockActiveOrganization(tx, organizationId);
+      const connections = await tx.organizationProviderConnection.findMany({
+        where: { organizationId },
+        orderBy: [{ providerId: "asc" }, { createdAt: "asc" }],
+        include: {
+          activeSecretVersion: {
+            select: { version: true, keyId: true },
+          },
+        },
+      });
+      return connections.map((connection) => metadata(connection, connection.activeSecretVersion));
+    });
+  }
+}
+
+export function decryptStoredProviderCredential(
+  secrets: LocalSecretEnvelope,
+  input: {
+    readonly organizationId: string;
+    readonly connectionId: string;
+    readonly providerId: string;
+    readonly secretVersionId: string;
+    readonly envelopeVersion: number;
+    readonly keyId: string;
+    readonly envelope: Prisma.JsonValue;
+  },
+): ProviderSecretPayloadV1 {
+  if (input.envelopeVersion !== 1) {
+    throw new Error(`unsupported provider secret envelope version: ${input.envelopeVersion}`);
+  }
+  const envelope = input.envelope as unknown as SecretEnvelopeV1;
+  if (envelope.keyId !== input.keyId || envelope.version !== input.envelopeVersion) {
+    throw new Error("provider secret envelope metadata mismatch");
+  }
+  const payload = secrets.decryptJson<unknown>({
+    purpose: "provider-connection",
+    organizationId: input.organizationId,
+    connectionId: input.connectionId,
+    secretVersionId: input.secretVersionId,
+  }, envelope);
+  return validateStoredProviderPayload(payload, input.providerId);
+}
+
+export async function verifyStoredProviderEnvelopes(
+  prisma: PrismaClient | Prisma.TransactionClient,
+  secrets: LocalSecretEnvelope,
+): Promise<number> {
+  const versions = await prisma.providerCredentialVersion.findMany({
+    select: {
+      id: true,
+      envelopeVersion: true,
+      keyId: true,
+      envelope: true,
+      connection: {
+        select: { id: true, organizationId: true, providerId: true },
+      },
+    },
+  });
+  for (const version of versions) {
+    decryptStoredProviderCredential(secrets, {
+      organizationId: version.connection.organizationId,
+      connectionId: version.connection.id,
+      providerId: version.connection.providerId,
+      secretVersionId: version.id,
+      envelopeVersion: version.envelopeVersion,
+      keyId: version.keyId,
+      envelope: version.envelope,
+    });
+  }
+  return versions.length;
+}
+
+export async function rewrapStoredProviderEnvelopes(
+  prisma: Prisma.TransactionClient,
+  secrets: LocalSecretEnvelope,
+): Promise<{ readonly verified: number; readonly rewrapped: number }> {
+  const versions = await prisma.providerCredentialVersion.findMany({
+    select: {
+      id: true,
+      envelopeVersion: true,
+      keyId: true,
+      envelope: true,
+      connection: {
+        select: { id: true, organizationId: true, providerId: true },
+      },
+    },
+    orderBy: { createdAt: "asc" },
+  });
+  let rewrapped = 0;
+  for (const version of versions) {
+    const binding = {
+      purpose: "provider-connection",
+      organizationId: version.connection.organizationId,
+      connectionId: version.connection.id,
+      secretVersionId: version.id,
+    } as const;
+    decryptStoredProviderCredential(secrets, {
+      organizationId: version.connection.organizationId,
+      connectionId: version.connection.id,
+      providerId: version.connection.providerId,
+      secretVersionId: version.id,
+      envelopeVersion: version.envelopeVersion,
+      keyId: version.keyId,
+      envelope: version.envelope,
+    });
+    if (version.keyId === secrets.activeKeyId) continue;
+
+    const envelope = version.envelope as unknown as SecretEnvelopeV1;
+    const nextEnvelope = secrets.rewrap(binding, envelope);
+    const updated = await prisma.providerCredentialVersion.updateMany({
+      where: { id: version.id, keyId: version.keyId },
+      data: {
+        keyId: nextEnvelope.keyId,
+        envelope: nextEnvelope as unknown as Prisma.InputJsonValue,
+      },
+    });
+    if (updated.count !== 1) {
+      throw new Error(`provider secret envelope changed during KEK rotation: ${version.id}`);
+    }
+    await prisma.auditEntry.create({
+      data: {
+        organizationId: version.connection.organizationId,
+        action: "provider_secret.kek_rewrapped",
+        metadata: {
+          connectionId: version.connection.id,
+          providerId: version.connection.providerId,
+          secretVersionId: version.id,
+          previousKeyId: version.keyId,
+          keyId: nextEnvelope.keyId,
+        },
+      },
+    });
+    rewrapped += 1;
+  }
+  const verified = await verifyStoredProviderEnvelopes(prisma, secrets);
+  const remaining = await prisma.providerCredentialVersion.count({
+    where: { keyId: { not: secrets.activeKeyId } },
+  });
+  if (remaining !== 0) {
+    throw new Error(`KEK rotation left ${remaining} provider envelope(s) on a non-active key`);
+  }
+  return { verified, rewrapped };
+}
+
+function validateProviderCredential(input: RotateByokProviderInput): ProviderSecretPayloadV1 {
+  if (!PROVIDER_ID_PATTERN.test(input.providerId)) {
+    throw new Error("invalid provider connection id");
+  }
+  let baseUrl: URL;
+  try {
+    baseUrl = new URL(input.baseUrl);
+  } catch (error) {
+    throw new Error("invalid provider base URL", { cause: error });
+  }
+  if (baseUrl.protocol !== "https:") {
+    throw new Error("invalid provider base URL: HTTPS is required");
+  }
+  const authToken = input.authToken.trim();
+  if (authToken === "") {
+    throw new Error("provider auth token is required");
+  }
+  return {
+    schemaVersion: 1,
+    baseUrl: baseUrl.toString().replace(/\/$/, ""),
+    authToken,
+    anthropicApiKey: input.anthropicApiKey?.trim() ?? "",
+  };
+}
+
+function metadata(
+  connection: {
+    readonly id: string;
+    readonly providerId: string;
+    readonly mode: "BYOK" | "PLATFORM_MANAGED";
+    readonly status: "DRAFT" | "ACTIVE" | "DISABLED";
+    readonly createdAt: Date;
+    readonly updatedAt: Date;
+  },
+  secret: { readonly version: number; readonly keyId: string } | null,
+): ProviderConnectionMetadata {
+  return {
+    id: connection.id,
+    providerId: connection.providerId,
+    mode: connection.mode,
+    status: connection.status,
+    activeVersion: secret?.version ?? null,
+    keyId: secret?.keyId ?? null,
+    createdAt: connection.createdAt,
+    updatedAt: connection.updatedAt,
+  };
+}
+
+function validateStoredProviderPayload(value: unknown, providerId: string): ProviderSecretPayloadV1 {
+  if (!isRecord(value) || value["schemaVersion"] !== 1 || typeof value["baseUrl"] !== "string" ||
+      typeof value["authToken"] !== "string" || typeof value["anthropicApiKey"] !== "string" ||
+      value["authToken"].trim() === "") {
+    throw new Error(`invalid encrypted provider credential payload: ${providerId}`);
+  }
+  let baseUrl: URL;
+  try {
+    baseUrl = new URL(value["baseUrl"]);
+  } catch (error) {
+    throw new Error(`invalid encrypted provider credential payload: ${providerId}`, { cause: error });
+  }
+  if (baseUrl.protocol !== "https:") {
+    throw new Error(`invalid encrypted provider credential payload: ${providerId}`);
+  }
+  return {
+    schemaVersion: 1,
+    baseUrl: value["baseUrl"],
+    authToken: value["authToken"],
+    anthropicApiKey: value["anthropicApiKey"],
+  };
+}
+
+function isRecord(value: unknown): value is Record<string, unknown> {
+  return typeof value === "object" && value !== null && !Array.isArray(value);
+}
+
+async function lockConnection(tx: Prisma.TransactionClient, connectionId: string): Promise<void> {
+  await tx.$queryRaw`SELECT "id" FROM "OrganizationProviderConnection" WHERE "id" = ${connectionId} FOR UPDATE`;
+}
+
+async function requireByokActor(
+  tx: Prisma.TransactionClient,
+  input: Pick<RotateByokProviderInput, "organizationId" | "providerId" | "actorUserId">,
+): Promise<void> {
+  await lockActiveOrganization(tx, input.organizationId);
+  const [authorizedActor, existingConnection] = await Promise.all([
+    tx.organizationMembership.findFirst({
+      where: {
+        organizationId: input.organizationId,
+        userId: input.actorUserId,
+        role: { in: ["OWNER", "ADMIN"] },
+        revokedAt: null,
+      },
+      select: { id: true },
+    }),
+    tx.organizationProviderConnection.findUnique({
+      where: {
+        organizationId_providerId: {
+          organizationId: input.organizationId,
+          providerId: input.providerId,
+        },
+      },
+      select: { mode: true },
+    }),
+  ]);
+  if (authorizedActor === null) {
+    throw new Error("BYOK provider rotation requires an active Organization OWNER or ADMIN");
+  }
+  if (existingConnection?.mode === "PLATFORM_MANAGED") {
+    throw new Error(
+      "provider connection is managed by platform administrators and cannot be changed through organization API",
+    );
+  }
+}

hub/src/connections/providerProxy.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,225 @@
+import { randomBytes, timingSafeEqual } from "node:crypto";
+import { createServer, type IncomingHttpHeaders, type IncomingMessage, type ServerResponse } from "node:http";
+import { once } from "node:events";
+import { classifyNetworkFailure, type NetworkFailureCategory } from "./networkFailure.js";
+
+const MAX_PROVIDER_REQUEST_BYTES = 32 * 1024 * 1024;
+const HOP_BY_HOP_HEADERS = new Set([
+  "connection",
+  "keep-alive",
+  "proxy-authenticate",
+  "proxy-authorization",
+  "te",
+  "trailer",
+  "transfer-encoding",
+  "upgrade",
+]);
+const REPLACED_REQUEST_HEADERS = new Set([
+  ...HOP_BY_HOP_HEADERS,
+  "authorization",
+  "content-length",
+  "host",
+  "x-api-key",
+]);
+
+export interface ProviderUpstreamCredential {
+  readonly baseUrl: string;
+  readonly authToken: string;
+  readonly anthropicApiKey: string;
+}
+
+export interface AgentProviderLease {
+  readonly sdkEnv: Readonly<Record<string, string | undefined>>;
+  readonly sensitiveValues: readonly string[];
+  close(): Promise<void>;
+}
+
+export interface ProviderProxyDiagnostic {
+  readonly code:
+    | "provider_proxy_unauthorized"
+    | "provider_proxy_request_too_large"
+    | "provider_proxy_redirect_refused"
+    | "provider_proxy_upstream_failed";
+  readonly category: NetworkFailureCategory | "authorization" | "request_limit" | "redirect";
+}
+
+export interface ProviderProxyOptions {
+  readonly onDiagnostic?: (diagnostic: ProviderProxyDiagnostic) => void;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Starts one loopback-only proxy for one Agent run. The Agent receives only a
+ * random run capability; customer provider credentials stay in this Hub
+ * closure and are attached immediately before the upstream request.
+ */
+export async function openProviderProxyLease(
+  upstream: ProviderUpstreamCredential,
+  options: ProviderProxyOptions = {},
+): Promise<AgentProviderLease> {
+  const capability = randomBytes(32).toString("base64url");
+  const handler = (request: IncomingMessage, response: ServerResponse): void => {
+    void forwardProviderRequest(request, response, capability, upstream, options);
+  };
+  const server = createServer(handler);
+  server.requestTimeout = 5 * 60_000;
+  server.headersTimeout = 30_000;
+  server.maxRequestsPerSocket = 1_000;
+  server.listen(0, "127.0.0.1");
+  await Promise.race([
+    once(server, "listening"),
+    once(server, "error").then(([error]) => Promise.reject(error)),
+  ]);
+  server.unref();
+  const address = server.address();
+  if (address === null || typeof address === "string") {
+    server.close();
+    throw new Error("provider proxy did not bind a TCP address");
+  }
+
+  let closed = false;
+  return {
+    sdkEnv: {
+      ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL: `http://127.0.0.1:${address.port}`,
+      ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN: capability,
+      ANTHROPIC_API_KEY: "",
+    },
+    sensitiveValues: [capability],
+    async close(): Promise<void> {
+      if (closed) return;
+      closed = true;
+      server.closeAllConnections();
+      if (!server.listening) return;
+      server.close();
+      await once(server, "close");
+    },
+  };
+}
+
+async function forwardProviderRequest(
+  request: IncomingMessage,
+  response: ServerResponse,
+  capability: string,
+  upstream: ProviderUpstreamCredential,
+  options: ProviderProxyOptions,
+): Promise<void> {
+  if (!authorized(request.headers.authorization, capability)) {
+    options.onDiagnostic?.({ code: "provider_proxy_unauthorized", category: "authorization" });
+    response.writeHead(401, { "content-type": "text/plain; charset=utf-8" });
+    response.end("unauthorized");
+    return;
+  }
+
+  try {
+    const requestUrl = new URL(request.url ?? "/", "http://provider-proxy.invalid");
+    const upstreamBase = upstream.baseUrl.endsWith("/") ? upstream.baseUrl : `${upstream.baseUrl}/`;
+    const upstreamUrl = new URL(`${requestUrl.pathname.replace(/^\//, "")}${requestUrl.search}`, upstreamBase);
+    const body = await readBoundedBody(request);
+    const headers = forwardedRequestHeaders(request.headers);
+    headers.set("authorization", `Bearer ${upstream.authToken}`);
+    if (upstream.anthropicApiKey !== "") {
+      headers.set("x-api-key", upstream.anthropicApiKey);
+    }
+    headers.set("accept-encoding", "identity");
+
+    const abort = new AbortController();
+    request.once("aborted", () => abort.abort());
+    const upstreamResponse = await fetch(upstreamUrl, {
+      method: request.method ?? "GET",
+      headers,
+      ...(body.byteLength === 0 ? {} : { body }),
+      redirect: "manual",
+      signal: abort.signal,
+    });
+    if (upstreamResponse.status >= 300 && upstreamResponse.status < 400) {
+      options.onDiagnostic?.({ code: "provider_proxy_redirect_refused", category: "redirect" });
+      await upstreamResponse.body?.cancel();
+      response.writeHead(502, { "content-type": "text/plain; charset=utf-8" });
+      response.end("provider redirect refused");
+      return;
+    }
+    response.writeHead(upstreamResponse.status, forwardedResponseHeaders(upstreamResponse.headers));
+    if (upstreamResponse.body === null) {
+      response.end();
+      return;
+    }
+    for await (const chunk of upstreamResponse.body) {
+      if (!response.write(Buffer.from(chunk))) {
+        await once(response, "drain");
+      }
+    }
+    response.end();
+  } catch (error) {
+    const diagnostic = error instanceof ProviderProxyRequestError
+      ? { code: error.code, category: error.category } as const
+      : {
+          code: "provider_proxy_upstream_failed",
+          category: classifyNetworkFailure(error),
+        } as const;
+    options.onDiagnostic?.(diagnostic);
+    if (!response.headersSent) {
+      response.writeHead(502, { "content-type": "text/plain; charset=utf-8" });
+      response.end("provider request failed");
+    } else {
+      response.destroy();
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+function authorized(value: string | undefined, capability: string): boolean {
+  if (value === undefined || !value.startsWith("Bearer ")) return false;
+  const supplied = Buffer.from(value.slice("Bearer ".length));
+  const expected = Buffer.from(capability);
+  return supplied.byteLength === expected.byteLength && timingSafeEqual(supplied, expected);
+}
+
+function forwardedRequestHeaders(source: IncomingHttpHeaders): Headers {
+  const result = new Headers();
+  for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(source)) {
+    if (value === undefined || REPLACED_REQUEST_HEADERS.has(name.toLowerCase())) continue;
+    if (Array.isArray(value)) {
+      for (const item of value) result.append(name, item);
+    } else {
+      result.set(name, value);
+    }
+  }
+  return result;
+}
+
+function forwardedResponseHeaders(source: Headers): Record<string, string> {
+  const result: Record<string, string> = {};
+  for (const [name, value] of source.entries()) {
+    const normalized = name.toLowerCase();
+    if (HOP_BY_HOP_HEADERS.has(normalized) || normalized === "content-length" ||
+        normalized === "content-encoding") continue;
+    result[name] = value;
+  }
+  return result;
+}
+
+async function readBoundedBody(request: IncomingMessage): Promise<Buffer> {
+  const declared = Number(request.headers["content-length"] ?? 0);
+  if (Number.isFinite(declared) && declared > MAX_PROVIDER_REQUEST_BYTES) {
+    throw new ProviderProxyRequestError("provider_proxy_request_too_large", "request_limit");
+  }
+  const chunks: Buffer[] = [];
+  let bytes = 0;
+  for await (const chunk of request) {
+    const buffer = Buffer.isBuffer(chunk) ? chunk : Buffer.from(chunk as Uint8Array);
+    bytes += buffer.byteLength;
+    if (bytes > MAX_PROVIDER_REQUEST_BYTES) {
+      throw new ProviderProxyRequestError("provider_proxy_request_too_large", "request_limit");
+    }
+    chunks.push(buffer);
+  }
+  return Buffer.concat(chunks, bytes);
+}
+
+class ProviderProxyRequestError extends Error {
+  constructor(
+    readonly code: "provider_proxy_request_too_large",
+    readonly category: "request_limit",
+  ) {
+    super(code);
+    this.name = "ProviderProxyRequestError";
+  }
+}

hub/src/connections/providerReadiness.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+import { classifyNetworkFailure, type NetworkFailureCategory } from "./networkFailure.js";
+
+export interface ProviderReadinessInput {
+  readonly providerId: string;
+  readonly baseUrl: string;
+  readonly authToken: string;
+  readonly anthropicApiKey: string;
+}
+
+export type ProviderReadinessProbe = (input: ProviderReadinessInput) => Promise<void>;
+
+export class ProviderReadinessError extends Error {
+  constructor(
+    readonly code: "provider_readiness_unsupported" | "provider_readiness_unreachable" | "provider_readiness_rejected",
+    message: string,
+    readonly category: NetworkFailureCategory | "configuration" | "http",
+    readonly upstreamStatus?: number,
+  ) {
+    super(message);
+    this.name = "ProviderReadinessError";
+  }
+}
+
+/** Verify the pilot's OpenRouter credential without starting or billing a model run. */
+export async function probeOpenRouterCredential(input: ProviderReadinessInput): Promise<void> {
+  if (input.providerId !== "openrouter") {
+    throw new ProviderReadinessError(
+      "provider_readiness_unsupported",
+      `provider readiness probe is unavailable: ${input.providerId}`,
+      "configuration",
+    );
+  }
+  const base = input.baseUrl.endsWith("/") ? input.baseUrl : `${input.baseUrl}/`;
+  const url = new URL("v1/key", base);
+  const headers = new Headers({
+    authorization: `Bearer ${input.authToken}`,
+    accept: "application/json",
+  });
+  if (input.anthropicApiKey !== "") headers.set("x-api-key", input.anthropicApiKey);
+
+  let response: Response;
+  try {
+    response = await fetch(url, {
+      method: "GET",
+      headers,
+      redirect: "manual",
+      signal: AbortSignal.timeout(10_000),
+    });
+  } catch (error) {
+    throw new ProviderReadinessError(
+      "provider_readiness_unreachable",
+      "provider credential readiness check could not reach provider",
+      classifyNetworkFailure(error),
+    );
+  }
+  await response.body?.cancel();
+  if (!response.ok) {
+    throw new ProviderReadinessError(
+      "provider_readiness_rejected",
+      `provider credential readiness check failed: status ${response.status}`,
+      "http",
+      response.status,
+    );
+  }
+}

hub/src/deployment/preflight-cli.ts

@@ -1,11 +1,13 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env node
 import { execFile } from "node:child_process";
 import { constants } from "node:fs";
-import { access, readFile, realpath, stat } from "node:fs/promises";
+import { access, lstat, readFile, realpath, stat } from "node:fs/promises";
 import { basename, dirname, join, resolve } from "node:path";
 import { promisify } from "node:util";
 import { PrismaClient } from "@prisma/client";
 import { parse } from "dotenv";
+import { LocalSecretEnvelope, loadLocalSecretKeyring } from "../security/secretEnvelope.js";
+import { verifyStoredProviderEnvelopes } from "../connections/providerConnections.js";
 import {
   DeploymentPreflightError,
   validateDeploymentPreflight,
@@ -18,6 +20,7 @@ const execFileAsync = promisify(execFile);
 
 interface Options {
   readonly envFile: string;
+  readonly keyringFile: string;
   readonly nodeBin: string;
   readonly runuserBin: string;
   readonly setprivBin: string;
@@ -47,6 +50,7 @@ async function main(): Promise<void> {
   const canonicalInput = await canonicalizeInput(rawInput);
   const result = validateDeploymentPreflight(canonicalInput);
   await validateSecretFile(options.envFile);
+  const secretEnvelope = await validateKeyringFile(options.keyringFile);
   await validateNodeVersion(options.nodeBin);
   await validateExecutable(options.runuserBin, "runuser");
   await validateExecutable(options.setprivBin, "setpriv");
@@ -56,7 +60,7 @@ async function main(): Promise<void> {
   await validateExecutable(options.pgIsReadyBin, "pg_isready");
   await validateCph(result.cphBin);
   await validatePostgres(options.pgIsReadyBin, result);
-  await validatePostgresQuery(result.databaseUrl);
+  await validatePostgresQuery(result.databaseUrl, secretEnvelope);
 
   if (options.serviceUid !== undefined && options.serviceGid !== undefined) {
     await validateProvisionedDirectories(canonicalInput, options.serviceUid, options.serviceGid);
@@ -125,6 +129,22 @@ async function validateSecretFile(path: string): Promise<void> {
   }
 }
 
+async function validateKeyringFile(path: string): Promise<LocalSecretEnvelope> {
+  const metadata = await lstat(path);
+  if (metadata.isSymbolicLink() || !metadata.isFile()) {
+    throw new Error(`local secret keyring is not a regular non-symlink file: ${path}`);
+  }
+  if ((metadata.mode & 0o077) !== 0) {
+    throw new Error(`local secret keyring must not be accessible by group or others: ${path}`);
+  }
+  const keyring = await loadLocalSecretKeyring({
+    NODE_ENV: "preflight",
+    HUB_SECRET_KEYRING_FILE: path,
+  });
+  console.log("[preflight] local secret keyring is valid");
+  return new LocalSecretEnvelope(keyring);
+}
+
 async function validateNodeVersion(nodeBin: string): Promise<void> {
   let stdout: string;
   try {
@@ -189,14 +209,44 @@ async function validatePostgres(pgIsReadyBin: string, result: DeploymentPrefligh
   console.log("[preflight] PostgreSQL is accepting connections");
 }
 
-async function validatePostgresQuery(databaseUrl: string): Promise<void> {
+async function validatePostgresQuery(
+  databaseUrl: string,
+  secretEnvelope: LocalSecretEnvelope,
+): Promise<void> {
   const client = new PrismaClient({
     datasources: { db: { url: databaseUrl } },
     log: [],
   });
   let queryFailure: unknown;
+  let envelopeFailure: unknown;
   try {
     await client.$queryRawUnsafe("SELECT 1");
+    const migrationTable = await client.$queryRaw<Array<{ relation: string | null }>>`
+      SELECT to_regclass('public."_prisma_migrations"')::text AS "relation"
+    `;
+    if (migrationTable[0]?.relation === null || migrationTable[0]?.relation === undefined) {
+      console.log("[preflight] empty database has no migration table or stored provider envelopes");
+    } else {
+      const migration = await client.$queryRaw<Array<{ finished_at: Date | null; rolled_back_at: Date | null }>>`
+        SELECT "finished_at", "rolled_back_at"
+        FROM "_prisma_migrations"
+        WHERE "migration_name" = '20260710220000_org_provider_secret_envelopes'
+        ORDER BY "started_at" DESC
+        LIMIT 1
+      `;
+      const applied = migration[0]?.finished_at !== null && migration[0]?.finished_at !== undefined &&
+        migration[0]?.rolled_back_at === null;
+      if (!applied) {
+        console.log("[preflight] provider envelope migration is pending; no stored envelopes to authenticate");
+      } else {
+        try {
+          const verified = await verifyStoredProviderEnvelopes(client, secretEnvelope);
+          console.log(`[preflight] authenticated ${verified} stored provider envelope(s)`);
+        } catch (error) {
+          envelopeFailure = error;
+        }
+      }
+    }
   } catch (error) {
     queryFailure = error;
   }
@@ -222,6 +272,12 @@ async function validatePostgresQuery(databaseUrl: string): Promise<void> {
       { cause: disconnectFailure },
     );
   }
+  if (envelopeFailure !== undefined) {
+    throw new Error(
+      `stored provider envelope verification failed (${formatFailure(envelopeFailure)})`,
+      { cause: envelopeFailure },
+    );
+  }
   console.log("[preflight] PostgreSQL authenticated query succeeded");
 }
 
@@ -383,6 +439,7 @@ function parseArgs(argv: readonly string[]): Options {
 
   const allowed = new Set([
     "--env-file",
+    "--keyring-file",
     "--node-bin",
     "--runuser-bin",
     "--setpriv-bin",
@@ -411,6 +468,7 @@ function parseArgs(argv: readonly string[]): Options {
 
   return {
     envFile: required(values, "--env-file"),
+    keyringFile: required(values, "--keyring-file"),
     nodeBin: required(values, "--node-bin"),
     runuserBin: required(values, "--runuser-bin"),
     setprivBin: required(values, "--setpriv-bin"),

hub/src/deployment/preflight.ts

@@ -83,12 +83,11 @@ export function validateDeploymentPreflight(input: DeploymentPreflightInput): De
     problems.push("DATABASE_URL must be a valid postgresql:// or postgres:// URL");
   }
 
-  const providerBaseUrl = readRequired(input.env, "ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL", problems);
+  for (const name of ["ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL", "ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN", "ANTHROPIC_API_KEY"] as const) {
-  if (providerBaseUrl !== undefined && !isHttpUrl(providerBaseUrl)) {
+    if (Object.hasOwn(input.env, name)) {
-    problems.push("ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL must be a valid http(s) URL");
+      problems.push(`${name} must not be set; configure Organization Provider Connections`);
+    }
   }
-  readRequired(input.env, "ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN", problems);
-  requirePresentAndEmpty(input.env, "ANTHROPIC_API_KEY", problems);
 
   readRequired(input.env, "FEISHU_APP_ID", problems);
   readRequired(input.env, "FEISHU_APP_SECRET", problems);
@@ -139,12 +138,6 @@ function readRequired(env: DeploymentEnv, name: string, problems: string[]): str
   return value;
 }
 
-function requirePresentAndEmpty(env: DeploymentEnv, name: string, problems: string[]): void {
-  if (!Object.hasOwn(env, name) || env[name] === undefined || env[name]?.trim() !== "") {
-    problems.push(`${name} must be present and empty`);
-  }
-}
-
 function validateOptionalPositiveInteger(env: DeploymentEnv, name: string, problems: string[]): void {
   const raw = env[name]?.trim();
   if (raw === undefined || raw === "") return;
@@ -184,15 +177,6 @@ function isPostgresUrl(value: string): boolean {
   }
 }
 
-function isHttpUrl(value: string): boolean {
-  try {
-    const url = new URL(value);
-    return (url.protocol === "https:" || url.protocol === "http:") && url.hostname !== "";
-  } catch {
-    return false;
-  }
-}
-
 function isHttpsUrl(value: string): boolean {
   try {
     const url = new URL(value);

hub/src/deployment/rotate-secret-kek.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env node
+import { execFile } from "node:child_process";
+import { promisify } from "node:util";
+import { PrismaClient } from "@prisma/client";
+import { rotateLocalKek } from "../security/localKekRotation.js";
+
+const execFileAsync = promisify(execFile);
+const SERVICE_UNIT = "cph-hub.service";
+
+async function main(): Promise<void> {
+  if (process.getuid?.() !== 0) {
+    throw new Error("local KEK rotation must run as root");
+  }
+  await requireStoppedService();
+  const keyringFile = parseKeyringFile(process.argv.slice(2));
+  const databaseUrl = process.env["DATABASE_URL"]?.trim();
+  if (databaseUrl === undefined || databaseUrl === "") {
+    throw new Error("DATABASE_URL is required for local KEK rotation");
+  }
+  const prisma = new PrismaClient({ datasources: { db: { url: databaseUrl } }, log: [] });
+  try {
+    const result = await rotateLocalKek({ keyringFile, prisma });
+    console.log(
+      `[secret-kek] active=${result.activeKeyId} rewrapped=${result.rewrapped} verified=${result.verified}`,
+    );
+    console.log("[secret-kek] back up the updated keyring separately before retiring any previous key");
+  } finally {
+    await prisma.$disconnect();
+  }
+}
+
+async function requireStoppedService(): Promise<void> {
+  let activeState: string;
+  try {
+    const { stdout } = await execFileAsync(
+      "systemctl",
+      ["show", "--property=ActiveState", "--value", SERVICE_UNIT],
+      { timeout: 10_000 },
+    );
+    activeState = stdout.trim();
+  } catch {
+    throw new Error(`cannot verify that ${SERVICE_UNIT} is stopped`);
+  }
+  if (activeState !== "inactive" && activeState !== "failed") {
+    throw new Error(`${SERVICE_UNIT} must be stopped before local KEK rotation; state=${activeState || "unknown"}`);
+  }
+}
+
+function parseKeyringFile(argv: readonly string[]): string {
+  if (argv.length !== 2 || argv[0] !== "--keyring-file" || argv[1] === undefined || argv[1] === "") {
+    throw new Error("usage: rotate-secret-kek --keyring-file /absolute/path/to/secret-keyring.json");
+  }
+  return argv[1];
+}
+
+main().catch((error: unknown) => {
+  console.error(`[secret-kek] failed: ${error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)}`);
+  process.exitCode = 1;
+});

hub/src/feishu/trigger.ts

@@ -410,63 +410,72 @@ export function makeTriggerHandler(deps: TriggerDeps): TriggerHandler {
     // stop the SDK query. Cleared in the finally below.
     const abortController = new AbortController();
     activeRuns.set(run.id, abortController);
-    const sdkStderr = createAgentSdkStderrSink({
+    const agentExecution = (async () => {
-      logger: deps.logger,
+      const providerLease = await provider.openAgentLease({ runId: run.id });
-      runId: run.id,
+      const sdkStderr = createAgentSdkStderrSink({
-      projectId,
+        logger: deps.logger,
-      sensitiveValues: Object.values(provider.sdkEnv),
+        runId: run.id,
-    });
+        projectId,
-    runAgent({
+        sensitiveValues: providerLease.sensitiveValues,
-      prompt: promptForAgent,
+      });
-      model,
+      try {
-      project: projectCtx,
+        return await runAgent({
-      systemPrompt,
+          prompt: promptForAgent,
-      providerEnv: provider.sdkEnv,
+          model,
-      resumeSessionId: sessionMetadata.claudeSessionId,
+          project: projectCtx,
-      tools: roleTools,
+          systemPrompt,
-      mcpServers: { cph_hub: fileDeliveryMcpServer },
+          providerProxyEnv: { ...providerLease.sdkEnv },
-      maxTurns: runPolicy.maxTurns,
+          resumeSessionId: sessionMetadata.claudeSessionId,
-      runId: run.id,
+          tools: roleTools,
-      sessionId: session.id,
+          mcpServers: { cph_hub: fileDeliveryMcpServer },
-      prisma: deps.prisma,
+          maxTurns: runPolicy.maxTurns,
-      abortController,
+          runId: run.id,
-      onSdkStderr: sdkStderr.write,
+          sessionId: session.id,
-      onStream: (event) => {
+          prisma: deps.prisma,
-        switch (event.type) {
+          abortController,
-          case "text-delta":
+          onSdkStderr: sdkStderr.write,
-            card.appendText(event.text);
+          onStream: (event) => {
-            break;
+            switch (event.type) {
-          case "thinking-delta":
+              case "text-delta":
-            card.appendReasoning(event.text);
+                card.appendText(event.text);
-            break;
+                break;
-          case "tool-start":
+              case "thinking-delta":
-            card.onToolStart(event.toolName, event.toolUseId);
+                card.appendReasoning(event.text);
-            break;
+                break;
-          case "tool-end":
+              case "tool-start":
-            card.onToolEnd({
+                card.onToolStart(event.toolName, event.toolUseId);
-              toolName: event.toolName,
+                break;
-              toolUseId: event.toolUseId,
+              case "tool-end":
-              input: event.input,
+                card.onToolEnd({
-              result: undefined,
+                  toolName: event.toolName,
-              error: undefined,
+                  toolUseId: event.toolUseId,
-              durationMs: event.durationMs,
+                  input: event.input,
-            });
+                  result: undefined,
-            break;
+                  error: undefined,
-          case "tool-result":
+                  durationMs: event.durationMs,
-            card.onToolEnd({
+                });
-              toolName: event.toolName,
+                break;
-              toolUseId: event.toolUseId,
+              case "tool-result":
-              input: undefined,
+                card.onToolEnd({
-              result: event.result,
+                  toolName: event.toolName,
-              error: event.isError ? event.result : undefined,
+                  toolUseId: event.toolUseId,
-              durationMs: event.durationMs,
+                  input: undefined,
-            });
+                  result: event.result,
-            break;
+                  error: event.isError ? event.result : undefined,
-          case "finish":
+                  durationMs: event.durationMs,
-            break;
+                });
-        }
+                break;
-      },
+              case "finish":
-    })
+                break;
+            }
+          },
+        });
+      } finally {
+        sdkStderr.flush();
+        await providerLease.close();
+      }
+    })();
+    agentExecution
       .then(async (result) => {
         const interrupted = result.status === "interrupted";
         const finalText =
@@ -519,7 +528,6 @@ export function makeTriggerHandler(deps: TriggerDeps): TriggerHandler {
         await writeAudit(deps.prisma, { runId: run.id, projectId, action: "run.failed", metadata: { error: String(e) } });
       })
       .finally(async () => {
-        sdkStderr.flush();
         try {
           await releaseLock(deps.prisma, run.id);
         } catch (e) {

hub/src/hub.ts

@@ -5,7 +5,10 @@ import { createLarkClient, startFeishuListenerWithClient } from "./feishu/client
 import { makeTriggerHandler } from "./feishu/trigger.js";
 import { removeAbandonedMessageResourceStages } from "./feishu/resourceStaging.js";
 import { triggerQueue } from "./feishu/triggerQueue.js";
-import { createEnvRuntimeSettings } from "./settings/runtime.js";
+import { LocalSecretEnvelope, loadLocalSecretKeyring } from "./security/secretEnvelope.js";
+import { createDatabaseRuntimeSettings } from "./settings/runtime.js";
+import { verifyStoredProviderEnvelopes } from "./connections/providerConnections.js";
+import { openProviderProxyLease } from "./connections/providerProxy.js";
 import { readServerBinding } from "./settings/server.js";
 
 function requireEnv(name: string): string {
@@ -31,8 +34,25 @@ export async function startHub(): Promise<void> {
   const abandonedStages = await removeAbandonedMessageResourceStages(projectWorkspaceRoot);
   app.log.info({ removed: abandonedStages }, "startup: removed abandoned Feishu resource stages");
 
-  const runtimeSettings = createEnvRuntimeSettings();
+  const secretEnvelope = new LocalSecretEnvelope(await loadLocalSecretKeyring());
-  await runtimeSettings.provider("openrouter");
+  const verifiedProviderEnvelopes = await verifyStoredProviderEnvelopes(prisma, secretEnvelope);
+  app.log.info({ verified: verifiedProviderEnvelopes }, "startup: authenticated stored provider envelopes");
+  const runtimeSettings = createDatabaseRuntimeSettings(
+    prisma,
+    secretEnvelope,
+    process.env,
+    (credential, context) => openProviderProxyLease(credential, {
+      onDiagnostic: (diagnostic) => {
+        app.log.error({
+          runId: context.runId,
+          projectId: context.projectId,
+          providerId: context.providerId,
+          errorCode: diagnostic.code,
+          failureCategory: diagnostic.category,
+        }, "provider proxy diagnostic");
+      },
+    }),
+  );
 
   const feishuAppId = requireEnv("FEISHU_APP_ID");
   const feishuAppSecret = requireEnv("FEISHU_APP_SECRET");
@@ -58,6 +78,7 @@ export async function startHub(): Promise<void> {
     feishuAppId,
     feishuAppSecret,
     projectWorkspaceRoot,
+    secretEnvelope,
   });
 
   const address = await app.listen(bind);

hub/src/security/localKekRotation.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,204 @@
+import { randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
+import { lstat, open, rename, unlink, type FileHandle } from "node:fs/promises";
+import { basename, dirname, isAbsolute, join } from "node:path";
+import type { Prisma, PrismaClient } from "@prisma/client";
+import { rewrapStoredProviderEnvelopes } from "../connections/providerConnections.js";
+import {
+  LocalSecretEnvelope,
+  loadLocalSecretKeyringFile,
+  type LocalSecretKeyring,
+} from "./secretEnvelope.js";
+
+export interface RotateLocalKekInput {
+  readonly keyringFile: string;
+  readonly prisma: PrismaClient;
+  readonly now?: Date;
+  readonly generatedKey?: Buffer;
+  readonly expectedOwner?: { readonly uid: number; readonly gid: number };
+}
+
+export interface RotateLocalKekResult {
+  readonly previousActiveKeyId: string;
+  readonly activeKeyId: string;
+  readonly verified: number;
+  readonly rewrapped: number;
+}
+
+export const LOCAL_KEK_ROTATION_ADVISORY_LOCK = 7_310_579_862_737_525_041n;
+
+/**
+ * Atomically installs a new active KEK while retaining all previous keys, then
+ * rewraps database DEKs. A crash after the file rename is recoverable because
+ * both old and new KEKs remain in the keyring and the operation is rerunnable.
+ */
+export async function rotateLocalKek(input: RotateLocalKekInput): Promise<RotateLocalKekResult> {
+  if (!isAbsolute(input.keyringFile)) {
+    throw new Error("local secret keyring path must be absolute");
+  }
+  const expectedOwner = input.expectedOwner ?? { uid: 0, gid: 0 };
+  const initialMetadata = await lstat(input.keyringFile);
+  assertKeyringMetadata(initialMetadata, expectedOwner);
+  return input.prisma.$transaction(async (tx) => {
+    const rows = await tx.$queryRaw<Array<{ readonly locked: boolean }>>`
+      SELECT pg_try_advisory_xact_lock(${LOCAL_KEK_ROTATION_ADVISORY_LOCK}) AS "locked"
+    `;
+    if (rows[0]?.locked !== true) {
+      throw new Error("local KEK rotation lock is already held");
+    }
+    return rotateUnderLock(input, expectedOwner, tx);
+  }, { maxWait: 5_000, timeout: 300_000 });
+}
+
+async function rotateUnderLock(
+  input: RotateLocalKekInput,
+  expectedOwner: { readonly uid: number; readonly gid: number },
+  tx: Prisma.TransactionClient,
+): Promise<RotateLocalKekResult> {
+  const metadata = await lstat(input.keyringFile);
+  assertKeyringMetadata(metadata, expectedOwner);
+
+  const previous = await loadLocalSecretKeyringFile(input.keyringFile);
+  const generatedKey = input.generatedKey === undefined
+    ? randomBytes(32)
+    : Buffer.from(input.generatedKey);
+  if (generatedKey.byteLength !== 32) {
+    generatedKey.fill(0);
+    throw new Error("generated local KEK must contain exactly 32 bytes");
+  }
+  const keyId = nextKeyId(input.now ?? new Date());
+  if (previous.keys.has(keyId)) {
+    generatedKey.fill(0);
+    throw new Error(`generated local KEK identifier already exists: ${keyId}`);
+  }
+
+  const keys = new Map(previous.keys);
+  keys.set(keyId, generatedKey);
+  const keyring: LocalSecretKeyring = { activeKeyId: keyId, keys };
+  try {
+    await replaceKeyringAtomically(input.keyringFile, keyring, metadata.uid, metadata.gid);
+    const result = await rewrapStoredProviderEnvelopes(
+      tx,
+      new LocalSecretEnvelope(keyring),
+    );
+    return {
+      previousActiveKeyId: previous.activeKeyId,
+      activeKeyId: keyId,
+      ...result,
+    };
+  } finally {
+    generatedKey.fill(0);
+  }
+}
+
+function assertKeyringMetadata(
+  metadata: {
+    readonly mode: number;
+    readonly uid: number;
+    readonly gid: number;
+    isFile(): boolean;
+    isSymbolicLink(): boolean;
+  },
+  expectedOwner: { readonly uid: number; readonly gid: number },
+): void {
+  if (metadata.isSymbolicLink() || !metadata.isFile()) {
+    throw new Error("local secret keyring must be a regular non-symlink file");
+  }
+  if (metadata.uid !== expectedOwner.uid || metadata.gid !== expectedOwner.gid) {
+    throw new Error(
+      `local secret keyring must be owned by ${expectedOwner.uid}:${expectedOwner.gid}`,
+    );
+  }
+  if ((metadata.mode & 0o777) !== 0o600) {
+    throw new Error("local secret keyring must have mode 0600");
+  }
+}
+
+async function replaceKeyringAtomically(
+  file: string,
+  keyring: LocalSecretKeyring,
+  uid: number,
+  gid: number,
+): Promise<void> {
+  const directory = dirname(file);
+  const temporary = join(directory, `.${basename(file)}.${process.pid}.${randomBytes(6).toString("hex")}.tmp`);
+  const encodedKeys = Object.fromEntries(
+    [...keyring.keys].map(([keyId, key]) => [keyId, key.toString("base64")]),
+  );
+  const contents = `${JSON.stringify({ version: 1, activeKeyId: keyring.activeKeyId, keys: encodedKeys })}\n`;
+  let handle: FileHandle | undefined;
+  try {
+    handle = await open(temporary, "wx", 0o600);
+    await handle.chown(uid, gid);
+    await handle.writeFile(contents, "utf8");
+    await handle.sync();
+    await handle.close();
+    handle = undefined;
+    await rename(temporary, file);
+    await syncDirectory(directory);
+  } catch (error) {
+    const cleanupFailures: unknown[] = [];
+    if (handle !== undefined) {
+      try {
+        await handle.close();
+      } catch (cleanupError) {
+        cleanupFailures.push(cleanupError);
+      }
+    }
+    try {
+      await removeIfExists(temporary);
+    } catch (cleanupError) {
+      cleanupFailures.push(cleanupError);
+    }
+    if (cleanupFailures.length > 0) {
+      throw new AggregateError(
+        [error, ...cleanupFailures],
+        "local keyring replacement and cleanup both failed",
+        { cause: error },
+      );
+    }
+    throw error;
+  }
+}
+
+async function syncDirectory(directory: string): Promise<void> {
+  const handle = await open(directory, "r");
+  let syncFailure: unknown;
+  try {
+    await handle.sync();
+  } catch (error) {
+    syncFailure = error;
+  }
+  let closeFailure: unknown;
+  try {
+    await handle.close();
+  } catch (error) {
+    closeFailure = error;
+  }
+  if (syncFailure !== undefined && closeFailure !== undefined) {
+    throw new AggregateError(
+      [syncFailure, closeFailure],
+      "keyring directory sync and handle close both failed",
+      { cause: syncFailure },
+    );
+  }
+  if (syncFailure !== undefined) throw syncFailure;
+  if (closeFailure !== undefined) throw closeFailure;
+}
+
+async function removeIfExists(file: string): Promise<void> {
+  try {
+    await unlink(file);
+  } catch (error) {
+    if (isErrno(error, "ENOENT")) return;
+    throw error;
+  }
+}
+
+function isErrno(error: unknown, code: string): error is NodeJS.ErrnoException {
+  return error instanceof Error && "code" in error && error.code === code;
+}
+
+function nextKeyId(now: Date): string {
+  const timestamp = now.toISOString().replace(/[-:]/g, "").replace(/\.\d{3}Z$/, "Z");
+  return `local-${timestamp}-${randomBytes(4).toString("hex")}`;
+}

hub/src/security/secretEnvelope.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,268 @@
+import { createCipheriv, createDecipheriv, randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
+import { readFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+import path from "node:path";
+
+const KEY_BYTES = 32;
+const NONCE_BYTES = 12;
+const AUTH_TAG_BYTES = 16;
+const PRODUCTION_CREDENTIAL_NAME = "cph-secret-keyring";
+
+export interface SecretBinding {
+  readonly purpose: string;
+  readonly organizationId: string;
+  readonly connectionId: string;
+  readonly secretVersionId: string;
+}
+
+export interface EncryptedPart {
+  readonly nonce: string;
+  readonly ciphertext: string;
+  readonly authTag: string;
+}
+
+export interface SecretEnvelopeV1 {
+  readonly version: 1;
+  readonly algorithm: "AES-256-GCM";
+  readonly keyId: string;
+  readonly wrappedDek: EncryptedPart;
+  readonly payload: EncryptedPart;
+}
+
+export interface LocalSecretKeyring {
+  readonly activeKeyId: string;
+  readonly keys: ReadonlyMap<string, Buffer>;
+}
+
+export type SecretKeyringEnv = Readonly<Record<string, string | undefined>>;
+
+/**
+ * Loads the one local KEK source accepted by the current runtime. Production
+ * deliberately has no file-path fallback: systemd must materialize the fixed
+ * credential below CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY.
+ */
+export async function loadLocalSecretKeyring(
+  env: SecretKeyringEnv = process.env,
+): Promise<LocalSecretKeyring> {
+  const nodeEnv = env["NODE_ENV"]?.trim();
+  const configuredFile = env["HUB_SECRET_KEYRING_FILE"]?.trim();
+  let file: string;
+
+  if (nodeEnv === "production") {
+    if (configuredFile !== undefined && configuredFile !== "") {
+      throw new Error("production secret keyring must use the systemd credential");
+    }
+    const credentialsDirectory = env["CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY"]?.trim();
+    if (credentialsDirectory === undefined || credentialsDirectory === "") {
+      throw new Error("missing required secret keyring setting: CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY");
+    }
+    file = path.join(credentialsDirectory, PRODUCTION_CREDENTIAL_NAME);
+  } else {
+    if (configuredFile === undefined || configuredFile === "") {
+      throw new Error("missing required secret keyring setting: HUB_SECRET_KEYRING_FILE");
+    }
+    file = configuredFile;
+  }
+
+  return loadLocalSecretKeyringFile(file);
+}
+
+export async function loadLocalSecretKeyringFile(file: string): Promise<LocalSecretKeyring> {
+  let source: string;
+  try {
+    source = await readFile(file, "utf8");
+  } catch (error) {
+    throw new Error("local secret keyring is unavailable", { cause: error });
+  }
+
+  return parseKeyring(source);
+}
+
+export class LocalSecretEnvelope {
+  constructor(private readonly keyring: LocalSecretKeyring) {}
+
+  get activeKeyId(): string {
+    return this.keyring.activeKeyId;
+  }
+
+  encryptJson(binding: SecretBinding, value: unknown): SecretEnvelopeV1 {
+    validateBinding(binding);
+    const kek = requireKey(this.keyring, this.keyring.activeKeyId);
+    const dek = randomBytes(KEY_BYTES);
+    const payloadBytes = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(value), "utf8");
+
+    try {
+      return {
+        version: 1,
+        algorithm: "AES-256-GCM",
+        keyId: this.keyring.activeKeyId,
+        wrappedDek: encryptPart(kek, dek, additionalData(binding, "dek")),
+        payload: encryptPart(dek, payloadBytes, additionalData(binding, "payload")),
+      };
+    } finally {
+      dek.fill(0);
+      payloadBytes.fill(0);
+    }
+  }
+
+  decryptJson<T = unknown>(binding: SecretBinding, envelope: SecretEnvelopeV1): T {
+    validateBinding(binding);
+    validateEnvelope(envelope);
+    const kek = requireKey(this.keyring, envelope.keyId);
+    const dek = decryptPart(kek, envelope.wrappedDek, additionalData(binding, "dek"));
+
+    try {
+      const plaintext = decryptPart(dek, envelope.payload, additionalData(binding, "payload"));
+      try {
+        return JSON.parse(plaintext.toString("utf8")) as T;
+      } catch (error) {
+        throw new Error("secret envelope payload is invalid", { cause: error });
+      } finally {
+        plaintext.fill(0);
+      }
+    } finally {
+      dek.fill(0);
+    }
+  }
+
+  rewrap(binding: SecretBinding, envelope: SecretEnvelopeV1): SecretEnvelopeV1 {
+    validateBinding(binding);
+    validateEnvelope(envelope);
+    const previousKek = requireKey(this.keyring, envelope.keyId);
+    const activeKek = requireKey(this.keyring, this.keyring.activeKeyId);
+    const dek = decryptPart(previousKek, envelope.wrappedDek, additionalData(binding, "dek"));
+
+    try {
+      return {
+        ...envelope,
+        keyId: this.keyring.activeKeyId,
+        wrappedDek: encryptPart(activeKek, dek, additionalData(binding, "dek")),
+      };
+    } finally {
+      dek.fill(0);
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+function parseKeyring(source: string): LocalSecretKeyring {
+  let value: unknown;
+  try {
+    value = JSON.parse(source) as unknown;
+  } catch (error) {
+    throw new Error("invalid local secret keyring", { cause: error });
+  }
+
+  if (!isRecord(value) || value["version"] !== 1 || !isNonEmptyString(value["activeKeyId"]) ||
+      !isRecord(value["keys"])) {
+    throw new Error("invalid local secret keyring");
+  }
+
+  const keys = new Map<string, Buffer>();
+  for (const [keyId, encodedKey] of Object.entries(value["keys"])) {
+    if (!isNonEmptyString(keyId) || !isNonEmptyString(encodedKey)) {
+      throw new Error("invalid local secret keyring");
+    }
+    const key = decodeBase64(encodedKey, "invalid local secret keyring");
+    if (key.byteLength !== KEY_BYTES) {
+      throw new Error("invalid local secret keyring");
+    }
+    keys.set(keyId, key);
+  }
+
+  const activeKeyId = value["activeKeyId"];
+  if (!keys.has(activeKeyId)) {
+    throw new Error("local secret keyring active key is unavailable");
+  }
+  return { activeKeyId, keys };
+}
+
+function encryptPart(key: Buffer, plaintext: Buffer, aad: Buffer): EncryptedPart {
+  const nonce = randomBytes(NONCE_BYTES);
+  const cipher = createCipheriv("aes-256-gcm", key, nonce, { authTagLength: AUTH_TAG_BYTES });
+  cipher.setAAD(aad);
+  const ciphertext = Buffer.concat([cipher.update(plaintext), cipher.final()]);
+  const authTag = cipher.getAuthTag();
+  return {
+    nonce: nonce.toString("base64"),
+    ciphertext: ciphertext.toString("base64"),
+    authTag: authTag.toString("base64"),
+  };
+}
+
+function decryptPart(key: Buffer, encrypted: EncryptedPart, aad: Buffer): Buffer {
+  try {
+    const nonce = decodeBase64(encrypted.nonce, "secret envelope is malformed");
+    const ciphertext = decodeBase64(encrypted.ciphertext, "secret envelope is malformed");
+    const authTag = decodeBase64(encrypted.authTag, "secret envelope is malformed");
+    if (nonce.byteLength !== NONCE_BYTES || authTag.byteLength !== AUTH_TAG_BYTES) {
+      throw new Error("secret envelope is malformed");
+    }
+    const decipher = createDecipheriv("aes-256-gcm", key, nonce, { authTagLength: AUTH_TAG_BYTES });
+    decipher.setAAD(aad);
+    decipher.setAuthTag(authTag);
+    return Buffer.concat([decipher.update(ciphertext), decipher.final()]);
+  } catch (error) {
+    if (error instanceof Error && error.message === "secret envelope is malformed") {
+      throw error;
+    }
+    throw new Error("secret envelope authentication failed", { cause: error });
+  }
+}
+
+function additionalData(binding: SecretBinding, layer: "dek" | "payload"): Buffer {
+  return Buffer.from(JSON.stringify([
+    "cph-secret-envelope",
+    1,
+    layer,
+    binding.purpose,
+    binding.organizationId,
+    binding.connectionId,
+    binding.secretVersionId,
+  ]), "utf8");
+}
+
+function requireKey(keyring: LocalSecretKeyring, keyId: string): Buffer {
+  const key = keyring.keys.get(keyId);
+  if (key === undefined) {
+    throw new Error("secret envelope key is unavailable");
+  }
+  return key;
+}
+
+function validateBinding(binding: SecretBinding): void {
+  if (!isNonEmptyString(binding.purpose) || !isNonEmptyString(binding.organizationId) ||
+      !isNonEmptyString(binding.connectionId) || !isNonEmptyString(binding.secretVersionId)) {
+    throw new Error("secret envelope binding is invalid");
+  }
+}
+
+function validateEnvelope(envelope: SecretEnvelopeV1): void {
+  if (!isRecord(envelope) || envelope["version"] !== 1 || envelope["algorithm"] !== "AES-256-GCM" ||
+      !isNonEmptyString(envelope["keyId"]) || !isEncryptedPart(envelope["wrappedDek"]) ||
+      !isEncryptedPart(envelope["payload"])) {
+    throw new Error("secret envelope is malformed");
+  }
+}
+
+function isEncryptedPart(value: unknown): value is EncryptedPart {
+  return isRecord(value) && isNonEmptyString(value["nonce"]) &&
+    isNonEmptyString(value["ciphertext"]) && isNonEmptyString(value["authTag"]);
+}
+
+function decodeBase64(value: string, errorMessage: string): Buffer {
+  if (!/^(?:[A-Za-z0-9+/]{4})*(?:[A-Za-z0-9+/]{2}==|[A-Za-z0-9+/]{3}=)?$/.test(value)) {
+    throw new Error(errorMessage);
+  }
+  const decoded = Buffer.from(value, "base64");
+  if (decoded.toString("base64") !== value) {
+    throw new Error(errorMessage);
+  }
+  return decoded;
+}
+
+function isRecord(value: unknown): value is Record<string, unknown> {
+  return typeof value === "object" && value !== null && !Array.isArray(value);
+}
+
+function isNonEmptyString(value: unknown): value is string {
+  return typeof value === "string" && value.trim() !== "";
+}

hub/src/server.ts

@@ -10,8 +10,10 @@
  * Org admin (ADR-0021): Feishu OAuth session + `/api/org/:orgSlug/*`.
  *
  * Env (see .env.example):
- *  DATABASE_URL, ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN, FEISHU_APP_ID/SECRET/BOT_OPEN_ID, PORT,
+ *  DATABASE_URL, FEISHU_APP_ID/SECRET/BOT_OPEN_ID, PORT,
- *  HUB_PROJECT_WORKSPACE_ROOT, HUB_SESSION_SECRET, HUB_PUBLIC_BASE_URL
+ *  HUB_PROJECT_WORKSPACE_ROOT, HUB_SESSION_SECRET, HUB_PUBLIC_BASE_URL.
+ * Provider credentials are org-scoped encrypted records; production receives
+ * the local master-key keyring only through systemd CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY.
  */
 import "dotenv/config";
 import { startHub } from "./hub.js";

hub/src/settings/runtime.ts

@@ -1,22 +1,37 @@
+import type { Prisma, PrismaClient } from "@prisma/client";
 import { InMemoryModelRegistry, type ModelRegistry } from "../agent/models.js";
+import { lockActiveOrganization } from "../org/status.js";
+import { decryptStoredProviderCredential } from "../connections/providerConnections.js";
+import { openProviderProxyLease, type AgentProviderLease, type ProviderUpstreamCredential } from "../connections/providerProxy.js";
+import { LocalSecretEnvelope } from "../security/secretEnvelope.js";
 
 export type Env = Readonly<Record<string, string | undefined>>;
 
 type EnvSource = Env | (() => Env);
 
-const DEFAULT_OPENROUTER_BASE_URL = "https://openrouter.ai/api";
 const DEFAULT_SONNET_MODEL = "anthropic/claude-sonnet-5";
 const DEFAULT_SONNET_LABEL = "Claude Sonnet 5";
 const DEFAULT_AGENT_MAX_TURNS = 25;
 
 export interface ProviderRuntimeSettings {
   readonly id: string;
-  readonly baseUrl: string;
+  openAgentLease(input: { readonly runId: string }): Promise<AgentProviderLease>;
-  readonly authToken: string;
-  readonly anthropicApiKey: string;
-  readonly sdkEnv: Record<string, string | undefined>;
 }
 
+export interface ProviderLeaseContext {
+  readonly providerId: string;
+  readonly projectId: string;
+  readonly runId: string;
+}
+
+export type ProviderLeaseFactory = (
+  credential: ProviderUpstreamCredential,
+  context: ProviderLeaseContext,
+) => Promise<AgentProviderLease>;
+
+const DEFAULT_PROVIDER_LEASE_FACTORY: ProviderLeaseFactory = (credential) =>
+  openProviderProxyLease(credential);
+
 export interface RuntimeScope {
   readonly projectId?: string;
 }
@@ -44,26 +59,11 @@ export class EnvRuntimeSettings implements RuntimeSettings {
   }
 
   async provider(providerId: string, scope?: RuntimeScope): Promise<ProviderRuntimeSettings> {
+    void providerId;
     void scope;
-    if (providerId !== "openrouter") {
+    throw new Error(
-      throw new Error(`unknown provider runtime settings: ${providerId}`);
+      "process-global provider credentials are disabled; use the project-scoped provider resolver",
-    }
+    );
-    const env = this.envSource();
-    const baseUrl = readEnv(env, "ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL") ?? DEFAULT_OPENROUTER_BASE_URL;
-    const authToken = requireSetting(env, "ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN");
-    const anthropicApiKey = readEnv(env, "ANTHROPIC_API_KEY") ?? "";
-
-    return {
-      id: providerId,
-      baseUrl,
-      authToken,
-      anthropicApiKey,
-      sdkEnv: {
-        ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL: baseUrl,
-        ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN: authToken,
-        ANTHROPIC_API_KEY: anthropicApiKey,
-      },
-    };
   }
 
   async modelRegistry(scope?: RuntimeScope): Promise<ModelRegistry> {
@@ -79,10 +79,124 @@ export class EnvRuntimeSettings implements RuntimeSettings {
   }
 }
 
+export class DatabaseRuntimeSettings implements RuntimeSettings {
+  private readonly envSettings: EnvRuntimeSettings;
+
+  constructor(
+    private readonly prisma: PrismaClient,
+    private readonly secrets: LocalSecretEnvelope,
+    env: EnvSource = process.env,
+    private readonly leaseFactory: ProviderLeaseFactory = DEFAULT_PROVIDER_LEASE_FACTORY,
+  ) {
+    this.envSettings = new EnvRuntimeSettings(env);
+  }
+
+  async provider(providerId: string, scope?: RuntimeScope): Promise<ProviderRuntimeSettings> {
+    const projectId = scope?.projectId?.trim();
+    if (projectId === undefined || projectId === "") {
+      throw new Error("projectId is required to resolve provider credentials");
+    }
+
+    await this.prisma.$transaction(async (tx) => {
+      await loadActiveProviderSecret(tx, projectId, providerId);
+    });
+
+    return {
+      id: providerId,
+      openAgentLease: async ({ runId }) => this.prisma.$transaction(async (tx) => {
+        const resolved = await loadActiveProviderSecret(tx, projectId, providerId);
+        const secretVersion = resolved.connection.activeSecretVersion;
+        const credential = decryptStoredProviderCredential(this.secrets, {
+          organizationId: resolved.organizationId,
+          connectionId: resolved.connection.id,
+          providerId,
+          secretVersionId: secretVersion.id,
+          envelopeVersion: secretVersion.envelopeVersion,
+          keyId: secretVersion.keyId,
+          envelope: secretVersion.envelope,
+        });
+        return this.leaseFactory(
+          {
+            baseUrl: credential.baseUrl,
+            authToken: credential.authToken,
+            anthropicApiKey: credential.anthropicApiKey,
+          },
+          { providerId, projectId, runId },
+        );
+      }),
+    };
+  }
+
+  modelRegistry(scope?: RuntimeScope): Promise<ModelRegistry> {
+    return this.envSettings.modelRegistry(scope);
+  }
+
+  runPolicy(input: RunPolicyInput): Promise<RunPolicy> {
+    return this.envSettings.runPolicy(input);
+  }
+}
+
+async function loadActiveProviderSecret(
+  tx: Prisma.TransactionClient,
+  projectId: string,
+  providerId: string,
+): Promise<{
+  readonly organizationId: string;
+  readonly connection: {
+    readonly id: string;
+    readonly activeSecretVersion: {
+      readonly id: string;
+      readonly connectionId: string;
+      readonly envelopeVersion: number;
+      readonly keyId: string;
+      readonly envelope: Prisma.JsonValue;
+      readonly retiredAt: Date | null;
+    };
+  };
+}> {
+  const project = await tx.project.findUnique({
+    where: { id: projectId },
+    select: { organizationId: true, archivedAt: true },
+  });
+  if (project === null || project.archivedAt !== null) {
+    throw new Error(`active project not found: ${projectId}`);
+  }
+  await lockActiveOrganization(tx, project.organizationId);
+
+  const connection = await tx.organizationProviderConnection.findUnique({
+    where: {
+      organizationId_providerId: {
+        organizationId: project.organizationId,
+        providerId,
+      },
+    },
+    include: { activeSecretVersion: true },
+  });
+  const activeSecretVersion = connection?.activeSecretVersion;
+  if (connection === null || connection.status !== "ACTIVE" ||
+      activeSecretVersion === null || activeSecretVersion === undefined || activeSecretVersion.retiredAt !== null ||
+      activeSecretVersion.connectionId !== connection.id) {
+    throw new Error(`active provider connection not found: ${providerId} for project ${projectId}`);
+  }
+  return {
+    organizationId: project.organizationId,
+    connection: { id: connection.id, activeSecretVersion },
+  };
+}
+
 export function createEnvRuntimeSettings(env: EnvSource = process.env): RuntimeSettings {
   return new EnvRuntimeSettings(env);
 }
 
+export function createDatabaseRuntimeSettings(
+  prisma: PrismaClient,
+  secrets: LocalSecretEnvelope,
+  env: EnvSource = process.env,
+  leaseFactory: ProviderLeaseFactory = DEFAULT_PROVIDER_LEASE_FACTORY,
+): RuntimeSettings {
+  return new DatabaseRuntimeSettings(prisma, secrets, env, leaseFactory);
+}
+
 export function defaultSonnetModel(env: Env = process.env): string {
   return readEnv(env, "ANTHROPIC_DEFAULT_SONNET_MODEL") ?? DEFAULT_SONNET_MODEL;
 }
@@ -109,14 +223,6 @@ function readEnv(env: Env, name: string): string | undefined {
   return value === undefined || value === "" ? undefined : value;
 }
 
-function requireSetting(env: Env, name: string): string {
-  const value = readEnv(env, name);
-  if (value === undefined) {
-    throw new Error(`missing required runtime setting: ${name}`);
-  }
-  return value;
-}
-
 function positiveIntegerEnv(env: Env, name: string, fallback: number): number {
   const raw = readEnv(env, name);
   if (raw === undefined) return fallback;

hub/test/integration/admin-auth.test.ts

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ import {
   sessionCookieHeader,
 } from "../../src/admin/routes/authRoutes.js";
 import { OAUTH_STATE_COOKIE_NAME, signOAuthState } from "../../src/admin/auth/session.js";
-import { DEFAULT_ORG_ID, prisma, resetDb } from "./helpers.js";
+import { DEFAULT_ORG_ID, prisma, resetDb, testSecretEnvelope } from "./helpers.js";
 
 const SESSION_SECRET = "integration-test-session-secret";
 const PUBLIC_BASE = "http://127.0.0.1:8788";
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ async function buildApp(fetchImpl?: typeof fetch) {
     feishuAppId: "cli_test",
     feishuAppSecret: "secret_test",
     projectWorkspaceRoot: "/tmp/cph-test-workspaces",
+    secretEnvelope: testSecretEnvelope,
     cookieSecure: false,
     ...(fetchImpl !== undefined ? { fetchImpl } : {}),
   });

hub/test/integration/admin-explorer.test.ts

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ import {
   mintSessionToken,
   sessionCookieHeader,
 } from "../../src/admin/routes/authRoutes.js";
-import { DEFAULT_ORG_ID, prisma, resetDb } from "./helpers.js";
+import { DEFAULT_ORG_ID, prisma, resetDb, testSecretEnvelope } from "./helpers.js";
 
 const SESSION_SECRET = "integration-test-session-secret";
 const workspaceRoots: string[] = [];
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ async function buildApp(workspaceRoot: string) {
     feishuAppId: "cli_test",
     feishuAppSecret: "secret_test",
     projectWorkspaceRoot: workspaceRoot,
+    secretEnvelope: testSecretEnvelope,
     cookieSecure: false,
   });
   await app.ready();

hub/test/integration/admin-members-teams.test.ts

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ import {
   mintSessionToken,
   sessionCookieHeader,
 } from "../../src/admin/routes/authRoutes.js";
-import { DEFAULT_ORG_ID, prisma, resetDb } from "./helpers.js";
+import { DEFAULT_ORG_ID, prisma, resetDb, testSecretEnvelope } from "./helpers.js";
 import { addOrgMember } from "../../src/org/members.js";
 import { addTeamMember, archiveTeam, createTeam, updateTeam } from "../../src/org/teams.js";
 
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ async function buildApp() {
     feishuAppId: "cli_test",
     feishuAppSecret: "secret_test",
     projectWorkspaceRoot: "/tmp/cph-test-ws",
+    secretEnvelope: testSecretEnvelope,
     cookieSecure: false,
   });
   await app.ready();

hub/test/integration/admin-provider-connections.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,214 @@
+import Fastify from "fastify";
+import { afterAll, beforeEach, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
+import { registerAdminPlugin } from "../../src/admin/plugin.js";
+import { ProviderConnectionService } from "../../src/connections/providerConnections.js";
+import { mintSessionToken, sessionCookieHeader } from "../../src/admin/routes/authRoutes.js";
+import { DEFAULT_ORG_ID, prisma, resetDb, testSecretEnvelope } from "./helpers.js";
+
+const SESSION_SECRET = "integration-test-session-secret";
+const secrets = testSecretEnvelope;
+
+async function buildApp() {
+  const app = Fastify({ logger: false });
+  await registerAdminPlugin(app, {
+    prisma,
+    sessionSecret: SESSION_SECRET,
+    publicBaseUrl: "http://127.0.0.1:8788",
+    feishuAppId: "cli_test",
+    feishuAppSecret: "secret_test",
+    projectWorkspaceRoot: "/tmp/cph-test-workspaces",
+    secretEnvelope: secrets,
+    providerReadinessProbe: async () => {},
+    cookieSecure: false,
+  });
+  await app.ready();
+  return app;
+}
+
+async function seedUser(role: "OWNER" | "ADMIN" | "MEMBER"): Promise<string> {
+  const id = `u-${role.toLowerCase()}`;
+  const openId = `ou_${role.toLowerCase()}`;
+  await prisma.user.create({ data: { id, feishuOpenId: openId, displayName: id } });
+  await prisma.organizationMembership.create({
+    data: { organizationId: DEFAULT_ORG_ID, userId: id, role },
+  });
+  return mintSessionToken({ userId: id, feishuOpenId: openId }, SESSION_SECRET);
+}
+
+describe("Organization BYOK provider connections", () => {
+  beforeEach(async () => {
+    await resetDb();
+  });
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    await prisma.$disconnect();
+  });
+
+  it("stores write-only credentials in an encrypted immutable version", async () => {
+    const token = await seedUser("OWNER");
+    const app = await buildApp();
+    const credential = {
+      baseUrl: "https://provider.example/api",
+      authToken: "org-a-auth-token-never-return",
+      anthropicApiKey: "org-a-api-key-never-return",
+    };
+    try {
+      const response = await app.inject({
+        method: "PUT",
+        url: "/api/org/test-default/provider-connections/openrouter",
+        headers: {
+          cookie: sessionCookieHeader(token),
+          "content-type": "application/json",
+        },
+        payload: credential,
+      });
+
+      expect(response.statusCode).toBe(201);
+      expect(response.json()).toMatchObject({
+        providerId: "openrouter",
+        mode: "BYOK",
+        status: "ACTIVE",
+        activeVersion: 1,
+        keyId: "test-active",
+      });
+      expect(response.body).not.toContain(credential.authToken);
+      expect(response.body).not.toContain(credential.anthropicApiKey);
+      expect(response.body).not.toContain(credential.baseUrl);
+
+      const persisted = await prisma.$queryRaw<Array<{
+        envelope: unknown;
+        activeSecretVersionId: string;
+      }>>`
+        SELECT v."envelope", c."activeSecretVersionId"
+        FROM "ProviderCredentialVersion" v
+        JOIN "OrganizationProviderConnection" c ON c."id" = v."connectionId"
+        WHERE c."organizationId" = ${DEFAULT_ORG_ID} AND c."providerId" = 'openrouter'
+      `;
+      expect(persisted).toHaveLength(1);
+      const serialized = JSON.stringify(persisted);
+      expect(serialized).not.toContain(credential.authToken);
+      expect(serialized).not.toContain(credential.anthropicApiKey);
+      expect(serialized).not.toContain(credential.baseUrl);
+      expect(persisted[0]?.activeSecretVersionId).toBeTruthy();
+    } finally {
+      await app.close();
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("rotates by appending a version and never exposes old or new plaintext", async () => {
+    const token = await seedUser("ADMIN");
+    const app = await buildApp();
+    const cookie = sessionCookieHeader(token);
+    try {
+      const first = await app.inject({
+        method: "PUT",
+        url: "/api/org/test-default/provider-connections/openrouter",
+        headers: { cookie, "content-type": "application/json" },
+        payload: { baseUrl: "https://one.example", authToken: "first-secret" },
+      });
+      const second = await app.inject({
+        method: "PUT",
+        url: "/api/org/test-default/provider-connections/openrouter",
+        headers: { cookie, "content-type": "application/json" },
+        payload: { baseUrl: "https://two.example", authToken: "second-secret" },
+      });
+
+      expect(first.statusCode).toBe(201);
+      expect(second.statusCode).toBe(200);
+      expect(second.json()).toMatchObject({ activeVersion: 2, status: "ACTIVE" });
+      const versions = await prisma.$queryRaw<Array<{ version: number; retiredAt: Date | null }>>`
+        SELECT v."version", v."retiredAt"
+        FROM "ProviderCredentialVersion" v
+        JOIN "OrganizationProviderConnection" c ON c."id" = v."connectionId"
+        WHERE c."organizationId" = ${DEFAULT_ORG_ID}
+        ORDER BY v."version"
+      `;
+      expect(versions).toEqual([
+        { version: 1, retiredAt: expect.any(Date) },
+        { version: 2, retiredAt: null },
+      ]);
+
+      const read = await app.inject({
+        method: "GET",
+        url: "/api/org/test-default/provider-connections",
+        headers: { cookie },
+      });
+      expect(read.statusCode).toBe(200);
+      expect(read.json()).toEqual({ connections: [expect.objectContaining({ activeVersion: 2 })] });
+      expect(read.body).not.toContain("first-secret");
+      expect(read.body).not.toContain("second-secret");
+    } finally {
+      await app.close();
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("rejects members and refuses to overwrite a platform-managed connection", async () => {
+    const memberToken = await seedUser("MEMBER");
+    const app = await buildApp();
+    try {
+      const denied = await app.inject({
+        method: "PUT",
+        url: "/api/org/test-default/provider-connections/openrouter",
+        headers: {
+          cookie: sessionCookieHeader(memberToken),
+          "content-type": "application/json",
+        },
+        payload: { baseUrl: "https://provider.example", authToken: "denied-secret" },
+      });
+      expect(denied.statusCode).toBe(403);
+      const service = new ProviderConnectionService(prisma, secrets, async () => {});
+      await expect(service.rotateByok({
+        organizationId: DEFAULT_ORG_ID,
+        providerId: "another-provider",
+        actorUserId: "u-member",
+        baseUrl: "https://provider.example",
+        authToken: "service-bypass-secret",
+      })).rejects.toThrow("requires an active Organization OWNER or ADMIN");
+      await expect(prisma.organizationProviderConnection.count({
+        where: { organizationId: DEFAULT_ORG_ID, providerId: "another-provider" },
+      })).resolves.toBe(0);
+
+      await prisma.$executeRaw`
+        INSERT INTO "OrganizationProviderConnection"
+          ("id", "organizationId", "providerId", "mode", "status", "createdAt", "updatedAt")
+        VALUES
+          ('platform-connection', ${DEFAULT_ORG_ID}, 'openrouter', 'PLATFORM_MANAGED', 'DRAFT', NOW(), NOW())
+      `;
+      const ownerToken = await seedUser("OWNER");
+      const refused = await app.inject({
+        method: "PUT",
+        url: "/api/org/test-default/provider-connections/openrouter",
+        headers: {
+          cookie: sessionCookieHeader(ownerToken),
+          "content-type": "application/json",
+        },
+        payload: { baseUrl: "https://provider.example", authToken: "takeover-secret" },
+      });
+      expect(refused.statusCode).toBe(403);
+      expect(refused.json()).toMatchObject({
+        error: { code: "forbidden" },
+      });
+    } finally {
+      await app.close();
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("does not activate or persist a credential that fails readiness", async () => {
+    await seedUser("ADMIN");
+    const service = new ProviderConnectionService(prisma, secrets, async () => {
+      throw new Error("provider credential readiness check failed: status 401");
+    });
+
+    await expect(service.rotateByok({
+      organizationId: DEFAULT_ORG_ID,
+      providerId: "openrouter",
+      actorUserId: "u-admin",
+      baseUrl: "https://provider.example/api",
+      authToken: "rejected-secret",
+    })).rejects.toThrow("readiness check failed");
+    await expect(prisma.organizationProviderConnection.count({
+      where: { organizationId: DEFAULT_ORG_ID, providerId: "openrouter" },
+    })).resolves.toBe(0);
+    await expect(prisma.providerCredentialVersion.count()).resolves.toBe(0);
+  });
+});

hub/test/integration/agent-sandbox-linux.test.ts

@@ -125,10 +125,10 @@ describe("real Claude SDK sandbox boundary", () => {
           workspaceDir: workspace,
         },
         systemPrompt: "Use the Bash tool exactly once, then report completion.",
-        providerEnv: {
+        providerProxyEnv: {
           ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL: stub.baseUrl,
-          ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN: "provider-secret",
+          ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN: "run-proxy-capability",
-          ANTHROPIC_API_KEY: "provider-api-secret",
+          ANTHROPIC_API_KEY: "",
         },
         tools: ["bash"],
         maxTurns: 3,

hub/test/integration/deployment-preflight-cli.test.ts

@@ -4,6 +4,15 @@ import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
 import { join, resolve } from "node:path";
 import { promisify } from "node:util";
 import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
+import {
+  DEFAULT_ORG_ID,
+  prisma,
+  resetDb,
+  testSecretEnvelope,
+  TEST_SECRET_KEY,
+  TEST_SECRET_KEY_ID,
+} from "./helpers.js";
+import { ProviderConnectionService } from "../../src/connections/providerConnections.js";
 
 const execFileAsync = promisify(execFile);
 const TEST_DATABASE_URL = "postgresql://paradigm:paradigm@127.0.0.1:5432/cph_hub_test";
@@ -16,6 +25,7 @@ describe("deployment preflight CLI", () => {
   let marker: string;
 
   beforeEach(async () => {
+    await resetDb();
     root = await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), "cph-deployment-preflight-"));
     baseDir = join(root, "deploy");
     hubDir = join(baseDir, "current", "hub");
@@ -93,6 +103,23 @@ describe("deployment preflight CLI", () => {
     expect(result.stderr).toContain("PostgreSQL authenticated query failed for DATABASE_URL");
   });
 
+  it("rejects a structurally valid keyring that cannot authenticate stored envelopes", async () => {
+    await prismaActorForEnvelope();
+    const workspaceRoot = join(persistentDir, "workspaces");
+    const fixture = await createFixture({
+      workspaceRoot,
+      marker,
+      keyringKey: Buffer.alloc(32, "wrong"),
+    });
+
+    const result = await runCli(fixture.args);
+
+    expect(result.exitCode).toBe(1);
+    expect(result.stderr).toContain("stored provider envelope verification failed");
+    expect(result.stderr).toContain("secret envelope authentication failed");
+    expect(result.stderr).not.toContain("stored-envelope-secret");
+  });
+
   it("loads the actual Hub dependency graph and queries PostgreSQL in the runtime probe", async () => {
     const result = await execFileAsync(
       resolve("node_modules/.bin/tsx"),
@@ -138,6 +165,7 @@ describe("deployment preflight CLI", () => {
     marker: string;
     pgIsReadyScript?: string;
     databaseUrl?: string;
+    keyringKey?: Buffer;
   }): Promise<{ args: string[] }> {
     const binDir = join(root, "bin");
     const cphBin = join(binDir, "cph");
@@ -147,6 +175,7 @@ describe("deployment preflight CLI", () => {
     const runuserBin = join(binDir, "runuser");
     const setprivBin = join(binDir, "setpriv");
     const envFile = join(root, "platform.env");
+    const keyringFile = join(root, "secret-keyring.json");
     await Promise.all([
       mkdir(binDir, { recursive: true }),
       mkdir(join(hubDir, "dist"), { recursive: true }),
@@ -180,15 +209,17 @@ describe("deployment preflight CLI", () => {
         `const { appendFileSync } = require("node:fs");\nappendFileSync(${JSON.stringify(options.marker)}, "service-prisma\\n");\n`,
       ),
       writeFile(join(hubDir, "prisma", "schema.prisma"), "// fixture\n"),
+      writeFile(keyringFile, JSON.stringify({
+        version: 1,
+        activeKeyId: TEST_SECRET_KEY_ID,
+        keys: { [TEST_SECRET_KEY_ID]: (options.keyringKey ?? TEST_SECRET_KEY).toString("base64") },
+      }), { mode: 0o600 }),
     ]);
     await writeFile(
       envFile,
       [
         "NODE_ENV=production",
         `DATABASE_URL=${options.databaseUrl ?? TEST_DATABASE_URL}`,
-        "ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL=https://openrouter.ai/api",
-        "ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN=provider-token",
-        "ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=",
         "FEISHU_APP_ID=cli_app_id",
         "FEISHU_APP_SECRET=feishu-app-secret",
         "FEISHU_BOT_OPEN_ID=ou_bot",
@@ -207,6 +238,8 @@ describe("deployment preflight CLI", () => {
       args: [
         "--env-file",
         envFile,
+        "--keyring-file",
+        keyringFile,
         "--node-bin",
         process.execPath,
         "--runuser-bin",
@@ -236,6 +269,20 @@ describe("deployment preflight CLI", () => {
       ],
     };
   }
+
+  async function prismaActorForEnvelope(): Promise<void> {
+    await prisma.user.create({ data: { id: "preflight-admin", feishuOpenId: "ou_preflight", displayName: "Preflight" } });
+    await prisma.organizationMembership.create({
+      data: { organizationId: DEFAULT_ORG_ID, userId: "preflight-admin", role: "ADMIN" },
+    });
+    await new ProviderConnectionService(prisma, testSecretEnvelope, async () => {}).rotateByok({
+      organizationId: DEFAULT_ORG_ID,
+      providerId: "openrouter",
+      actorUserId: "preflight-admin",
+      baseUrl: "https://provider.example/api",
+      authToken: "stored-envelope-secret",
+    });
+  }
 });
 
 async function executable(path: string, contents: string): Promise<void> {

hub/test/integration/helpers.ts

@@ -17,9 +17,16 @@ import type {
 } from "@ai-sdk/provider";
 import type { FeishuRuntime } from "../../src/feishu/client.js";
 import type { ModelFactory } from "../../src/agent/runner.js";
+import { LocalSecretEnvelope } from "../../src/security/secretEnvelope.js";
 
 export const TEST_DATABASE_URL = "postgresql://paradigm:paradigm@127.0.0.1:5432/cph_hub_test";
 export const DEFAULT_ORG_ID = "org_test_default";
+export const TEST_SECRET_KEY_ID = "test-active";
+export const TEST_SECRET_KEY = Buffer.alloc(32, "k");
+export const testSecretEnvelope = new LocalSecretEnvelope({
+  activeKeyId: TEST_SECRET_KEY_ID,
+  keys: new Map([[TEST_SECRET_KEY_ID, TEST_SECRET_KEY]]),
+});
 
 export const prisma = new PrismaClient({
   datasources: { db: { url: TEST_DATABASE_URL } },
@@ -29,6 +36,8 @@ export const prisma = new PrismaClient({
 export async function resetDb(): Promise<void> {
   const tables = [
     "FeishuEventReceipt",
+    "ProviderCredentialVersion",
+    "OrganizationProviderConnection",
     "AgentFileChange",
     "AgentMessage",
     "AuditEntry",

hub/test/integration/local-kek-rotation.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+import { mkdtemp, readFile, rm, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
+import { join } from "node:path";
+import { afterAll, beforeEach, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
+import { ProviderConnectionService, verifyStoredProviderEnvelopes } from "../../src/connections/providerConnections.js";
+import { LocalSecretEnvelope, loadLocalSecretKeyringFile, type SecretEnvelopeV1 } from "../../src/security/secretEnvelope.js";
+import { LOCAL_KEK_ROTATION_ADVISORY_LOCK, rotateLocalKek } from "../../src/security/localKekRotation.js";
+import { DEFAULT_ORG_ID, prisma, resetDb } from "./helpers.js";
+
+const temporaryDirectories: string[] = [];
+
+describe("local KEK rotation", () => {
+  beforeEach(async () => {
+    await resetDb();
+  });
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    await Promise.all(temporaryDirectories.splice(0).map((directory) => rm(directory, { recursive: true, force: true })));
+    await prisma.$disconnect();
+  });
+
+  it("atomically retains the old KEK, rewraps DEKs, and authenticates every envelope", async () => {
+    const oldKey = Buffer.alloc(32, "o");
+    const oldSecrets = new LocalSecretEnvelope({
+      activeKeyId: "local-old",
+      keys: new Map([["local-old", oldKey]]),
+    });
+    await prisma.user.create({ data: { id: "rotation-admin", feishuOpenId: "ou_rotation", displayName: "Rotation" } });
+    await prisma.organizationMembership.create({
+      data: { organizationId: DEFAULT_ORG_ID, userId: "rotation-admin", role: "OWNER" },
+    });
+    await new ProviderConnectionService(prisma, oldSecrets, async () => {}).rotateByok({
+      organizationId: DEFAULT_ORG_ID,
+      providerId: "openrouter",
+      actorUserId: "rotation-admin",
+      baseUrl: "https://provider.example/api",
+      authToken: "credential-stays-encrypted",
+    });
+    const before = await prisma.providerCredentialVersion.findFirstOrThrow({
+      include: { connection: true },
+    });
+    const beforeEnvelope = before.envelope as unknown as SecretEnvelopeV1;
+    const directory = await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), "cph-kek-rotation-"));
+    temporaryDirectories.push(directory);
+    const keyringFile = join(directory, "keyring.json");
+    await writeFile(keyringFile, JSON.stringify({
+      version: 1,
+      activeKeyId: "local-old",
+      keys: { "local-old": oldKey.toString("base64") },
+    }), { mode: 0o600 });
+    const expectedOwner = {
+      uid: process.getuid?.() ?? 0,
+      gid: process.getgid?.() ?? 0,
+    };
+    if (expectedOwner.uid !== 0 || expectedOwner.gid !== 0) {
+      await expect(rotateLocalKek({
+        keyringFile,
+        prisma,
+        generatedKey: Buffer.alloc(32, "x"),
+      })).rejects.toThrow("must be owned by 0:0");
+    }
+
+    let releaseLock!: () => void;
+    const releaseLockPromise = new Promise<void>((resolve) => {
+      releaseLock = resolve;
+    });
+    let lockAcquired!: () => void;
+    const lockAcquiredPromise = new Promise<void>((resolve) => {
+      lockAcquired = resolve;
+    });
+    const lockHolder = prisma.$transaction(async (tx) => {
+      await tx.$queryRaw<Array<{ readonly locked: string }>>`
+        SELECT pg_advisory_xact_lock(${LOCAL_KEK_ROTATION_ADVISORY_LOCK})::text AS "locked"
+      `;
+      lockAcquired();
+      await releaseLockPromise;
+    }, { timeout: 30_000 });
+    await lockAcquiredPromise;
+    try {
+      await expect(rotateLocalKek({
+        keyringFile,
+        prisma,
+        generatedKey: Buffer.alloc(32, "x"),
+        expectedOwner,
+      })).rejects.toThrow("rotation lock is already held");
+    } finally {
+      releaseLock();
+      await lockHolder;
+    }
+
+    const result = await rotateLocalKek({
+      keyringFile,
+      prisma,
+      now: new Date("2026-07-10T12:34:56.000Z"),
+      generatedKey: Buffer.alloc(32, "n"),
+      expectedOwner,
+    });
+
+    expect(result).toMatchObject({
+      previousActiveKeyId: "local-old",
+      activeKeyId: expect.stringMatching(/^local-20260710T123456Z-/),
+      rewrapped: 1,
+      verified: 1,
+    });
+    const after = await prisma.providerCredentialVersion.findUniqueOrThrow({ where: { id: before.id } });
+    const afterEnvelope = after.envelope as unknown as SecretEnvelopeV1;
+    expect(after.keyId).toBe(result.activeKeyId);
+    expect(afterEnvelope.payload).toEqual(beforeEnvelope.payload);
+    expect(afterEnvelope.wrappedDek).not.toEqual(beforeEnvelope.wrappedDek);
+    const keyringSource = await readFile(keyringFile, "utf8");
+    expect(keyringSource).toContain("local-old");
+    expect(keyringSource).toContain(result.activeKeyId);
+    expect(keyringSource).not.toContain("credential-stays-encrypted");
+
+    const rotatedSecrets = new LocalSecretEnvelope(await loadLocalSecretKeyringFile(keyringFile));
+    await expect(verifyStoredProviderEnvelopes(prisma, rotatedSecrets)).resolves.toBe(1);
+    expect(() => oldSecrets.decryptJson({
+      purpose: "provider-connection",
+      organizationId: before.connection.organizationId,
+      connectionId: before.connection.id,
+      secretVersionId: before.id,
+    }, afterEnvelope)).toThrow("secret envelope key is unavailable");
+    await expect(prisma.auditEntry.count({
+      where: { action: "provider_secret.kek_rewrapped", organizationId: DEFAULT_ORG_ID },
+    })).resolves.toBe(1);
+  });
+});

hub/test/integration/provider-runtime-settings.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+import { afterAll, beforeEach, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
+import { ProviderConnectionService } from "../../src/connections/providerConnections.js";
+import { DatabaseRuntimeSettings } from "../../src/settings/runtime.js";
+import type { ProviderUpstreamCredential } from "../../src/connections/providerProxy.js";
+import { DEFAULT_ORG_ID, prisma, resetDb, seedTestOrganization, testSecretEnvelope } from "./helpers.js";
+
+const secrets = testSecretEnvelope;
+
+describe("project-scoped provider runtime settings", () => {
+  beforeEach(async () => {
+    await resetDb();
+  });
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    await prisma.$disconnect();
+  });
+
+  it("resolves two projects only through their own Organization connection", async () => {
+    await seedTestOrganization("org_other", "other");
+    await Promise.all([
+      prisma.user.create({ data: { id: "user-a", feishuOpenId: "ou_a", displayName: "A" } }),
+      prisma.user.create({ data: { id: "user-b", feishuOpenId: "ou_b", displayName: "B" } }),
+      prisma.project.create({
+        data: {
+          id: "project-a",
+          organizationId: DEFAULT_ORG_ID,
+          name: "A",
+          workspaceDir: "/tmp/project-a",
+        },
+      }),
+      prisma.project.create({
+        data: {
+          id: "project-b",
+          organizationId: "org_other",
+          name: "B",
+          workspaceDir: "/tmp/project-b",
+        },
+      }),
+    ]);
+    await Promise.all([
+      prisma.organizationMembership.create({
+        data: { organizationId: DEFAULT_ORG_ID, userId: "user-a", role: "ADMIN" },
+      }),
+      prisma.organizationMembership.create({
+        data: { organizationId: "org_other", userId: "user-b", role: "OWNER" },
+      }),
+    ]);
+    const service = new ProviderConnectionService(prisma, secrets, async () => {});
+    await service.rotateByok({
+      organizationId: DEFAULT_ORG_ID,
+      providerId: "openrouter",
+      actorUserId: "user-a",
+      baseUrl: "https://provider-a.example/api",
+      authToken: "provider-a-token",
+      anthropicApiKey: "provider-a-api-key",
+    });
+    await service.rotateByok({
+      organizationId: "org_other",
+      providerId: "openrouter",
+      actorUserId: "user-b",
+      baseUrl: "https://provider-b.example/api",
+      authToken: "provider-b-token",
+    });
+    const leasedCredentials: ProviderUpstreamCredential[] = [];
+    const settings = new DatabaseRuntimeSettings(prisma, secrets, {
+      ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN: "forbidden-global-token",
+      ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL: "https://forbidden-global.example",
+    }, async (credential) => {
+      leasedCredentials.push(credential);
+      return {
+        sdkEnv: {
+          ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL: "http://127.0.0.1:12345",
+          ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN: `run-capability-${leasedCredentials.length}`,
+          ANTHROPIC_API_KEY: "",
+        },
+        sensitiveValues: [`run-capability-${leasedCredentials.length}`],
+        async close() {},
+      };
+    });
+
+    const providerA = await settings.provider("openrouter", { projectId: "project-a" });
+    const providerB = await settings.provider("openrouter", { projectId: "project-b" });
+    expect(JSON.stringify([providerA, providerB])).not.toContain("provider-a-token");
+    expect(JSON.stringify([providerA, providerB])).not.toContain("provider-b-token");
+
+    const leaseA = await providerA.openAgentLease({ runId: "run-a" });
+    const leaseB = await providerB.openAgentLease({ runId: "run-b" });
+    expect(leaseA.sdkEnv).toMatchObject({
+      ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL: "http://127.0.0.1:12345",
+      ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN: "run-capability-1",
+      ANTHROPIC_API_KEY: "",
+    });
+    expect(leaseB.sdkEnv.ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN).toBe("run-capability-2");
+    expect(leasedCredentials).toEqual([
+      {
+        baseUrl: "https://provider-a.example/api",
+        authToken: "provider-a-token",
+        anthropicApiKey: "provider-a-api-key",
+      },
+      {
+        baseUrl: "https://provider-b.example/api",
+        authToken: "provider-b-token",
+        anthropicApiKey: "",
+      },
+    ]);
+  });
+
+  it("fails closed without project scope or for missing, inactive, and corrupt connections", async () => {
+    await prisma.user.create({ data: { id: "user-a", feishuOpenId: "ou_a", displayName: "A" } });
+    await prisma.organizationMembership.create({
+      data: { organizationId: DEFAULT_ORG_ID, userId: "user-a", role: "ADMIN" },
+    });
+    await prisma.project.create({
+      data: {
+        id: "project-a",
+        organizationId: DEFAULT_ORG_ID,
+        name: "A",
+        workspaceDir: "/tmp/project-a",
+      },
+    });
+    const settings = new DatabaseRuntimeSettings(prisma, secrets, {
+      ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN: "must-not-be-a-fallback",
+    });
+
+    await expect(settings.provider("openrouter")).rejects.toThrow("projectId is required");
+    await expect(settings.provider("openrouter", { projectId: "project-a" })).rejects.toThrow(
+      "active provider connection not found",
+    );
+
+    const service = new ProviderConnectionService(prisma, secrets, async () => {});
+    await service.rotateByok({
+      organizationId: DEFAULT_ORG_ID,
+      providerId: "openrouter",
+      actorUserId: "user-a",
+      baseUrl: "https://provider-a.example/api",
+      authToken: "provider-a-token",
+    });
+    await prisma.organization.update({
+      where: { id: DEFAULT_ORG_ID },
+      data: { status: "SUSPENDED" },
+    });
+    await expect(settings.provider("openrouter", { projectId: "project-a" })).rejects.toThrow(
+      `organization ${DEFAULT_ORG_ID} is SUSPENDED`,
+    );
+
+    await prisma.organization.update({ where: { id: DEFAULT_ORG_ID }, data: { status: "ACTIVE" } });
+    const connection = await prisma.organizationProviderConnection.findUniqueOrThrow({
+      where: {
+        organizationId_providerId: { organizationId: DEFAULT_ORG_ID, providerId: "openrouter" },
+      },
+    });
+    const version = await prisma.providerCredentialVersion.findUniqueOrThrow({
+      where: { id: connection.activeSecretVersionId ?? "missing" },
+    });
+    const envelope = structuredClone(version.envelope) as {
+      payload: { ciphertext: string };
+    };
+    const bytes = Buffer.from(envelope.payload.ciphertext, "base64");
+    bytes[0] = (bytes[0] ?? 0) ^ 1;
+    envelope.payload.ciphertext = bytes.toString("base64");
+    await prisma.providerCredentialVersion.update({
+      where: { id: version.id },
+      data: { envelope },
+    });
+    const corruptProvider = await settings.provider("openrouter", { projectId: "project-a" });
+    await expect(corruptProvider.openAgentLease({ runId: "run-corrupt" })).rejects.toThrow(
+      "secret envelope authentication failed",
+    );
+  });
+});

hub/test/integration/server-start.test.ts

@@ -1,8 +1,10 @@
 import { createServer } from "node:net";
 import { once } from "node:events";
+import { mkdtemp, rm, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
+import { join } from "node:path";
 import { afterEach, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
-import { startHub } from "../../src/hub.js";
+import { resetDb, TEST_DATABASE_URL, TEST_SECRET_KEY, TEST_SECRET_KEY_ID } from "./helpers.js";
-import { TEST_DATABASE_URL } from "./helpers.js";
 
 const ENV_KEYS = [
   "DATABASE_URL",
@@ -15,6 +17,7 @@ const ENV_KEYS = [
   "HUB_SESSION_SECRET",
   "HUB_PUBLIC_BASE_URL",
   "HUB_FEISHU_LISTENER_ENABLED",
+  "HUB_SECRET_KEYRING_FILE",
   "HOST",
   "PORT",
 ] as const;
@@ -30,16 +33,23 @@ describe("Hub startup", () => {
   });
 
   it("rejects startup before the Feishu listener when the HTTP bind fails", async () => {
+    await resetDb();
     const blocker = createServer();
     blocker.listen(0, "127.0.0.1");
     await once(blocker, "listening");
     const address = blocker.address();
     if (address === null || typeof address === "string") throw new Error("expected an INET test listener");
 
+    const keyringDirectory = await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), "cph-hub-start-keyring-"));
+    const keyringFile = join(keyringDirectory, "keyring.json");
+    await writeFile(keyringFile, JSON.stringify({
+      version: 1,
+      activeKeyId: TEST_SECRET_KEY_ID,
+      keys: { [TEST_SECRET_KEY_ID]: TEST_SECRET_KEY.toString("base64") },
+    }), { mode: 0o600 });
+
     Object.assign(process.env, {
       DATABASE_URL: TEST_DATABASE_URL,
-      ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN: "test-provider-token",
-      ANTHROPIC_API_KEY: "",
       FEISHU_APP_ID: "test-app",
       FEISHU_APP_SECRET: "test-secret",
       FEISHU_BOT_OPEN_ID: "ou_test_bot",
@@ -47,15 +57,18 @@ describe("Hub startup", () => {
       HUB_SESSION_SECRET: "integration-session-secret-with-32-bytes",
       HUB_PUBLIC_BASE_URL: "https://hub.example.test",
       HUB_FEISHU_LISTENER_ENABLED: "false",
+      HUB_SECRET_KEYRING_FILE: keyringFile,
       HOST: "127.0.0.1",
       PORT: String(address.port),
     });
 
     try {
+      const { startHub } = await import("../../src/hub.js");
       await expect(startHub()).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: "EADDRINUSE" });
     } finally {
       blocker.close();
       await once(blocker, "close");
+      await rm(keyringDirectory, { recursive: true, force: true });
     }
   });
 });

hub/test/integration/trigger.test.ts

@@ -30,13 +30,16 @@ function makeTestSettings(models: InMemoryModelRegistry): RuntimeSettings {
     async provider(providerId) {
       return {
         id: providerId,
-        baseUrl: "https://openrouter.ai/api",
+        async openAgentLease() {
-        authToken: "test-token",
+          return {
-        anthropicApiKey: "",
+            sdkEnv: {
-        sdkEnv: {
+              ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL: "http://127.0.0.1:12345",
-          ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL: "https://openrouter.ai/api",
+              ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN: "test-run-capability",
-          ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN: "test-token",
+              ANTHROPIC_API_KEY: "",
-          ANTHROPIC_API_KEY: "",
+            },
+            sensitiveValues: ["test-run-capability"],
+            async close() {},
+          };
         },
       };
     },
@@ -153,9 +156,9 @@ describe("trigger full lifecycle (integration)", () => {
     });
     expect(rt.sentTexts.some((text) => text.includes("mock response") && text.includes("本次成本: $0.0023"))).toBe(true);
     expect(runAgentCalls).toHaveLength(1);
-    expect(runAgentCalls[0]?.providerEnv).toMatchObject({
+    expect(runAgentCalls[0]?.providerProxyEnv).toMatchObject({
-      ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL: "https://openrouter.ai/api",
+      ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL: "http://127.0.0.1:12345",
-      ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN: "test-token",
+      ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN: "test-run-capability",
       ANTHROPIC_API_KEY: "",
     });
     expect(runAgentCalls[0]?.maxTurns).toBe(7);

hub/test/unit/agent-security.test.ts

@@ -11,14 +11,14 @@ describe("agent subprocess security policy", () => {
     await Promise.all(roots.splice(0).map((root) => rm(root, { recursive: true, force: true })));
   });
 
-  it("passes only provider and safe runtime variables and protects provider credentials from tools", async () => {
+  it("passes only the run proxy capability and safe runtime variables and protects the capability from tools", async () => {
     const { workspaceRoot, workspace } = await makeWorkspace();
     const policy = await createAgentSecurityPolicy({
       workspaceRoot,
       workspaceDir: workspace,
-      providerEnv: {
+      providerProxyEnv: {
-        ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL: "https://openrouter.ai/api",
+        ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL: "http://127.0.0.1:43123",
-        ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN: "provider-secret",
+        ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN: "run-proxy-capability",
         ANTHROPIC_API_KEY: "",
       },
       hostEnv: {
@@ -37,8 +37,8 @@ describe("agent subprocess security policy", () => {
       PATH: "/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/bin",
       LANG: "C.UTF-8",
       CPH_BIN: "/usr/local/bin/cph",
-      ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL: "https://openrouter.ai/api",
+      ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL: "http://127.0.0.1:43123",
-      ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN: "provider-secret",
+      ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN: "run-proxy-capability",
       ANTHROPIC_API_KEY: "",
     });
     expect(policy.env).not.toHaveProperty("DATABASE_URL");
@@ -73,8 +73,8 @@ describe("agent subprocess security policy", () => {
     await expect(createAgentSecurityPolicy({
       workspaceRoot,
       workspaceDir: workspace,
-      providerEnv: {
+      providerProxyEnv: {
-        ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN: "provider-secret",
+        ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN: "run-proxy-capability",
         DATABASE_URL: "must-not-cross-boundary",
       },
       hostEnv: { PATH: "/usr/bin:/bin" },
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ describe("agent subprocess security policy", () => {
     await expect(createAgentSecurityPolicy({
       workspaceRoot,
       workspaceDir: linked,
-      providerEnv: { ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN: "provider-secret" },
+      providerProxyEnv: { ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN: "run-proxy-capability" },
       hostEnv: { PATH: "/usr/bin:/bin" },
     })).rejects.toThrow("project workspace contains a symlink");
   });
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ describe("agent subprocess security policy", () => {
     await expect(createAgentSecurityPolicy({
       workspaceRoot,
       workspaceDir: linked,
-      providerEnv: { ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN: "provider-secret" },
+      providerProxyEnv: { ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN: "run-proxy-capability" },
       hostEnv: { PATH: "/usr/bin:/bin" },
     })).rejects.toThrow("symlink");
   });

hub/test/unit/deployment-preflight.test.ts

@@ -8,9 +8,6 @@ import {
 const VALID_ENV = {
   NODE_ENV: "production",
   DATABASE_URL: "postgresql://hub:secret@127.0.0.1:5432/hub",
-  ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL: "https://openrouter.ai/api",
-  ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN: "provider-token",
-  ANTHROPIC_API_KEY: "",
   FEISHU_APP_ID: "cli_app_id",
   FEISHU_APP_SECRET: "feishu-app-secret",
   FEISHU_BOT_OPEN_ID: "ou_bot",
@@ -82,7 +79,6 @@ describe("validateDeploymentPreflight", () => {
         input({
           env: {
             ...VALID_ENV,
-            ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN: "",
             FEISHU_APP_SECRET: "",
             HUB_PUBLIC_BASE_URL: "http://hub.example.com",
             HUB_SESSION_SECRET: "short",
@@ -93,7 +89,6 @@ describe("validateDeploymentPreflight", () => {
       expect(error).toBeInstanceOf(DeploymentPreflightError);
       expect((error as Error).message).toMatchInlineSnapshot(`
         "deployment preflight failed:
-        - ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN is required
         - FEISHU_APP_SECRET is required
         - HUB_PUBLIC_BASE_URL must use https
         - HUB_SESSION_SECRET must contain at least 32 characters"
@@ -107,11 +102,11 @@ describe("validateDeploymentPreflight", () => {
     );
   });
 
-  it("rejects a non-empty ANTHROPIC_API_KEY that would conflict with auth-token mode", () => {
+  it("rejects legacy process-global provider settings instead of silently ignoring them", () => {
     expect(() =>
       validateDeploymentPreflight(
-        input({ env: { ...VALID_ENV, ANTHROPIC_API_KEY: "conflicting-api-key" } }),
+        input({ env: { ...VALID_ENV, ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN: "global-secret" } }),
       ),
-    ).toThrow("ANTHROPIC_API_KEY must be present and empty");
+    ).toThrow("ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN must not be set");
   });
 });

hub/test/unit/feishu-reactions.test.ts

@@ -212,10 +212,13 @@ function mockSettings(): RuntimeSettings {
     async provider(providerId) {
       return {
         id: providerId,
-        baseUrl: "https://example.invalid",
+        async openAgentLease() {
-        authToken: "test-token",
+          return {
-        anthropicApiKey: "",
+            sdkEnv: {},
-        sdkEnv: {},
+            sensitiveValues: [],
+            async close() {},
+          };
+        },
       };
     },
     async modelRegistry() {

hub/test/unit/provider-proxy.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+import { createServer } from "node:http";
+import { once } from "node:events";
+import { afterEach, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
+import { openProviderProxyLease, type AgentProviderLease } from "../../src/connections/providerProxy.js";
+
+const leases: AgentProviderLease[] = [];
+const upstreamServers: ReturnType<typeof createServer>[] = [];
+
+afterEach(async () => {
+  await Promise.all(leases.splice(0).map((lease) => lease.close()));
+  await Promise.all(upstreamServers.splice(0).map(async (server) => {
+    server.closeAllConnections();
+    if (server.listening) {
+      server.close();
+      await once(server, "close");
+    }
+  }));
+});
+
+describe("run-scoped provider proxy", () => {
+  it("keeps the Organization provider credential out of the Agent environment", async () => {
+    const observed: Array<{ authorization: string | undefined; apiKey: string | undefined; body: string }> = [];
+    const upstream = createServer((request, response) => {
+      const chunks: Buffer[] = [];
+      request.on("data", (chunk: Buffer) => chunks.push(chunk));
+      request.on("end", () => {
+        observed.push({
+          authorization: request.headers.authorization,
+          apiKey: header(request.headers["x-api-key"]),
+          body: Buffer.concat(chunks).toString("utf8"),
+        });
+        response.writeHead(200, { "content-type": "application/json" });
+        response.end(JSON.stringify({ ok: true }));
+      });
+    });
+    upstreamServers.push(upstream);
+    upstream.listen(0, "127.0.0.1");
+    await once(upstream, "listening");
+    const address = upstream.address();
+    if (address === null || typeof address === "string") throw new Error("expected upstream TCP address");
+
+    const lease = await openProviderProxyLease({
+      baseUrl: `http://127.0.0.1:${address.port}/api`,
+      authToken: "customer-provider-auth-token",
+      anthropicApiKey: "customer-provider-api-key",
+    });
+    leases.push(lease);
+
+    const serializedAgentEnv = JSON.stringify(lease.sdkEnv);
+    expect(serializedAgentEnv).not.toContain("customer-provider-auth-token");
+    expect(serializedAgentEnv).not.toContain("customer-provider-api-key");
+    expect(serializedAgentEnv).not.toContain(String(address.port));
+    expect(lease.sdkEnv).toMatchObject({
+      ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL: expect.stringMatching(/^http:\/\/127\.0\.0\.1:\d+$/),
+      ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN: expect.any(String),
+      ANTHROPIC_API_KEY: "",
+    });
+
+    const response = await fetch(`${lease.sdkEnv.ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL}/v1/messages`, {
+      method: "POST",
+      headers: {
+        authorization: `Bearer ${lease.sdkEnv.ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN}`,
+        "content-type": "application/json",
+        "anthropic-version": "2023-06-01",
+      },
+      body: JSON.stringify({ model: "test" }),
+    });
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+    await expect(response.json()).resolves.toEqual({ ok: true });
+    expect(observed).toEqual([{
+      authorization: "Bearer customer-provider-auth-token",
+      apiKey: "customer-provider-api-key",
+      body: JSON.stringify({ model: "test" }),
+    }]);
+  });
+
+  it("rejects requests without the run capability before contacting upstream", async () => {
+    let upstreamRequests = 0;
+    const diagnostics: unknown[] = [];
+    const upstream = createServer((_request, response) => {
+      upstreamRequests += 1;
+      response.end("unexpected");
+    });
+    upstreamServers.push(upstream);
+    upstream.listen(0, "127.0.0.1");
+    await once(upstream, "listening");
+    const address = upstream.address();
+    if (address === null || typeof address === "string") throw new Error("expected upstream TCP address");
+    const lease = await openProviderProxyLease(
+      {
+        baseUrl: `http://127.0.0.1:${address.port}`,
+        authToken: "customer-secret",
+        anthropicApiKey: "",
+      },
+      { onDiagnostic: (diagnostic) => diagnostics.push(diagnostic) },
+    );
+    leases.push(lease);
+
+    const response = await fetch(`${lease.sdkEnv.ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL}/v1/messages`, {
+      method: "POST",
+      body: "{}",
+    });
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(401);
+    expect(upstreamRequests).toBe(0);
+    expect(diagnostics).toEqual([{ code: "provider_proxy_unauthorized", category: "authorization" }]);
+  });
+
+  it("does not forward provider credentials across an upstream redirect", async () => {
+    let redirectedRequests = 0;
+    const diagnostics: unknown[] = [];
+    const redirectTarget = createServer((_request, response) => {
+      redirectedRequests += 1;
+      response.end("leaked");
+    });
+    upstreamServers.push(redirectTarget);
+    redirectTarget.listen(0, "127.0.0.1");
+    await once(redirectTarget, "listening");
+    const targetAddress = redirectTarget.address();
+    if (targetAddress === null || typeof targetAddress === "string") throw new Error("expected redirect target address");
+
+    const upstream = createServer((_request, response) => {
+      response.writeHead(307, { location: `http://127.0.0.1:${targetAddress.port}/capture` });
+      response.end();
+    });
+    upstreamServers.push(upstream);
+    upstream.listen(0, "127.0.0.1");
+    await once(upstream, "listening");
+    const upstreamAddress = upstream.address();
+    if (upstreamAddress === null || typeof upstreamAddress === "string") throw new Error("expected upstream address");
+    const lease = await openProviderProxyLease(
+      {
+        baseUrl: `http://127.0.0.1:${upstreamAddress.port}`,
+        authToken: "customer-secret",
+        anthropicApiKey: "",
+      },
+      { onDiagnostic: (diagnostic) => diagnostics.push(diagnostic) },
+    );
+    leases.push(lease);
+
+    const response = await fetch(`${lease.sdkEnv.ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL}/v1/messages`, {
+      headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${lease.sdkEnv.ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN}` },
+      redirect: "manual",
+    });
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(502);
+    await expect(response.text()).resolves.toBe("provider redirect refused");
+    expect(redirectedRequests).toBe(0);
+    expect(diagnostics).toEqual([{ code: "provider_proxy_redirect_refused", category: "redirect" }]);
+  });
+});
+
+function header(value: string | string[] | undefined): string | undefined {
+  return Array.isArray(value) ? value[0] : value;
+}

hub/test/unit/provider-readiness.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+import { createServer } from "node:http";
+import { once } from "node:events";
+import { afterEach, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
+import { ProviderReadinessError, probeOpenRouterCredential } from "../../src/connections/providerReadiness.js";
+
+const servers: ReturnType<typeof createServer>[] = [];
+
+afterEach(async () => {
+  await Promise.all(servers.splice(0).map(async (server) => {
+    server.closeAllConnections();
+    if (server.listening) {
+      server.close();
+      await once(server, "close");
+    }
+  }));
+});
+
+describe("provider credential readiness", () => {
+  it("authenticates the OpenRouter key endpoint before activation", async () => {
+    const requests: Array<{ url: string | undefined; authorization: string | undefined }> = [];
+    const server = createServer((request, response) => {
+      requests.push({ url: request.url, authorization: request.headers.authorization });
+      response.writeHead(200, { "content-type": "application/json" });
+      response.end('{"data":{"label":"test"}}');
+    });
+    servers.push(server);
+    server.listen(0, "127.0.0.1");
+    await once(server, "listening");
+    const address = server.address();
+    if (address === null || typeof address === "string") throw new Error("expected TCP address");
+
+    await expect(probeOpenRouterCredential({
+      providerId: "openrouter",
+      baseUrl: `http://127.0.0.1:${address.port}/api`,
+      authToken: "readiness-secret",
+      anthropicApiKey: "",
+    })).resolves.toBeUndefined();
+    expect(requests).toEqual([{
+      url: "/api/v1/key",
+      authorization: "Bearer readiness-secret",
+    }]);
+  });
+
+  it("fails closed on rejected credentials without exposing them in the error", async () => {
+    const server = createServer((_request, response) => {
+      response.writeHead(401, { "content-type": "application/json" });
+      response.end('{"error":"token rejected"}');
+    });
+    servers.push(server);
+    server.listen(0, "127.0.0.1");
+    await once(server, "listening");
+    const address = server.address();
+    if (address === null || typeof address === "string") throw new Error("expected TCP address");
+
+    let message = "";
+    try {
+      await probeOpenRouterCredential({
+        providerId: "openrouter",
+        baseUrl: `http://127.0.0.1:${address.port}`,
+        authToken: "never-return-readiness-secret",
+        anthropicApiKey: "",
+      });
+    } catch (error) {
+      message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);
+    }
+    expect(message).toBe("provider credential readiness check failed: status 401");
+    expect(message).not.toContain("never-return-readiness-secret");
+  });
+
+  it("does not follow redirects with the provider credential", async () => {
+    let redirected = 0;
+    const target = createServer((_request, response) => {
+      redirected += 1;
+      response.end("leaked");
+    });
+    servers.push(target);
+    target.listen(0, "127.0.0.1");
+    await once(target, "listening");
+    const targetAddress = target.address();
+    if (targetAddress === null || typeof targetAddress === "string") throw new Error("expected target address");
+    const provider = createServer((_request, response) => {
+      response.writeHead(307, { location: `http://127.0.0.1:${targetAddress.port}/capture` });
+      response.end();
+    });
+    servers.push(provider);
+    provider.listen(0, "127.0.0.1");
+    await once(provider, "listening");
+    const providerAddress = provider.address();
+    if (providerAddress === null || typeof providerAddress === "string") throw new Error("expected provider address");
+
+    await expect(probeOpenRouterCredential({
+      providerId: "openrouter",
+      baseUrl: `http://127.0.0.1:${providerAddress.port}`,
+      authToken: "redirect-secret",
+      anthropicApiKey: "",
+    })).rejects.toThrow("status 307");
+    expect(redirected).toBe(0);
+  });
+
+  it("preserves a redacted network category for observability", async () => {
+    const server = createServer();
+    server.listen(0, "127.0.0.1");
+    await once(server, "listening");
+    const address = server.address();
+    if (address === null || typeof address === "string") throw new Error("expected provider address");
+    server.close();
+    await once(server, "close");
+
+    let failure: unknown;
+    try {
+      await probeOpenRouterCredential({
+        providerId: "openrouter",
+        baseUrl: `http://127.0.0.1:${address.port}`,
+        authToken: "network-secret",
+        anthropicApiKey: "",
+      });
+    } catch (error) {
+      failure = error;
+    }
+    expect(failure).toBeInstanceOf(ProviderReadinessError);
+    expect(failure).toMatchObject({
+      code: "provider_readiness_unreachable",
+      category: "connection",
+      message: "provider credential readiness check could not reach provider",
+    });
+    expect(JSON.stringify(failure)).not.toContain("network-secret");
+  });
+});

hub/test/unit/runner.test.ts

@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ describe("runAgent", () => {
     expect(result.costUsd).toBe(0.0042);
   });
 
-  it("passes only provider and safe runtime env without mutating process env", async () => {
+  it("passes only the loopback provider proxy capability and safe runtime env without mutating process env", async () => {
     process.env["DATABASE_URL"] = "postgresql://platform-secret";
     process.env["FEISHU_APP_SECRET"] = "feishu-secret";
     process.env["HUB_SESSION_SECRET"] = "session-secret";
@@ -205,9 +205,9 @@ describe("runAgent", () => {
       model: undefined,
       project: { projectId: "p", boundChatId: "c", workspaceRoot, workspaceDir: workspace },
       systemPrompt: undefined,
-      providerEnv: {
+      providerProxyEnv: {
-        ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL: "https://openrouter.ai/api",
+        ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL: "http://127.0.0.1:43123",
-        ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN: "test-token",
+        ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN: "run-proxy-capability",
         ANTHROPIC_API_KEY: "",
       },
       runId: "run-1",
@@ -219,8 +219,8 @@ describe("runAgent", () => {
     expect(call).toMatchObject({
       options: {
         env: {
-          ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL: "https://openrouter.ai/api",
+          ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL: "http://127.0.0.1:43123",
-          ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN: "test-token",
+          ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN: "run-proxy-capability",
           ANTHROPIC_API_KEY: "",
         },
         sandbox: {

hub/test/unit/runtime-settings.test.ts

@@ -15,44 +15,16 @@ describe("runtime settings", () => {
     expect((await settings.modelRegistry()).resolve(undefined, "draft")).toBe("z-ai/glm-4.7");
   });
 
-  it("returns provider SDK env without requiring global process env mutation", async () => {
+  it("refuses process-global provider credentials even when they are present", async () => {
     const settings = createEnvRuntimeSettings({
       ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL: "https://example.test/api",
       ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN: "openrouter-token",
       ANTHROPIC_API_KEY: "explicit-api-key",
     });
 
-    await expect(settings.provider("openrouter")).resolves.toMatchObject({
+    await expect(settings.provider("openrouter")).rejects.toThrow(
-      id: "openrouter",
+      "process-global provider credentials are disabled",
-      baseUrl: "https://example.test/api",
+    );
-      authToken: "openrouter-token",
-      anthropicApiKey: "explicit-api-key",
-      sdkEnv: {
-        ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL: "https://example.test/api",
-        ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN: "openrouter-token",
-        ANTHROPIC_API_KEY: "explicit-api-key",
-      },
-    });
-  });
-
-  it("defaults Anthropic API key to empty for OpenRouter's Anthropic skin", async () => {
-    const settings = createEnvRuntimeSettings({
-      ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN: "openrouter-token",
-    });
-
-    await expect(settings.provider("openrouter")).resolves.toMatchObject({
-      baseUrl: "https://openrouter.ai/api",
-      anthropicApiKey: "",
-      sdkEnv: {
-        ANTHROPIC_API_KEY: "",
-      },
-    });
-  });
-
-  it("requires an auth token for the OpenRouter provider", async () => {
-    const settings = createEnvRuntimeSettings({});
-
-    await expect(settings.provider("openrouter")).rejects.toThrow("missing required runtime setting: ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN");
   });
 
   it("honors HUB_AGENT_MAX_TURNS as a runtime run policy", async () => {

hub/test/unit/secret-envelope.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
+import { mkdtemp, rm, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
+import path from "node:path";
+import { afterEach, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
+import {
+  LocalSecretEnvelope,
+  loadLocalSecretKeyring,
+  type SecretBinding,
+} from "../../src/security/secretEnvelope.js";
+
+const createdDirectories: string[] = [];
+
+afterEach(async () => {
+  await Promise.all(createdDirectories.splice(0).map((directory) => rm(directory, { recursive: true, force: true })));
+});
+
+describe("local secret envelope", () => {
+  it("encrypts with a per-secret DEK and authenticates the complete binding", async () => {
+    const keyring = await keyringFile({ active: key("a"), previous: key("b") }, "active");
+    const secrets = new LocalSecretEnvelope(await loadLocalSecretKeyring({
+      NODE_ENV: "test",
+      HUB_SECRET_KEYRING_FILE: keyring,
+    }));
+    const binding = secretBinding();
+    const plaintext = {
+      schemaVersion: 1,
+      baseUrl: "https://provider.example/api",
+      authToken: "org-a-secret-token",
+      anthropicApiKey: "org-a-api-key",
+    };
+
+    const envelope = secrets.encryptJson(binding, plaintext);
+
+    expect(envelope).toMatchObject({
+      version: 1,
+      algorithm: "AES-256-GCM",
+      keyId: "active",
+    });
+    expect(JSON.stringify(envelope)).not.toContain(plaintext.authToken);
+    expect(envelope.wrappedDek.ciphertext).not.toBe(envelope.payload.ciphertext);
+    expect(secrets.decryptJson(binding, envelope)).toEqual(plaintext);
+  });
+
+  it.each([
+    ["organization", { organizationId: "org-b" }],
+    ["connection", { connectionId: "connection-b" }],
+    ["version", { secretVersionId: "secret-version-b" }],
+    ["purpose", { purpose: "feishu-application" }],
+  ])("rejects ciphertext substituted across %s scope", async (_label, changed) => {
+    const keyring = await keyringFile({ active: key("a") }, "active");
+    const secrets = new LocalSecretEnvelope(await loadLocalSecretKeyring({
+      NODE_ENV: "test",
+      HUB_SECRET_KEYRING_FILE: keyring,
+    }));
+    const binding = secretBinding();
+    const envelope = secrets.encryptJson(binding, { token: "never-log-this-token" });
+
+    expect(() => secrets.decryptJson({ ...binding, ...changed }, envelope)).toThrow(
+      "secret envelope authentication failed",
+    );
+  });
+
+  it("fails closed for a missing KEK or corrupted ciphertext without including plaintext", async () => {
+    const encryptingKeyring = await keyringFile({ encrypting: key("a") }, "encrypting");
+    const decryptingKeyring = await keyringFile({ other: key("b") }, "other");
+    const encrypting = new LocalSecretEnvelope(await loadLocalSecretKeyring({
+      NODE_ENV: "test",
+      HUB_SECRET_KEYRING_FILE: encryptingKeyring,
+    }));
+    const decrypting = new LocalSecretEnvelope(await loadLocalSecretKeyring({
+      NODE_ENV: "test",
+      HUB_SECRET_KEYRING_FILE: decryptingKeyring,
+    }));
+    const binding = secretBinding();
+    const envelope = encrypting.encryptJson(binding, { token: "never-log-this-token" });
+
+    expect(() => decrypting.decryptJson(binding, envelope)).toThrow("secret envelope key is unavailable");
+
+    const corrupted = structuredClone(envelope);
+    corrupted.payload.ciphertext = flipFirstByte(corrupted.payload.ciphertext);
+    let message = "";
+    try {
+      encrypting.decryptJson(binding, corrupted);
+    } catch (error) {
+      message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);
+    }
+    expect(message).toBe("secret envelope authentication failed");
+    expect(message).not.toContain("never-log-this-token");
+  });
+
+  it("rewraps only the DEK when the active KEK rotates", async () => {
+    const firstFile = await keyringFile({ old: key("a") }, "old");
+    const rotatedFile = await keyringFile({ old: key("a"), current: key("c") }, "current");
+    const first = new LocalSecretEnvelope(await loadLocalSecretKeyring({
+      NODE_ENV: "test",
+      HUB_SECRET_KEYRING_FILE: firstFile,
+    }));
+    const rotated = new LocalSecretEnvelope(await loadLocalSecretKeyring({
+      NODE_ENV: "test",
+      HUB_SECRET_KEYRING_FILE: rotatedFile,
+    }));
+    const binding = secretBinding();
+    const envelope = first.encryptJson(binding, { token: "rotatable" });
+
+    const rewrapped = rotated.rewrap(binding, envelope);
+
+    expect(rewrapped.keyId).toBe("current");
+    expect(rewrapped.payload).toEqual(envelope.payload);
+    expect(rewrapped.wrappedDek).not.toEqual(envelope.wrappedDek);
+    expect(rotated.decryptJson(binding, rewrapped)).toEqual({ token: "rotatable" });
+  });
+
+  it("loads production keys only from the fixed systemd credential", async () => {
+    const credentialsDirectory = await temporaryDirectory();
+    await writeKeyring(path.join(credentialsDirectory, "cph-secret-keyring"), { active: key("a") }, "active");
+
+    await expect(loadLocalSecretKeyring({
+      NODE_ENV: "production",
+      CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY: credentialsDirectory,
+    })).resolves.toMatchObject({ activeKeyId: "active" });
+
+    await expect(loadLocalSecretKeyring({
+      NODE_ENV: "production",
+      CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY: credentialsDirectory,
+      HUB_SECRET_KEYRING_FILE: "/tmp/untrusted-keyring.json",
+    })).rejects.toThrow("production secret keyring must use the systemd credential");
+  });
+
+  it("rejects absent, malformed, or incomplete keyrings", async () => {
+    await expect(loadLocalSecretKeyring({ NODE_ENV: "test" })).rejects.toThrow(
+      "missing required secret keyring setting",
+    );
+
+    const directory = await temporaryDirectory();
+    const malformed = path.join(directory, "malformed.json");
+    await writeFile(malformed, "not json", "utf8");
+    await expect(loadLocalSecretKeyring({
+      NODE_ENV: "test",
+      HUB_SECRET_KEYRING_FILE: malformed,
+    })).rejects.toThrow("invalid local secret keyring");
+
+    const missingActive = await keyringFile({ old: key("a") }, "current");
+    await expect(loadLocalSecretKeyring({
+      NODE_ENV: "test",
+      HUB_SECRET_KEYRING_FILE: missingActive,
+    })).rejects.toThrow("active key is unavailable");
+  });
+});
+
+function secretBinding(): SecretBinding {
+  return {
+    purpose: "provider-connection",
+    organizationId: "org-a",
+    connectionId: "connection-a",
+    secretVersionId: "secret-version-a",
+  };
+}
+
+function key(character: string): string {
+  return Buffer.alloc(32, character).toString("base64");
+}
+
+async function keyringFile(keys: Readonly<Record<string, string>>, activeKeyId: string): Promise<string> {
+  const directory = await temporaryDirectory();
+  const file = path.join(directory, "keyring.json");
+  await writeKeyring(file, keys, activeKeyId);
+  return file;
+}
+
+async function temporaryDirectory(): Promise<string> {
+  const directory = await mkdtemp(path.join(tmpdir(), "cph-secret-envelope-"));
+  createdDirectories.push(directory);
+  return directory;
+}
+
+async function writeKeyring(
+  file: string,
+  keys: Readonly<Record<string, string>>,
+  activeKeyId: string,
+): Promise<void> {
+  await writeFile(file, JSON.stringify({ version: 1, activeKeyId, keys }), { encoding: "utf8", mode: 0o600 });
+}
+
+function flipFirstByte(value: string): string {
+  const bytes = Buffer.from(value, "base64");
+  bytes[0] = (bytes[0] ?? 0) ^ 1;
+  return bytes.toString("base64");
+}

spec/Spec/System.lean

@@ -18,7 +18,8 @@ import Spec.System.Audit
 **语义分歧点**:
 
 - `ProjectGroup` —— project↔飞书群 1:1 长生命周期绑定(ADR-0001);群是协作空间,不持锁。
-- `Organization` —— SaaS tenant root(ADR-0020);project/team 单归属,TEAM grant 不跨 org。
+- `Organization` —— SaaS tenant root(ADR-0020);project/team 单归属,TEAM grant 不跨 org;
+  connection secret 使用本地主密钥信封与 fail-closed resolver(ADR-0024)。
 - `ProjectWorkspace` —— org 后台 project explorer:folder 是透明组织节点,project 仍是权限边界
   (ADR-0021)。
 - `Capacity` —— platform ceiling 与 org policy 的分层限制、持久 admission request 状态和
@@ -36,5 +37,5 @@ import Spec.System.Audit
 - `Audit` —— customer Project/Run 审计有意从简(内容多为 plumbing,OPEN);Platform
   Audit 由 `PlatformAdministration` 独立钉死。
 
-标识符见 `Spec.Prelude`。决策出处:ADR-0001..0004, 0018, 0020..0023。
+标识符见 `Spec.Prelude`。决策出处:ADR-0001..0004, 0018, 0020..0024。
 -/

spec/Spec/System/Organization.lean

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 import Spec.Prelude
 
 /-!
-# Organization —— SaaS tenant root (ADR-0020)
+# Organization —— SaaS tenant root (ADR-0020, ADR-0024)
 
 ADR-0020:Hub 长期按 SaaS 形态演进,`Organization` 是客户侧 tenant root。
 `Project` 与 `Team` 都必须归属且只归属一个 organization;team 对 project 的授权
@@ -11,7 +11,8 @@ ADR-0020:Hub 长期按 SaaS 形态演进,`Organization` 是客户侧 tenant root
 本模块只钉死会造成实现分歧的不变量:tenant root 存在、project/team 单归属、team grant
 不得跨 org,以及 model provider connection 的凭据归属模式。用户身份、外部目录
 provider 细节仍为 `OPEN`;平台控制面身份/角色/审计已由 ADR-0023 与
-`Spec.System.PlatformAdministration` 独立决定。
+`Spec.System.PlatformAdministration` 独立决定。连接凭据的本地主密钥信封、不可变版本、
+writer authority 与 fail-closed resolver 由 ADR-0024 固定。
 -/
 
 namespace Spec.System
@@ -57,13 +58,50 @@ inductive ProviderCredentialMode where
   | byok
   | platformManaged
 
-/-- Organization 的 model provider connection(`PINNED`, ADR-0021):connection 必须
+/-- Organization 的 model provider connection(`PINNED`, ADR-0021, ADR-0024):connection
-归属一个且仅一个 organization,并明确采用哪一种凭据模式。key/base URL 的加密表示、
+必须归属一个且仅一个 organization,并明确采用哪一种凭据模式。凭据存为由本地版本化
-轮换与 resolver 机制由后续 secret-control-plane 决策规定。 -/
+master-key keyring 包裹的不可变信封版本;业务代码只能通过显式 organization/project
+作用域的 fail-closed resolver 获得短生命周期明文,不得回退到 process-global key;Agent
+执行环境只获得 run-scoped 本地 proxy capability,不得获得 org provider 明文。 -/
 structure OrganizationProviderConnection where
   /-- connection 所属 organization(`PINNED`, ADR-0021)。 -/
   organization : I.OrganizationId
   /-- connection 的凭据归属模式(`PINNED`, ADR-0021)。 -/
   mode : ProviderCredentialMode
 
+/-- Organization connection 的运行态(`PINNED`, ADR-0024):只有 `active` connection
+可被 resolver 使用;`draft` 与 `disabled` 都必须 fail closed。 -/
+inductive OrganizationConnectionStatus where
+  | draft
+  | active
+  | disabled
+
+/-- Organization secret version 的信封绑定上下文(`PINNED`, ADR-0024):认证附加数据必须
+同时绑定 organization、connection、secret version 与 purpose,因此密文不能跨行、跨 org、
+跨 connection 或跨用途替换。各标识符的数据库表示属于 plumbing,这里保持 opaque。 -/
+structure OrganizationSecretBinding
+    (OrganizationId ConnectionId SecretVersionId Purpose : Type) where
+  /-- secret 所属 organization(`PINNED`, ADR-0024)。 -/
+  organization : OrganizationId
+  /-- secret 所属稳定 connection(`PINNED`, ADR-0024)。 -/
+  connection : ConnectionId
+  /-- 不可变 secret version(`PINNED`, ADR-0024)。 -/
+  secretVersion : SecretVersionId
+  /-- payload 的连接类型/用途(`PINNED`, ADR-0024)。 -/
+  purpose : Purpose
+
+/-- 生产 secret resolver 的使用条件(`PINNED`, ADR-0024):connection 与 active secret
+必须属于请求解析出的同一 active organization,connection 必须 active,且信封必须能用其
+记录的本地 KEK 完整认证并解密。缺失/错误 key、损坏密文和任何 scope 不一致都返回失败;
+不得尝试全局环境变量凭据;Agent child 也不得接收该明文。`authenticatedEnvelope` 是
+密码学实现提供的判定。 -/
+def OrganizationSecretResolvable
+    {OrganizationId ConnectionId SecretVersionId Purpose : Type}
+    [BEq OrganizationId]
+    (requestedOrganization : OrganizationId)
+    (binding : OrganizationSecretBinding OrganizationId ConnectionId SecretVersionId Purpose)
+    (organizationActive connectionActive authenticatedEnvelope : Bool) : Bool :=
+  organizationActive && connectionActive &&
+    (binding.organization == requestedOrganization) && authenticatedEnvelope
+
 end Spec.System